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INTRODUCTION 
t • AHE following pages are based on observations made 
I; on two journeys in the Baltic area, the first in 
JL Finland and the Baltic States during the summer 
of 192 , and the second in Germany, Poland, and Danzig 
during the winter of 1928-9. As this particular area 
contains several dangerous situations which will in the 
future play an important part in the destinies of Europe, 
I have tried to explain them in some detail and to show 
their significance in the maze of European politics. 
In this book I make a plea for less talk, less pens, ink 
and paper, and more reality in dealing with international 
questions ; and I do so because I believe that the Great 
War has left many of us in a realm of fanciful dreams, 
building castles in the air and feasting our eyes on idealistic 
conceptions which are unlikely ever to take permanent con­
crete form. After the greatest war in history it is in the 
nature of things that this should be so, but we must re­
orient our minds and let true facts be our only guide. Our 
generation bears a great responsibility towards those who 
come after us, and it is our duty to mankind to make every 
effort to dispel the confused mirages that dazzle our outlook 
upon post-war Europe, and to look into the future with a 
penetrating objectivity based on the grim tragedies of the 
past and hard realities of the present. 
The future will demand that many of our ideals of the 
last ten years be jettisoned and that many of our most 
cherished hopes be shattered. Many of us are doomed to 
bitter disappointment and disillusionment. But perhaps 
this may prove to be our salvation. The future peace of 
Europe depends, not on the theories of philosophizing pro­
fessors, nor on the countless resolutions of pacifist societies, 
but on the constant and determined endeavour of our 
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statesmen, diplomatists, and men of affairs to see things 
as they really are, to see human nature as it really is, and 
to mould their policies in accordance with hard facts, stern 
probabilities, and the principle that modern war is fatal to 
every moral and material interest of the nations that take 
part in it. 
It is a profound mistake to imagine that what is termed 
' the new diplomacy' is any different from that of former 
times. Diplomacy may change its outward appearance by 
adopting a new outer casing for its machinery, but the 
fundamental principles remain the same—every nation for 
itself, policies based on national interests, and concessions 
only regarded as objects of legitimate exchange. If we 
delude ourselves into thinking that the nations of Europe 
can be influenced to settle their differences against their 
respective material interests, we are building up a rotten 
foundation of peace which will bring about the collapse of 
all that is built thereon. Peace cannot be assured until it 
is based on purely practical policies, until it is in the material 
interests of the respective nations to maintain it, and until 
the interests of Europe as a whole become the chief concern 
of the nations that form its component parts. Peace on 
these lines will take a long time to establish, but it will be 
worth while to concentrate our efforts on building with sound 
material. 
For detailed information with regard to Treaties and 
fundamental questions of fact, I have drawn upon these 
excellent works, The History of the Peace Conference of Paris 
and the Survey of International Affairs, issued by the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, by whose courtesy 
I am able to reproduce a map of the Baltic area. I am also 
indebted to The Times for permission to use certain of their 
maps. 
In the spelling of place-names, where there are usually 
two and sometimes three different spellings, it is difficult 
to be consistent throughout. The spellings now adopted in 
the countries concerned usually differ from those found on 
most maps, and are little known to the world in general; 
yet it is only right that these new spellings should be recog­
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nized as soon as possible. I have, therefore, adopted the 
following compromise : while in general questions of inter­
national and historic interest I have adopted the spellings 
most widely known, in the chapters dealing with certain 
countries in particular I have used those favoured by the 
Government concerned, and I have added foot-notes where 
there is likely to be confusion. 
My thanks are due to a large number of diplomatists and 
others, in London and in the various countries which I have 
visited, who have assisted me in the collection of material 
and have been kind enough to grant me the necessary 
facilities for accomplishing my task. I am also deeply 
grateful to my wife for her most valuable help during all 
stages of the work in England and abroad. 
WARSAW, 1929 
E. W. POLSON NEWMAN 
Major 
CONTENTS 
PAGE 
I N T R O D U C T I O N  . . . . . . .  vii 
CHAP. 
I  THE BALTIC : YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY I 
II THE NEW FINLAND . . . . . .27 
III ESTONIA AS A SOVEREIGN STATE .... 58 
IV LATVIA : THE KEY OF THE BALTIC STATES . . 76 
V LITHUANIA AND HER TROUBLES . . . .102 
VI POLAND AND VILNA . . . . . .123 
VII THE NEW POLISH REPUBLIC ..... 147 
VIII THE POLISH CORRIDOR AND DANZIG . . .183 
I X  P O W E R S  A N D  P O L I C I E S  .  .  .  .  .  . 2 1 7  
X GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY .... 235 
A P P E N D I X  . . . . . . . .  2 5 3  
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  . . . . . . .  2 6 7  
I N D E X  . . . . . . . . .  2 6 9  
xi 
LIST OF MAPS 
PAGE 
FINLAND'S OUTLET TO THE ARCTIC 1 . . . . .29 
VILNA AREA 1 ........ 123 
P O L A N D  . . . . . . . . . .  1 5 1  
THE POLISH CORRIDOR 1 . . . . . . . 184 
THE BALTIC ...... Facing page 268 
(Reproduced, from the Survey of International Affairs, 1920-3, by courtesy of the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs.) 
1 These three maps are reproduced by courtesy of " The Times." 
XH 
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CHAPTER I 
THE BALTIC: YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY 
THE Baltic is usually associated with the Midnight Sun, with eternal daylight, with sharp, invigorating air, and with the healthy smell of pine forests. 
To those who inhabit more southern lands it is regarded 
as an ideal place for summer rest and recreation. The 
Norwegian fiords, the forty thousand lakes of Finland, 
the old Hanseatic cities, and the more modern capitals 
attract travellers from all parts of the world, who return 
home laden with reindeer horns, hunting-knives, and block 
amber. To them there is a strange romance about the 
Baltic. Visions of the hardy Vikings who roamed the seas 
before William the Conqueror set foot in England, of the 
Danes who figure so prominently in the early pages of 
English history, and of the victorious armies of Gustavus 
Adolphus, make it impossible to forget that throughout 
history the Baltic countries have played a prominent part 
in the destinies of Europe, and of these islands in which we 
live. Petrograd stands as a monument to the efforts of 
Peter the Great to introduce into Russia the civilization 
of Western Europe ; Helsinki,1 guarded by the ancient 
fortress of Sveaborg, recalls the bitter struggles of centuries 
between Sweden and Russia ; Tallin 2 and Riga stand for 
the power and prestige of the German Order of Teutonic 
Knights ; and Stockholm is one of the most beautiful cities 
in the world. Scarcely less imposing is Copenhagen, while 
1 Helsingfors in Swedish. 
2 Formerly known as Reval. 
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Konigsberg and Danzig carry the mind back to the days 
of mediaeval commerce, when the Hanseatic League carried 
their trade into foreign lands under the banner of the Cross 
and the Sword. British trade with the Baltic ports has 
been of importance since the earliest times, and a visit to 
the docks of Newcastle or Hull is sufficient to show that 
it is still of importance to-day. As time passes, the Baltic 
countries are all, with the exception of Russia, looking 
more and more towards Great Britain ; for they believe 
that in this direction lie their chief interests. Politically, 
economically and strategically, they believe that the British 
nation is the surest and safest friend in case of need. British 
policy, dictated by common sense, appeals to these northern 
peoples much more than it does to the more logical nations 
of the south ; London is regarded as a financial rock little 
affected by the world's economic upheavals ; and the power 
and efficiency of the British Navy is an object of the highest 
respect by these seafaring peoples. Each year our ships 
of war make a ciuise through the waters of the Baltic, and 
there are few sights that give more satisfaction in the 
northern capitals than that of the white ensign fluttering 
in the breeze. The sight of a British battleship or cruiser 
gives the people a certain feeling of security. They find it 
difficult to imagine that Great Britain will not stand by 
them in case of need, and they hope that in time some 
assurance will be forthcoming. They know that British 
interests in the Baltic are considerable, but fear that the 
English people are too wrapped up in their own imperial 
affairs to show much concern in what happens north of the 
Kiel Canal. Yet they keep on hoping that one day Great 
Britain will awaken to her northern responsibilities, and 
that she will then respond to the silent appeal of those smaller 
states which have no sheet-anchor other than the League 
of Nations. 
Apart from the contrast between the Slavonic and non-
Slavonic races, there is no great racial clash on the shores 
of the Baltic. The Swedes and the Danes belong to the same 
Teutonic race as the Anglo-Saxons. On the other hand, the 
Finns, to whom the Estonians are closely allied, belong to 
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the Finno-Ugrian race which came originally from the banks 
of the Volga ; the Latvians are of Aryan descent and Indo-
European origin; and the Lithuanians have from the 
earliest times inhabited the shores of the Baltic between 
the Dvina and the Vistula. But if there is no great clash 
of races, there is a muddle of languages which more than 
makes up for it. The Baltic is a perfect babel of strange 
tongues, few of which are intelligible to the ordinary Euro­
pean. While Sweden, Norway and Denmark have under­
gone little change since pre-war days, the countries on 
the east of the Baltic have passed through a period of 
linguistic revolution, and Finland in the north and Poland 
in the south have been faced with new problems calling 
for a re-orientation of their linguistic conditions. In 
countries where formerly German and Russian were the 
languages of commerce newly revived languages are 
strongly encouraged at the expense of the more practical 
means of conversation, with the result that the stranger 
is completely bewildered by the confusion of tongues 
with which he is surrounded. And what is more, these 
peoples are very susceptible. No Finn will talk Russian 
if he can help it, and there are exceedingly few Finns 
who have a knowledge of the Russian language; few 
Estonians care to speak German ; and very few of either 
race can speak French. But there is now a great liking 
for English, specially in Finland and Estonia, and the 
tendency is to substitute English for German in the 
state schools. Poland, the new arrival as a state on the 
Baltic shores, is a babel of tongues unto herself. Polish, 
Russian, German, French, Ruthenian, Lithuanian, Czech, 
and Yiddish are all spoken in the new Poland, restored from 
the territory of the former German, Russian, and Austro-
Hungarian Empires; and, although nominally French is 
recognized as the second language of the country, the fact 
remains that Polish is the only tongue that is readily under­
stood in the course of ordinary travel. But if these lands 
of strange tongues have complicated the progress of the 
traveller, they have contributed more than their share to 
education and learning. The universities maintain a high 
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standard, higher than exists in most other countries, and 
a doctor's degree obtained at Upsala, Tartu,1 Helsinki, or 
Riga represents more than an equivalent degree in most 
of the better known seats of learning farther south. 
In the matter of religion the honours are divided between 
the Lutheran, Greek Orthodox and Roman Churches. 
While Poland and Lithuania are Roman strongholds, the 
Lutheran cult practically has the monopoly in Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark, and has a strong following in Estonia 
and a part of Latvia. The Greek Orthodox faith, which 
was the national church of Imperial Russia, is nowhere 
predominant, but exists as a minority in many of the Baltic 
countries, where the gilded domes of its church buildings 
are still conspicuous to the obvious annoyance of the local 
inhabitants. In modern times Rome has made little head­
way in the North, and in the countries where she has the 
smallest foothold there is a little prospect of her being able 
to advance her position. In material progress the Scandi­
navian countries and Finland have come to the fore in 
many departments of human activity; and it is only 
natural that the new states bordering on Russia should be 
unable to show the same progress as their neighbours. 
But the Baltic has undergone a great transformation since 
the Great War, and it is reasonable to suppose that the next 
ten years will see changes no less remarkable than those 
of the last decade. 
In looking at the Baltic to-day it would be a great mistake 
to forget the Baltic of yesterday, and to fail to realize that 
Sweden has undergone no material change for centuries 
and is the country of the greatest stability in the whole 
Baltic region. With her ancient traditions, her advanced 
culture, and her dignified prestige, Sweden stands to-day 
for all that is best in human civilization. Her past history 
shows her valuable contribution to the evolution of modern 
Europe, and her stable policy of peace makes her a bulwark 
of strength in an atmosphere of political uncertainty. As 
it is difficult to understand the situations that have deve­
loped in the Baltic without some knowledge of a country 
1 Formerly Dorpat. 
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which has played so significant a role in peace and in war, 
I propose to give some account of Swedish achievements 
during the time of her greatest activity. 
The sixteenth century was the age of Sweden's re-birth, 
and the line of the Vasas, which then ascended the throne, 
was one of the most celebrated and gifted families known 
to history. The name of Gustavus Vasa stands out pro­
minently amongst the great rulers of the world, and his 
services to Sweden marked a turning-point in the evolution 
of the nation. He rallied a half-annihilated people ; he 
freed Sweden from her political dependence on Denmark, 
her economic dependence on the Hanseatic cities, and her 
ecclesiastical dependence on the Papal powers. The traces 
of nearly a century of warfare were obliterated by a newly 
awakened and peaceful industry; and this Scandinavian 
people became for the first time in history a distinguished 
member of the state system of Europe. Thanks to his 
personality, Gustavus Vasa won the undisguised reverence 
and love of his people. In spite of a certain vehemence of 
temperament and an excessive patriarchal omnipotence, 
' Good old King Gosta ' was regarded as an ideal monarch 
both by his contemporaries and by posterity ; and, although 
his name is less familiar to foreigners than those of his 
successors Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII, it has by 
no means been overshadowed by them in the memory of 
the Swedish nation. 
In 1544 Gustavus succeeded in making the kingdom of 
Sweden hereditary in his family, and a hereditary kingdom 
at that time conferred the right to a share in that kingdom 
upon the younger sons of the royal house. This gave rise 
to internal feuds among the descendants of Gustavus Vasa, 
and it took the wisdom of Charles IX, another ruler of the 
first rank, to restore stability. For several years before his 
accession to the throne Charles was the virtual ruler of 
Sweden, and it was he who brought about the definite 
victory of the Reformation over Roman Catholicism ; while 
under his son, Gustavus Adolphus, the division of the 
kingdom among the royal princes was discontinued, and a 
new principle, laying down the individuality of the state, 
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removed one of the strongest possible barriers to any form 
of national union. 
Immediately after the middle of the sixteenth century, 
Sweden embarked upon the acquisition of territory on the 
other side of the Baltic. As a consequence of the Reforma­
tion the states east of the Baltic, which had been established 
on a Catholic foundation, fell to pieces ; and from the year 
1561 the adjoining countries began to contend with one 
another for the prize. Sweden could not permit this terri­
tory to fall into the hands of Russia, nor of Poland, which 
was under the sway of Roman Catholicism, nor of Denmark, 
whose aspirations lay in the restoration of the Scandinavian 
Union from which Sweden had but recently broken away. 
Hence, chiefly out of consideration for her own safety, the 
Swedes were compelled to seize as large a share as 
possible, which led to the great conflict for the mastery 
of the Baltic, and carried Sweden both to the summit 
of her greatness and to the brink of destruction. The 
mastery of the Baltic was considered to be a necessity 
for Sweden at a time when trade routes led more often over 
sea than land, and when it was much easier to travel from 
Stockholm to Riga than from the Swedish capital to the 
provinces of Smaland or Vastergotland. But the more im­
mediate consequences of all these new complications did not 
develop till the next epoch of Swedish history—the period 
that begins with the accession of Gustavus Adolphus to the 
throne and ends with the death of Charles XII. Compared 
with the stirring period of the Union, the sixteenth century 
did not bring to light many great personages outside the 
reigning house, and advance on the cultural side was not 
so considerable as on the political and economic sides. It 
was not until the following century that the great work 
of the period in the spiritual world, the reformation of the 
Church, was realized in its true significance. 
In order not to break the thread of Swedish history, it 
is usual to regard the beginning of the period of Sweden's 
political greatness from the accession of Gustavus Adolphus 
in 1611, although it ought more correctly to be dated from 
his appearance on the theatre of the great European war 
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in 1630. During the seventeenth century, which played 
so important a part in the whole history of Europe, the rulers 
of Sweden were Charles IX ; Gustavus II Adolphus ; Axel 
Oxenstierna, the head of the regency during the minority 
of Queen Christina ; Christina as a ruling sovereign ; Charles 
X Gustavus ; the regency during the minority of Charles XI; 
Charles XI as a ruling sovereign ; and Charles XII. The 
history of the world cannot often show such a series of 
great personalities as successive leaders of the destinies of 
a single nation. It is only the second regency that gives 
an impression of insignificance, and the period of its rule 
marks a noticeable weakness in an otherwise brilliant picture. 
The personality and fate of Gustavus Adolphus and the 
story of Sweden during his reign belong to world history, 
and they are more generally and better known than are the 
events of any other period of Swedish history. His appear­
ance on the scene of the Thirty Years War was as much 
a measure of self-defence on the part of the Swedish nation 
against the far-reaching plans of Wallenstein and the Roman 
Catholic princes who were trying to obtain the mastery of 
the Baltic and its shores, as it was a magnanimous assistance 
rendered to the German co-religionists of the Swedish people. 
The victory of Breitenfeld at once raised Sweden to the 
position of a Great Power. Although her newly won position 
was subsequently threatened by the death of the king on 
the field of Liitzen, it was saved by the political genius of 
Axel Oxenstierna and the military exploits of the Swedish 
generals which, even during the latter phases of the war, 
assured for Sweden a more important position than is 
acknowledged in some quarters. At the close of hostilities 
Sweden was master of the mouths of all the German rivers 
and of the greater part of the shores of the Baltic ; and, 
almost at the same time as these events, she succeeded in 
acquiring the provinces of Sweden proper,1 which had 
hitherto belonged to Denmark or Norway. The acquisition 
of these provinces, which increased the Swedish population 
by about one-third and gave the country its present natural 
1 Skane, Halland, Blekinge, Gottland, Bohuslan, Harjedalen, 
and Jamtland. 
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boundaries, was a gain of the greatest political importance. 
Moreover, of all the lands won in her period of political 
greatness these are the only provinces that Sweden still has 
in her possession. 
In 1658 the Swedish power had reached its culminating 
point. Even after some territory had been given up a 
few years later, Swedish dominion embraced the whole of 
Sweden and Finland, as well as Estonia, Livonia, a part 
of Ingria, Hither Pomerania, Wismar, Bremen, and Verden, 
making a- total of about half a million square miles. Yet 
the Swedish Empire was rather a geographical expression 
than a state with natural and national boundaries. Modern 
Sweden is bounded by the Baltic ; but during the seven­
teenth century the Baltic was merely the bond between her 
various widely dispersed dominions. Stockholm, the 
capital, lay in the very centre of the empire, while the 
second city, Riga, was situated on the other side of the 
sea, and this vast empire contained but half the population 
of modern Sweden. These extensive wars and the newly 
acquired position of a Great Power had a considerable 
reaction upon the internal conditions of the country. In­
creased relationships with foreign peoples exerted a strong 
influence on Swedish intellectual culture, which was pro­
moted to a high degree and fostered by the enlightened 
monarch Gustavus Adolphus, by Axel Oxenstierna, and by 
Charles XI. But Sweden's prestige as a military Power 
was purchased at the price of heavy economic sacrifices, 
and it was with the greatest difficulty that the common 
people could bear the heavy burden of taxation and the 
continual demands of the military levies. The nobles 
enriched themselves by means of the war, and increased 
their power as well as their material wealth. Imposing 
castles, filled with foreign loot, sprang up in all parts of 
the country, and the fiefs which the nobles received as 
payment for their services in the war made them masters 
of an ever-increasing share of the land. Indeed, things 
came to such a pass that Charles XI introduced a measure 
whereby the estates of the nobles obtained in this way 
reverted to the Crown; and this economic revolution 
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completely broke the power of the nobility and practically 
transformed its members into a nobility of state officials. At 
this time sweeping changes were also made in the form of 
government. Gustavus Adolphus prepared, and Axel Oxen­
stierna carried out, the reform of the administration which 
ensured national unity. The monarchy was supported by 
a powerful council, composed of the chief representatives 
of the highest noble families, thereby creating a well-
organized ruling body based on a corporate system. The 
balance of power within the state was for some time dis­
turbed owing to the great wealth of the nobles and the 
increased influence acquired by the council during the long 
regencies ; but royal power had everywhere emerged from 
the Thirty Years War with increased strength, and it was 
impossible that Sweden should remain untouched by this 
movement in favour of royal absolutism. The great de­
pression which followed the wars undertaken by the feeble 
regency during the youth of Charles XI aroused much 
ill-will against the Council and the nobility ; and the forcible 
measures found necessary for the salvation of the country 
could not be carried out without a royal autocracy, which 
in these circumstances almost assumed the character of 
a Roman dictatorship. Indeed, about 1680, absolutism 
was embodied in the constitution under Charles XI, but it 
did not involve the abolition of the Riksdag, although that 
body was never once summoned even by the succeeding 
monarch. 
The position in the political system of Europe attained 
by Sweden was of the greatest importance in the history of 
her cultural development ; but, as this position was out of 
all proportion to the size and material resources of the 
nation, it was only natural that it should be of brief duration. 
The downfall occurred during the reign of Charles XII, as 
a result of what is usually known as the Great Northern 
War (1700-21). The great military efforts of this monarch, 
which in the end were directed against the whole of Northern 
and Eastern Europe, gained for himself and for Sweden the 
general admiration of the civilized world ; and the devotion 
of the Swedish people to their leader was remarkable in 
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adversity as well as in success, in spite of the almost super­
human demands made upon them. The struggles and 
sufferings of Sweden and Finland during this period are, 
indeed, among the most stirring incidents in history, although 
there was never much doubt as to the final issue of a conflict 
with such superior forces. By the peace treaties that 
followed Sweden lost her possessions in the eastern and 
southern Baltic, with the exception of the most northerly 
part of Hither Pomerania and the town of Wismar ; and 
the south-east part of Finland also had to be given up. 
Sweden had then ruled in Estonia for about a century and 
a half, in Livonia about a century, and about sixty-five 
years in Southern Pomerania. Although these periods are 
short in the history of nations, Swedish rule left its traces 
and was remembered with gratitude by the lower classes 
of the population, which at that time suffered so much 
from oppression at the hands of others. The well-ordered 
Swedish administration was taken as a model by Prussia 
and Russia, who succeeded as the possessors of these Baltic 
countries ; and the nobility of Livonia was chiefly indebted 
to the political education they received from the Swedes 
for the influential position which they afterwards attained 
in the history of Russia throughout the whole of the 
eighteenth century. 
The death of Charles XII in 1718 was the occasion of 
a fundamental change in the form of the Swedish Govern­
ment. The unrest caused by the misuse of royal autocracy 
during the period of the Great Northern War was so general 
and deep-rooted that Sweden lost no time in rushing to 
the other extreme, and became subject to a Riksdag possess­
ing power not only over the legislative but also over a great 
part of the executive. The Riksdag still consisted, as it 
had done for many hundred years previously, of four Estates 
—the Nobility, Clergy, Burghers, and Peasantry. Of these 
the Nobility, especially the numerous class of the lesser 
nobility, now acquired the greatest influence ; and gradually 
the greater part of the power of the Riksdag came into the 
hands of a Committee, on which only the first three Estates 
were represented. Indeed, the royal power became a mere 
THE BALTIC: YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY 11 
shadow, and for half a century Sweden was virtually a 
republic ruled by an oligarchy. This was a peculiar pheno­
menon at a time when royal absolutism held sway in all 
the states of continental Europe. There is no doubt that 
the Government of Sweden, during this so-called ' period 
of liberty ', suffered from serious defects, of which the most 
sinister was the general corruption that prevailed towards 
the close of this period, recalling the state of affairs which 
had existed a little earlier in England under the government 
of Walpole; and this was specially dangerous in Sweden, 
as it was to a large extent due to the activities of foreign 
Powers for the promotion of their own interests. Yet it 
was here that Sweden had the opportunity of learning her 
earliest lessons in constitutional government, and in this 
she preceded all other European nations with the exception 
of Great Britain. Indeed, if the Swedish form of govern­
ment has now attained a high degree of constitutional 
maturity, this is due in no small degree to the experience 
gained during these early days of danger and difficulty. 
If this period of the predominance of the Riksdag was 
significant for the important progress made in political 
development, it was equally remarkable for a revival in 
economic and scientific directions; and Sweden, deprived 
of her former influence on the military and political destinies 
of Europe, flung herself with youthful enthusiasm into the 
progressive pursuits of peace. The name of Linnaeus, the 
botanist, outshines all others, but Sweden at that time 
also produced chemists, such as Scheele and Bergman ; 
physicists, such as Celsius ; and general scientists, such as 
Swedenborg, who in most departments of knowledge was 
far ahead of his time. While Alstromer was busy laying 
the foundations of Swedish industrialism, Dalin was engaged 
in introducing modern Swedish as a literary language. But 
further political changes were forthcoming; for in 1772 
Gustavus III abolished by a coup d'etat the form of govern­
ment already described, and introduced a constitution, in 
which the royal power was considerably extended without 
going to the length of absolute autocracy. The country 
was tired of party strife and attached itself with confidence 
12 BRITAIN AND THE BALTIC 
to the king, who had imbibed the doctrines of the age 
respecting enlightened despotism, and governed well for 
some time in accordance with the spirit of those doctrines. 
But he soon involved the country in difficulties, owing to 
his lack of ability in financial matters, and he knew no 
other means of meeting growing opposition than a war 
with Russia, which certainly strengthened Sweden's position 
vis-a-vis this powerful neighbour. But, in order to break 
down the opposition of the irritated nobility Gustavus had 
to resort to another coup d'etat in 1789, when he nearly 
re-established the autocratic form of government, a legacy 
which was inherited by his son Gustavus IV Adolphus, 
one of the most ill-fated sovereigns who ever had the guidance 
of Swedish destinies in his hands. His fanatical hatred of 
Napoleon, whom he believed himself called upon to over­
throw, caused the great French leader to incite Russia 
against Sweden; and the war of 1808-9 brought about 
the loss of Finland, a country which had so long faithfully 
shared the fortunes of Sweden and had thereby gained a 
share of the culture of Western Europe. As result of this 
disastrous campaign, it became necessary to depose the 
king by means of a military revolution, in order to save 
the kingdom from ruin; and the new constitution then 
drawn up by the Riksdag has remained in force to this day. 
The Constitution of 1809 has given Sweden over a hundred 
years of internal and external peace, with great material 
and intellectual development under the protection of a 
constitutional form of government. With the first years 
came notable events in the sphere of foreign politics. 
Sweden participated in the war of liberation against Napo­
leon (1813) and, thanks to the personal qualities of Charles 
John, the heir-apparent, played a very important part. 
Then in the following year came the union with Norway. 
While helping in the struggle against Napoleon, Sweden 
had obtained the promise of a union with Norway in com­
pensation for the loss of Finland; and Charles John had 
obtained the consent of Denmark by force of arms. Norway, 
however, took another view of the matter, and ignoring 
this arrangement adopted a very democratic constitution 
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of her own, with Christian Frederick, the Danish Stadholder 
and heir-apparent, as her king. But Charles John was too 
strong for Christian, whose abdication led to the recognition 
of the union by the Norwegian Storthing, and Charles XIII 
was chosen to be king of the united monarchy. On the 
conclusion of peace with Denmark, Sweden handed over 
to that country, in compensation for Norway, her last 
remaining possessions on the other side of the Baltic— 
the northern part of Hither Pomerania; and since that 
time these two nations inhabiting the Scandinavian Penin­
sula, sheltered from sudden invasion, have pursued a strictly 
defensive and peaceful policy. 
For several decades ' the Scandinavian Movement' 
gathered strength and expressed itself in an endeavour to 
unite more closely the three Scandinavian peoples, Swedes, 
Norwegians, and Danes, first in a political sense and after­
wards in cultural and economic respects. While the chief 
benefits are to be found in the sphere of jurisprudence, the 
legislations being in many cases identical, the new move­
ment also had an important influence on literature, science, 
and art. In 1865 important changes took place in the 
composition of the Riksdag. The Four Estates were 
abolished and replaced by two Chambers in accordance 
with modern parliamentary methods, this change being 
completed in 1909, exactly one hundred years after the 
first establishment of a constitutional form of government. 
The union between Sweden and Norway never fulfilled the 
expectations of its promoters, although the defects of the 
Treaty of Union might have been remedied by good will 
on both sides. Unfortunately there was a good deal of 
mistrust, which showed itself in many directions, including 
the question of a combined scheme for Scandinavian defence 
and that of foreign representation. The conflict came to 
a climax on the question of parity in the conduct of foreign 
affairs. The Norwegians demanded their own minister of 
foreign affairs, their own envoys, and their own consuls in 
foreign countries, and their obstinacy in the face of all 
Swedish proposals pointed to the fact that they were really 
aiming at the dissolution of the union. On the 7th June, 
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1905, the crash came, and King Oscar's Norwegian Ministry 
renounced in revolutionary fashion their allegiance to their 
sovereign. The deed was done, but it was necessary that 
bloodshed should be avoided and that Norway should clothe 
her dissolution in a more respectable form. Negotiations 
were accordingly opened at Karlstad, where the legal 
instrument was drawn up, and the dissolution of the union 
of Norway and Sweden became de jure as well as de facto 
on its confirmation by the Swedish Riksdag in accordance 
with certain conditions laid down by the Swedes. Among 
these stipulations was an arbitration treaty and the 
establishment of a neutral boundary zone, in which the 
recently erected Norwegian fortifications were to be dis­
mantled. The methods adopted by the Norwegians to 
bring about the dissolution of the union led to a powerful 
national movement in Sweden, and the years that have 
elapsed since the separation of the two countries have shown 
an increasing activity in the spheres where Swedish spiritual 
and material life differed most from that of her western 
neighbour. In recent years Sweden has enjoyed an increas­
ing prosperity, she has been spared the ordeal of the Great 
War, and she has not failed to profit thereby. She has 
encouraged the rise of many new branches of industry; 
she has done much to improve her means of communication ; 
she has given a great stimulus to popular education ; and 
she has given to the world scientists and explorers of 
considerable distinction. Sweden, like the two other 
Scandinavian nations, has during the last few generations 
entered into far more intimate connection with foreign 
countries than was possible with the imperfect means of 
communication of former times. Moreover, new ideas and 
movements reach the shores of Sweden as quickly as those 
of any other nation ; and it often happens, indeed, that it 
is from the North that new ideas emanate. But, if Sweden 
has prospered through a long period of peace, she has also 
developed certain tendencies scarcely conducive to the 
maintenance of national strength. The Swedes are fond 
of luxury, and their policy of ' progress in an atmosphere 
of peaceful prosperity' leads them to try and avoid any 
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action that might threaten to disturb their comfortable 
ease. 
In the past Swedes have always been distinguished for 
soldier-like qualities, and the history of Sweden's wars 
is one of the most brilliant chapters in the history of the 
world In spite of a century of peace, there is reason to 
believe that these qualities still exist; for scarcely a war 
is waged in any part of the world without a considerable 
number of Swedes volunteering for service, and reflecting 
credit on the country to which they belong. Humanity is 
a prominent feature of the Swedish character, as is shown 
by the treatment meted out by the Swedes to other nations. 
Wherever Swedish rule has been exercised, as in the Baltic 
Provinces, in Pomerania, and elsewhere, it has left behind 
it pleasant memories of a rule of justice and humanity, 
which has never attempted to despoil or to oppress, but 
has endeavoured, as far as possible, to develop and raise 
its subject peoples. Another aspect of Swedish humanity 
is the decided aversion shown by most Swedes to all kinds 
of litigiousness. In no country is so little sympathy shown 
to insistence on mere legal rights, as opposed to what is 
equitable and fair. The Swedes have also a considerable 
gift for organization, due to the stability which the structure 
of Swedish society has exhibited for generations; and 
joined to this is a rare capacity for obedience without 
sacrificing personal dignity, and an equally rare capacity 
for command without the arrogance so often associated with 
this quality. There are many young Swedish engineers 
abroad who have hundreds or thousands of workers under 
them, and who, by quiet tact and a judicious blending of 
firmness with moderation, obtain from their subordinates 
that willing obedience which smooths the relations between 
employer and employed and produces work of the best 
quality. Swedes are known for their courtesy, their readi­
ness to do anything to oblige, and their hospitality. On 
great occasions they love magnificence and pomp, and are 
rather inclined to lapse into rhetoric. Indeed, their social 
etiquette is one of the most complicated in Europe to-day. 
But the most deeply seated feature of the Swedish character 
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is a passionate love of nature. It is this quality that has 
given birth to Sweden's great scientists, her inventors, and 
her explorers; but it has also diverted attention from 
psychological questions, and therefore cuts both ways. 
This strong attachment to nature, which in certain cases 
leads to licence and coarseness, is nevertheless the vital 
source of the health and vigour of the race, which has 
even defied the wanton recklessness that in Sweden often 
plays havoc with the energies of body and soul. Light-
hearted recklessness is, indeed, one of the greatest weak­
nesses of the Swedish character, but it cannot be denied 
that peoples so constituted often display a greater vitality 
than nations of the cautious, thrifty type. 
Sweden is the most ancient kingdom in the world, and 
has never, as far as history records, been subjected to 
foreign domination ; indeed, owing to her remote position, 
she has kept herself tolerably free from foreign influences. 
She has known neither feudalism nor serfdom ; her legisla­
tion has been but slightly affected by Roman Law; she 
has been less deeply influenced than most other nations by 
the Roman Catholic Church ; and she has had but a brief 
experience of absolute monarchy. As the Swedes have 
preserved their Aryan descent purer than any other race, 
one might naturally expect a very original culture, though 
possibly accompanied by that stagnation to which isolated 
nations are peculiarly liable. The originality certainly 
exists, but not quite to the extent that one might expect, 
while the stagnation does not exist at all, except in the form 
of a type of conservatism also characteristic of the British 
people. The explanation of this is to be found in a certain 
trait inherent in the Swedish character—a keen interest 
in all things foreign. This interest, which has caused the 
Swedes rather to over-estimate things from abroad and to 
under-estimate their own productions, has often tended to 
check the full growth of national individuality ; but, on 
the other hand, this keen interest in all things human has 
saved the Swedes from sticking fast in ruts, and has to a 
great extent warded off the dangers associated with a 
position of isolation. 
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The history of Sweden from a social point of view presents 
features of great interest, inasmuch as it is the record of 
an evolution on an exclusively Teutonic basis unaffected 
by the influence of Roman culture or the theories of Roman 
Law, which made so marked an impression on the continent 
of Europe as a whole. The oldest Swedish community 
knew of no other legal distinction among its members than 
that of thralls and freemen ; yet even at that time there 
were wealthy and powerful families from which a nobility 
could easily develop. After the introduction of Christianity, 
another form of aristocracy arose in the shape of the Catholic 
priesthood, with its claims to a legally recognized status ; 
and during the thirteenth century social conditions became 
crystallized. The ancient state of thraldom ceased to exist, 
although it was not until the beginning of the following 
century that it was entirely abolished. The new Estates, 
on the other hand, were now recognized by law, while the 
personnel of the Catholic Church formed a privileged class 
of the community. About forty years later, a legally 
acknowledged temporary aristocracy came into being, and 
every man who agreed to serve as a mounted soldier was 
exempted from all ordinary taxation. In this way an 
aristocracy of service rather than of birth was constituted ; 
but, as birth, wealth, and service under the Crown were 
generally enjoyed by the same individuals, this may be 
regarded as the beginning of an hereditary nobility. By this 
time the larger towns had also begun to detach themselves 
as distinct communities with their own constitutions, and 
the burgesses became a class by themselves. The Fourth 
Estate was formed of peasant proprietors, who constituted 
the bulk of the remainder of the population. 
In the fourteenth century, the aristocracy took advantage 
of the great unrest and general lawlessness to seize all the 
power they could in the body social, and tried to introduce 
into Sweden the contemporary principles of feudalism. The 
peasantry, however, succeeded in averting this danger by 
rising in arms, and the vigorous national movement that 
followed raised them to a position of political importance 
unparalleled in the history of that time. Although a check 
2 
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to the independence of the peasantry was given by Gustavus 
Vasa, their legal and social status was definitely secured, 
and as the Swedish Diet (Riksdag) became more firmly 
established it was impossible to exclude the peasant class 
from representation. The reform of the Church and the 
confiscation of its lands overthrew the ecclesiastical aristo­
cracy ; while new Protestant clergy became one of the 
Four Estates of the Riksdag, in which they always supported 
the lower classes against the nobility. 
The Estate of the Nobles, which was materially weakened 
as long as Gustavus Vasa was on the throne, became all 
the more influential during the wars which followed. 
Nobility became a mark of royal favour, and the Estate 
became a close, hereditary caste, with great legal and 
actual privileges, although the nobles were at the same time 
required to take a real share in the government of the country 
and in the great tasks resulting from Sweden's entry into 
the arena of European politics. It was during this period 
of Sweden's greatness that the nobility reached its zenith, 
when everything that was brilliant and remarkable was the 
property of the First Estate. Indeed, it may be said that 
there are few countries whose nbbility possessed such an 
excellent record as that of Sweden at this period, when 
valuable services were rendered, and there were few 
encroachments at the expense of the other classes of the 
community. Yet it must not be imagined that the position 
attained by the nobility in the seventeenth century was not 
burdensome to the other Estates. The immunity of the 
nobles from most ordinary taxation was a heavy burden 
on the rest of the population, which fell heaviest on the 
peasants, who were brought to the verge of social and 
economic ruin. The peasants, however, were rescued by the 
king and by the Riksdag, in which they had the support 
of the clergy and the burghers against the nobles. A 
series of struggles followed, lasting for more than thirty years 
(1650-82), after which Charles XI succeeded in introducing 
a measure for the forfeiture to the Crown of the vast areas 
of land which had been given away or leased to the nobility 
under previous monarchs. The greater part of the forfeited 
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estates passed later into the hands of peasant proprietors, 
whereby this class gained so firm an economic position that 
the effects of this land reform policy are distinctly noticeable 
in Swedish political life of the present day. The nobility, 
on the other hand, became divided into the higher and lower 
aristocracy and, although they formed a very numerous but 
comparatively impoverished class, they were willing for the 
most part to obtain a livelihood by filling posts in the public 
service. But Charles's land policy did not put an end to 
the quarrels between the Estates in Sweden. They burst 
out again in the eighteenth century over the privileges 
enjoyed by the nobility, especially their exclusive right to 
higher government appointments and to the possession of 
privileged land. Gustavus III brought about a further 
social reform in 1789, when a large number of privileges 
were abolished in exchange for the acquiescence of the 
other Estates to the introduction of a short-lived absolutism, 
and such privileges as still remained were voluntarily given 
up by the nobles after the revolution of 1809. 
The Estates had lost their legal and social importance, 
although they survived as political units until 1865, when 
this time-honoured division of the Riksdag was supplanted 
by two chambers with proportional representation. In 
Sweden a titled nobility still exists, but as a corporate body 
it is only concerned with the administration of joint funds, 
and additions to its ranks are of rare occurrence. The last 
relic of ancient social conditions, exemption from taxes, 
was withdrawn in 1892, and from that time forward it may 
be said that the struggle between the ' Estates ' was replaced 
by a struggle between ' Classes \ Since 1866, when the 
method of representation was altered, the class of peasant 
proprietors has had a very large share of political power, 
and it is significant that the Swedish peasants have exercised 
this power themselves, and not through representatives 
chosen from other classes of the community. Strained 
relations between the different social classes have always 
been modified by that human quality which is characteristic 
of the Swedes ; hence, all the dissensions that have occurred 
have been less violent than in most other countries. It is 
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perhaps nowhere so easy to rise in the social scale as it is 
in Sweden, which is chiefly due to the fact that higher 
education is almost free and open to all. About 25 per cent 
of the pupils at secondary schools are the sons of peasant 
farmers or artisans, and about half the total number belong 
to the lower classes of the population. As many of the 
finest men in Sweden can trace their origin back to the lower 
classes of the community, either directly or with the inter­
vention of one or two generations, the ' upper ' and ' lower ' 
classes are strongly united by the very closest of all ties, 
that of blood. But this has not prevented class distinctions 
from being artificially accentuated by the so-called ' labour 
movement \ The quite natural endeavour of manual 
labourers to improve their condition from a political, 
economic, and social point of view, has by means of socialistic 
theories and trades unionism led to a widening of the gulf 
between them and other classes of the community. Class 
warfare, and its immediate expression, general strikes, have 
consequently been adopted in Sweden as elsewhere in the 
hope of fulfilling aspirations that are visionary and utterly 
d e v o i d  o f  s e n s e .  B u t  a s  f a r  a s  c o m m u n i s m  i s  c o n c e r n e d ,  I  
do not think the Soviet will quickly forget the sound ' telling 
off ' which King Gustav gave the Russian Envoy on the 
occasion of their last attempt at propaganda on the 
Swedish coast. 
If I have devoted a good deal of space to the subject of 
Sweden and her past history, it is because Sweden must 
play a most important role in the future destinies of the 
Baltic, and this fact is insufficiently realized in this country. 
Our knowledge of the Swedes and their capabilities is very 
restricted, and it is seldom that the eyes of the British public 
are turned northwards. At the time of writing there are 
indications that something may occur to flood this part of 
Scandinavia with British limelight ; and if this does occur, 
the near future will see the popular press of these islands 
overflowing with information and trivialities about Sweden 
and the Swedish people. Should the British public be led 
to take a strong human interest in King Gustav V and his 
royal house, and should they be thereby encouraged to learn 
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something of the subjects of this descendant of Bernadotte, 
Marshal of France, it will be a great source of satisfaction 
throughout the entire Baltic and will be a substantial 
benefit to those countries, which have- hoped in vain for 
British interest since the end of the Great War. 
Prior to 1914 the Baltic Sea had been dominated by two 
Great Powers, Germany and Russia, although occasional 
visits of the British fleet reminded the world that the 
Sound and the Cattegat were not closed to ships of war. 
The whole continental coast, however, had been under 
Russian and German sovereignty, while the Scandinavian 
states on the opposite side had safeguarded their independ­
ence for a century by a policy of abstention from 
international complications. The general status of the 
Baltic basin had been regulated by two international 
instruments: a Treaty signed in 1907 between Great Britain, 
France, Germany, Norway, and Russia, which aimed at 
securing the integrity of Norway, which might have been 
threatened, after the separation of that country from Sweden 
in 1905, by Russian ambitions to possess an ice-free port 
on the open sea; and a Declaration signed in 1908 by 
Denmark, Germany, Russia, and Sweden, with a view to 
maintaining the territorial status quo in the Baltic. 
By the beginning of 1920, the war and the Russian 
Revolution had brought about a complete change in the 
political status of the countries bordering on the eastern 
and south-eastern shores of the Baltic, which affected the 
whole international situation in that area, including the 
position of the Scandinavian states of Sweden, Norway, 
and Denmark. The German Navy had almost ceased to 
exist, while the Baltic coast of the former Russian Empire 
had passed into the possession of five new states—Finland, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—the actual coastline 
of Russia being now confined to the eastern end of the Gulf 
of Finland, with the ports of Kronstadt and Petrograd. 
At the same time, the new arrangements for Danzig and 
Memel had interested Great Britain and France in these 
waters, while the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal at Kiel had been 
opened to the commerce and warships of all nations. The 
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Scandinavian states, which had succeeded in preserving 
their neutrality during the war, had emerged from it without 
any serious change. Norway increased her territory by 
the acquisition of the island of Spitzbergen in 1920, and 
in the same year Denmark benefited by the acquisition 
of North Slesvig. It was hoped that the result of the 
Slesvig plebiscite would be to remove what had been a 
constant cause of international friction since 1866, and the 
Danish Government showed great discretion and moderation 
throughout the affair. They made every endeavour to 
treat in a most conciliatory manner the comparatively 
small number of Germans who were incorporated in Denmark 
as a result of the plebiscite ; but, unfortunately, certain 
nationalist elements in Germany showed a disposition to 
keep the wound open. Since then, however, there has been 
a great improvement on the German side, and this increase 
of territory has in no way involved Denmark in the general 
current of affairs in continental Europe. Sweden, on the 
other hand, became involved in a controversy with Finland 
over the question of the Aland Islands, while all three 
Scandinavian countries would have become implicated in 
the problem of the Russian border, if they had established 
any form of entente with the new states on the east coast 
of the Baltic, either through the formation of a Scandinavian 
bloc including Finland or through the entry of the Scandi­
navian countries themselves into a general Baltic Union. 
Both these combinations were suggested at the time, but 
the Scandinavian countries preferred to retain their previous 
character of minor states of Western Europe without 
continental commitments, and to look for support from the 
League of Nations rather than in any local system of 
alliances. 
A tendency towards a political association of the Scandi­
navian states had appeared during the war, when they had 
been brought into closer contact with one another by their 
common neutrality ; but attempts to maintain this associa­
tion in any formal way after the war were unsuccessful. 
All three nations preferred to pursue their independent 
policies, although there did remain a tendency to co-operate 
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in certain matters. In Norway there was a continuance 
of the strong nationalist spirit that had led in 1905 to the 
disruption of the union with Sweden, and it was even 
suggested that the old Norwegian possessions of the Faroe 
Islands and Iceland should be returned to Norwegian 
sovereignty. This is a good illustration of how the doctrine 
of self-determination might be used to upset past settle­
ments of territorial questions, but fortunately this claim 
was defeated by circumstances. Iceland, which had long 
enjoyed extensive home rule under the Danish Crown, had 
attained the formal status of an independent sovereign state 
under the Danish-Icelandish Treaty of the 30th November, 
1918, although the conduct of her foreign affairs remained 
in the hands of Denmark. On occasions when the flags of 
all nations are displayed there is usually one that defeats 
most people : it is that of Iceland, which is the Norwegian 
flag with the colours interchanged. 
The many and great changes that have taken place in 
the map of Northern Europe as result of the Great War 
and the Russian Revolution have given rise to a Baltic 
situation, comprising a series of international questions of 
the first magnitude, which is engaging the serious attention 
of the Scandinavian and Baltic countries, even if it is 
receiving little consideration from the British public. But 
the fact that the British public is not particularly interested 
in what is taking place, or is likely to take place, in the 
Baltic region by no means implies that this comprehensive 
question does not concern Great Britain. It is not only 
of the greatest importance to our maritime interests in the 
Baltic, but it seriously affects our Continental policy and 
directly concerns the prospects of European peace. The 
advent of the Soviet regime in Russia, the independence of 
Finland, the establishment of the new Baltic States, and 
Poland's access to the sea, have given birth to such com­
plicated questions as those of Vilna and the Polish Corridor, 
both of which threaten the peace of Europe ; while most of 
the new states bordering on Russia are submitted to a 
varying degree of pressure, internal as well as external. 
The background is, as before, to be found in Russia, where 
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there is in force a political system which bewilders those 
who try to analyse its true significance. Revolutionary in 
its methods and Russian in its inconsistency, this strange 
regime has for eleven years dominated 130 million people 
spread over an area of 7 million square miles. From Arch­
angel to Baku and from Petrograd to Vladivostok this 
revolutionary philosophy, giving rise to the most grotesque 
and unbalanced policies, has ruled supreme ; and there is 
as yet no sign that holds out any reasonable prospect of 
change. To gain anything approaching an accurate insight 
into the present conditions of Russia is almost impossible, 
and it is as dangerous to generalize on the subject of this 
vast area as it is to study the reports emanating from the 
Tass Agency in Moscow and from the news factories of 
Tallinn and Riga. The conditions existing in the Ukraine 
may be separated from those prevailing in Northern Russia 
by a gulf no less great than that which separates the south 
of Spain from the north of Scotland ; and it is a known 
fact that the communications in the interior of Russia are 
so bad that while in some parts corn has to be used for 
fuel through want of wood, in others the people are reduced 
to eating the bark of trees through the failure of the local 
harvest. Russian news is a commercial commodity as well 
as a political instrument. The Russian Foreign Office 
co-operates when it is in its interests to co-operate, with the 
Third International to give the world such news as is 
considered beneficial to Russia and the progress of com­
munism ; while the foreign news merchants in the Latvian 
and Estonian capitals vie with one another to produce the 
most saleable material for press consumption. 
Yet, in the matter of general Russian policy, I am inclined 
to believe that Russia has not changed fundamentally, but 
that the present regime is merely another name of wielding 
power in a country where some form of autocracy is a fixed 
political precept. As far as foreign policy is concerned, I 
think that the same principle holds good and that we should 
regard that policy as Russian rather than Bolshevist. The 
Russians are simply making use of the fact that Bolshevism 
is a political power in their country in order to pursue their 
THE BALTIC: YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY 25 
ordinary and time-honoured lines of foreign policy, and 
there is little doubt that Russia must always play the same 
role in international affairs, irrespective of the form of 
government prevailing in Petrograd or Moscow, as long as 
her geographical integrity remains unimpaired. It is, in­
deed, a fallacy to imagine that the re-establishment of an 
imperial regime would to any great extent modify the 
position of Russia vis-d-vis the nations of Europe and Asia. 
While Russian foreign policy has its well-defined objectives 
in Southern Europe, in the Persian Gulf, in India, and in 
the Far East, it is only necessary to consider that policy 
in so far as it concerns the Baltic. Russia has been deprived 
of the important Baltic ports of Tallinn, Riga, and Libau, 
on which, under pre-war conditions, she largely relied for 
her export trade in the west; and a glance at the map 
is sufficient to indicate the political position of the new 
countries in which these ports are situated. Although at 
present Russia is economically diseased and has little need 
of Baltic ports, there is no reason to believe that this will 
always be the case. It may be that the Russians have 
learnt nothing from their past fatal mistakes, and that they 
would, at some opportune moment, try to reconquer their 
lost territory south of the Gulf of Finland. It is difficult 
to see a real necessity for this, although it may seem logical 
on paper; for, even without overrunning Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania, they can use the ports of these countries 
with great advantage, as these new states have been far-
seeing enough to grant Russia all imaginable facilities to 
use their ports and railways for commercial purposes. 
It is a mistake to conclude that the Russians necessarily 
contemplate a course of military aggression. They have 
other weapons at their disposal. By invoking the aid 
of the Third International they can try to oppose the 
endeavours of these new countries to settle down to peace 
conditions, and can pursue a policy tending to bring them 
into conflict with one another. 
Russia was really a state composed of several nationalities 
rather than a national state ; and the crystallization of 
the various constituent elements, which had been going on 
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prior to 1914, received a great stimulus with the progress of 
the war. In the matter of national consciousness, the border 
peoples were at very different stages of development, and 
the course of the war intensified the national and separatist 
feeling of those who suffered severely from the fighting in 
that area; so that the establishment of the Soviet Govern­
ment and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk became mere signals 
for the disintegration of that part of the Russian Empire, 
which was facilitated by the victory of the Allies on 
the Western Front. 
We will now turn to the position of the northern 
countries against which Russia may have aggressive 
designs in some form or another. 
CHAPTER II 
THE NEW FINLAND 
OF all the northern countries that became independent as result of the Great War and the Russian Revolu­tion, Finland is the most remarkable and the most 
progressive, which is chiefly due to the fact that, as an 
autonomous Grand Duchy, with her own institutions, her 
own language and her own culture, she was in a very favour­
able position to start life as an independent sovereign state. 
Finland was never a Russian province and, in the Russian 
sense, she was never a part of the Russian Empire. The 
feudal system never existed within her frontiers, and 
agriculture has throughout the ages been almost entirely 
in the hands of independent peasant proprietors. Indeed, 
about ten years ago the large estates did not exceed 8 per 
cent of the total area under cultivation. Hence, national 
independence, so severely encroached upon in practice, if 
not in law, during the Russian regime, has become almost 
a religion among the people ; and Finland, having thrown 
off any Russian influence that existed under the Grand 
Duchy, is now progressing fast in the most auspicious 
circumstances. While the former Russian provinces on 
the eastern shores of the Baltic had to contend with an 
antiquated land system based on the feudalism of the 
Middle Ages, and were at first quite unprepared to deal 
with the immense problems arising out of their independence, 
Finland was at that time almost fully equipped for the 
independent development of a system free of the encum­
brances of the past. Separated from Scandinavia by the 
Gulf of Bothnia, and by the Gulf of Finland from the 
European mainland, Finland now occupies an independent 
position in the Baltic. First under Sweden and then under 
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Russia, the Finns have trod a thorny path ever since the 
Middle Ages, while the geographical position of their country 
made it for centuries a buffer state and the cockpit of 
Northern Europe. Hence Finland has produced a virile 
race with staunch qualities and well-defined characteristics, 
which are the direct result of the difficult conditions imposed 
upon the people from the fifteenth to the twentieth centuries. 
From the fourth to the ninth centuries the Finnish 
nation was in the process of formation out of the original 
Finns who had immigrated from the area of the Volga, and 
during the period commonly known as the ' Viking Age ' 
there was an extensive migration of Swedes to the country; 
so that the Finnish people really emerged from a blending 
of the original inhabitants of the Finnish peninsula, Finns 
who had worked their way northwards from the Volga 
region, and Swedes who had come as colonists from across 
the Gulf of Bothnia and settled on the coast. The next 
element to influence the Finns was that of religion, which 
took the form of three Swedish ' Crusades ' beginning in the 
twelfth century, which were intended to put a stop to the 
piratical expeditions of the Finns, and at the same time to 
spread the Christian faith amongst the followers of a pan­
theistic religion. This religion, which included worship of 
the dead and the spirits of nature, forms part of the theme 
running through the great national epic, the " Kalevala 
The first Swedish military expedition in 1154 was undertaken 
by Eric IX, accompanied by the Bishop of Upsala, whose 
successor seems to have planned the establishment of some 
kind of ecclesiastical state directly under Papal jurisdiction ; 
the second crusade in 1249 brought all the west of Finland 
under the power of Sweden ; while the third expedition of 
1293 extended Swedish rule to Carelia in the east, and 
established the fortress of Viipuri1 on the north-east coast 
of the Gulf of Finland. These military expeditions gave 
rise to a prolonged struggle between the Swedes and the 
Russians of Novgorod for the possession of Carelia, but the 
war ended with the Peace of Noteborg, by which the frontiers 
of Finnish territory were for the first time determined, and 
1 In Swedish Viborg. 
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Russia ceded to Sweden the three western districts of 
Carelia. Hence the provinces now forming the territory 
of Finland, and the races from which the Finnish people 
are descended, were united under one rule. The Reforma­
tion, which led to the setting up of the Lutheran Church 
in Finland, took place in the reign of Gustavus Vasa, after 
the Diet of Vesteras in 1527, which also reorganized the 
administration, and started a scheme for settling and 
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cultivating the interior of the country. A few years later 
the elective monarchy was abolished, and Sweden and 
Finland were formed into an hereditary kingdom. 
In the almost continuous wars which followed between 
Sweden and Russia the Finns were invaluable in the services 
they rendered to the Swedish armies, and this was recognized 
in 1581 by John III of Sweden, who raised Finland to the 
position of a Grand Duchy, so that by the sixteenth century 
the Finns had achieved some degree of national independ­
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ence. But the country continued to form the battleground 
of the contending forces of Sweden and Russia, when the 
Finns greatly contributed to the success of their suzerain 
Power, and if the Finns owe a considerable measure of their 
culture to Sweden that debt has been fully paid in Finnish 
blood. The Thirty Years War, in which many Finns 
fought with distinction, brought the country to the notice 
of Central Europe for the first time, but the honours of war 
were accompanied by much trouble in other directions. 
Early in the seventeenth century, Gustavus Adolphus forced 
Russia to acknowledge as the territory of the Grand Duchy 
of Finland an area closely corresponding to the frontiers of 
to-day, and further concessions were subsequently made to 
the Swedes. It is also significant that the Finnish Diet, 
consisting of the four orders of Nobility, Clergy, Burghers, 
and Peasants, was set up at this time, and that the Swedish 
language supplanted Finnish among the upper and official 
classes. It was not until early in the nineteenth century 
that an attempt was made to revive the Finnish language, 
which has now been fully established as the language of the 
country. Swedish rule, which lasted until the war of 
1808-9, brought important benefits to Finland. A gradual 
organization of the country took place ; systems of justice 
and administration were set up on Swedish lines ; and the 
inhabitants were given full civil rights, similar to those 
enjoyed by the Swedes, so that the Finns learned to manage 
the affairs of their own country. A common government 
and a common Western civilization welded together the 
former scattered tribes into one Finnish people, which was 
united in the struggle against the ever-present danger in 
the east. As a result of the defeat of Sweden in the war of 
1808-9, Finland passed from the suzerainty of Sweden to 
that of Russia as an essential fruit of victory, and Finnish 
nationalism was inclined to regard the change as likely to 
lead to greater independence. 
Finland did not join Russia as a conquered province, 
but she maintained her free constitution and fundamental 
laws, and became an autonomous Grand Duchy under Tsar 
Alexander I as Grand Duke, who was accepted by a free 
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diet of the Estates at Porvoo.1 The Grand Duke then 
recognized the Finnish constitution and undertook to pre­
serve the religion, laws and liberties of the country. Under 
his successor, Alexander II, a policy of liberty and progress 
was pursued, but, after twenty-six years of prosperity, the 
murder of the Tsar and the accession of Alexander III led 
to a policy of gradual Russification, which was continued 
throughout the reign of Nicholas II in spite of repeated 
pledges to the contrary. During this period continued 
attempts were made to curtail, if not to abolish, the powers 
of the Finnish Diet. General Bobrikov, who was afterwards 
assassinated by a Finnish student, was appointed Governor-
General with almost dictatorial powers. Where possible 
Finnish officials were replaced by Russians, and the Russian 
language was introduced. The Finnish army was dis­
banded. Newspapers were suppressed. The Finnish Post 
Office was brought under the control of the Russian Min­
istry of the Interior. A Russian political gendarmerie 
was created with its system of spies and domiciliary visits. 
To all this the Finns presented an attitude of passive 
resistance, although many Finnish officials were arrested 
and imprisoned at St. Petersburg. Such was the position 
at the outbreak of the Great War. 
The war, however, brought no relaxation of the Russian 
rule. On the contrary, the Government took more active 
measures, and declared their intention of suspending the 
Diet for the duration of hostilities. The Finns naturally 
hoped for the overthrow of Russia, and it can easily be 
understood that their sympathies during this period were 
generally inclined towards the Central Powers, particularly 
as they were convinced that the top-hea\ry structure of 
Imperial Russia could not successfully resist the onslaught 
of superior and more up-to-date armies, or survive the 
• economic strain of war on a great scale without an internal 
revolution. At the outbreak of the first Russian revolu­
tion, when the Kerensky Government was set up, Finland 
recovered her right of autonomy and the Finnish Diet was 
again convoked. But it was not long before the Diet came 
1 In Swedish Borgfi.. 
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into conflict with the Petrograd Government which led to 
its dissolution ; and by the time the new Diet met in Decem­
ber, 1917, affairs in Russia had gone from bad to worse 
and the Bolshevist regime, which was rapidly developing, 
found no sympathy in the Finnish Chamber. Finland chose 
this moment 1 to declare her independence, which was 
then recognized by the Governments of Russia, Germany, 
Sweden, and France. It was, however, not until the follow­
ing year, after a sanguinary struggle with Bolshevism, in 
which the Red forces were utterly routed, that Finland 
could really be regarded as a free and independent state. 
No sooner had Finnish independence been proclaimed than 
certain radical elements of the population, in close collabora­
tion with the most evil elements in Russia, made a supreme 
attempt to suck Finland into the whirlpool in which Russia 
was being engulfed. Red Guards, with a good stiffening 
of Russian troops, with Russian instructors, and supplied 
with Russian arms, ammunition and material, were formed 
in all the chief centres ; and Finland was rapidly converted 
into a state of anarchy closely resembling that prevailing 
across her eastern frontier. By January, 1918, the situation 
was such that the Government had to resort to desperate 
measures. The already existing White Guards were officially 
legalized, and organized resistance was offered to the forces 
of revolution which were menacing the civilization and 
very existence of the country. The Reds occupied the 
south and south-west, including Helsinki, Turku, Tampere, 
and Viipuri 2 (by far the most prosperous part of the 
country), while the White Guards held Central and North 
Finland. In their despair the White Finns, who were 
very short of arms, turned for help to Germany who readily 
came to their assistance. The Finnish Jager Battalion, 
which had been trained in Germany since the beginning 
of 1915 and consisted of some 2,000 young men of the 
best Finnish elements, was sent to Finland and was followed 
later by a German ' Baltic Division ' under General von 
der Goltz, comprising some 12,000 men including marines. 
1 6th December, 1917. 
2 In Swedish Helsingfors, Abo, Tammerfors and Viborg. 
THE NEW FINLAND 33 
There followed a most desperate struggle in which the 
Red forces were driven across the Russian frontier with 
heavy casualties in killed and wounded, besides the loss 
of a large number of guns and great quantities of ammuni­
tion and stores. From the very first days of the Great 
War the belief was fairly widespread in Finland that Russia 
was likely to suffer defeat and that, as result of an unavoid­
able revolution, would probably fall to pieces. As events 
have proved, the Finns were right. They worked system­
atically for their freedom, which they only achieved after 
heavy fighting and great losses. Although this successful 
conflict with the Reds was chiefly important to Finland, 
it is scarcely realized in other countries that the Finns also 
performed a very significant service to Europe by definitely 
closing one important door against the forces of red 
revolution, which threatened to burst westward and carry 
everything before it. 
As Finland believed that the war would end in a negoti­
ated peace and that Germany would remain the strongest 
Power in Eastern Europe, their fear of Russia led many 
Finns to favour the election of a German prince to the 
Finnish throne as a means of strengthening the position 
of their country. When, however, Germany was ultimately 
defeated, this policy lost its raison d'etre, the election of 
Prince Friedrich Karl of Hesse, a close relative of the British 
royal house, was cancelled, and Finland became a republic. 
But after hostilities with the Bolshevists had been brought 
to a successful conclusion, and pending a decision as to the 
future government of the country, the Diet, which met in 
June, 1918, entrusted the supreme authority to a Regent, 
and M. Svinhufvud, the President of the Senate, was 
appointed. There was, however, a popular demand in 
favour of a republican government, which led to the resigna­
tion of the pro-German Regent and to the election of 
General Baron Mannerheim, the distinguished soldier who 
had done so much to save Finland'from Bolshevism, but it 
was not long before the Diet resolved to establish a republican 
form of government, and the new constitution came into 
force on the 17th July, 1919. The differences of opinion 
3 
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regarding the form of government of the country have 
now entirely disappeared. The Finnish constitution is 
one of the most democratic in the world, but the President 
of the Republic enjoys considerable powers. According to 
the Constitutional Law of 1906, which has only been modified 
as regards questions of parliamentary procedure, the Diet 
consists of one chamber of 200 members chosen by direct 
and proportional election, in which all who are entitled to 
vote have an equal vote. There is universal suffrage for all 
Finns who have attained the age of twenty-four years. The 
President is entrusted with the highest executive power in 
the country, and his authority extends to the sphere of 
legislation. As the holder of the highest executive power, 
the President decides the most important questions in the 
Government of Finland, and the term ' Government' is 
sometimes used to represent the President, sometimes the 
Council of State (or Cabinet), and sometimes both in con­
junction. In the Government it is the President alone who 
has the power of legislation in conjunction with Parliament, 
and of issuing ordinances, a power only granted to the 
Council of State by special authorization in particular 
circumstances. Lack of space prevents me from dealing 
more fully with one of the most interesting constitutions 
of modern times, which is a development of the old Finnish 
constitution, free to function without interference from 
the Russian capital. Those who are interested in Constitu­
tional Law would do well to study the system of this model 
democracy, which enjoys the respect and admiration even 
of those who are doubtful of the value of democratic forms 
of government. When the time came in 1917 for Finland 
to declare her independence, she not only already possessed 
a constitution of her own, but only had to create a Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and a Ministry of Defence to complete 
her equipment as an independent sovereign state. Hence, 
the Finns are now merely developing by themselves a system 
of government which never stood a chance of success under 
the suzerainty of Imperial Russia, but was a system well 
suited to their needs. 
The war seriously affected the economic life of Finland 
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as a dependent Grand Duchy, and the country could not 
but suffer from having to accept the Russian paper currency 
at its face value, and from the general requisition of food 
supplies and other material needed for the supply and 
equipment of the Russian armies. But, although these 
hardships were far from being appreciated at the time, 
especially as they had to be endured for the benefit of a 
dominating race which was heartily disliked by every 
patriotic Finn, they have proved to be for the ultimate 
benefit of the country. Industry received some stimulus, 
and necessity became the encouragement to enterprise in 
directions hitherto unexploited. Hence, the hardships of 
the war years gave rise to a realization of the benefits to 
be derived from the industrial experience gained during 
this period, and from the general increase of productive 
power. Finland only needed to secure her independence 
as a sovereign state in order to put these efforts to the 
best advantage for her own people instead of for the 
benefit of Imperial Russia. 
These last twelve years have been eventful ones for this 
new sovereign state, whose remarkable progress constitutes 
one of the most outstanding features of the last decade. 
The Finns have introduced a form of government based on 
the most modern democratic foundations ; they are develop­
ing their natural resources on the best economic and scientific 
lines; and they are organizing their industries so as to ensure 
the greatest output with the least possible expenditure of 
labour. The Finns are studious, slow, and deliberate. They 
are industrious, eager to acquire the latest information and 
methods, and very nationally minded. Little devoted to 
the pleasures of life, they are thrifty and very democratic 
in their ideas. Their sense of humour is somewhat heavy, 
and what pleasures they take they seem to take rather 
seriously. The Finnish national character is somewhat 
influenced by the attitude of the people to Russia and 
everything Russian ; and there was a note of tragedy, 
mingled with pride and hope, in the words of President 
Relander to me as we sat discussing the Finnish nation in 
what was once the palace of the Tsars in Helsinki. ' The 
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Finnish character,' he said, ' as you see it to-day, is the 
outcome of centuries of adversity.' There are many ways 
in which the British and Finnish mentalities are similar. 
British ways and methods, which in many countries are 
liable to be misunderstood, find favour in Finland, and 
the calm, dispassionate outlook of the average Finn is 
closely allied to that of the thinking Englishman. Besides 
being scrupulously honest, the Finns are very sincere and 
outspoken. Generally speaking, the Finns are reliable in a 
marked degree, although their conception of time is scarcely 
in keeping with this quality. They have an unusual 
capacity for collaboration, and prefer to put their heads 
together to arrive at decisions rather than to confer and 
leave the decision to a representative superior. In the 
government of the country they have a great liking for 
committees, and the administrative officials co-operate in 
a remarkable way. The co-operative movement, which is 
probably more successful and more advanced in Finland 
than anywhere else in the world, is an example of the 
capacity of the Finns to achieve the best results by united 
effort. The co-operative society has the whole-hearted 
support of the Finnish farmer, who obtains better prices for 
his produce than he would do otherwise, and is encouraged 
to increase his financial return by payments based on quality 
as well as quantity. The people are naturally suited to 
such a system, by which they produce better results than 
they would by independent endeavour. The Finnish con­
ception of liberty differs widely from that prevailing in 
England, the Finn viewing it in a national sense, while the 
Englishman regards it from the individual standpoint. For 
this reason the Finnish nation has achieved a considerable 
degree of consolidation, and this has been facilitated by 
the almost complete absence of class distinctions. 
The peasants, who form the great majority of the popula­
tion, are renowned for their high intellectual capacity. 
They study political questions in a most objective way, 
and they spend the long winter evenings in enlarging their 
knowledge not only of what concerns their own country 
but also of world affairs in general. While their know­
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ledge of Finland is profound, their interest in foreign 
countries is considerable. On visiting the homestead of 
a small farmer near Porvoo, I was more than surprised 
to find that he possessed a library of over 300 volumes, 
most of which dealt with serious subjects and many 
of which were translations of foreign works. The Finnish 
peasant is conservative in one way and yet not in 
another. Although he prefers the more or less primitive 
life on the farms in Finland, he admires the more modern 
system and the accumulation of wealth which he finds on 
emigration to America. On return to Finland, however, 
he resumes his old life, and has no respect for wealth in his 
native country—a tendency possibly due to the influence 
of the lakes and surroundings generally which cannot but 
have a strong effect on the people who dwell in their midst. 
Yet, in spite of the conservative atmosphere in which he 
lives, he seems to adapt himself easily to modern agricultural 
improvements and to any new invention which is likely to 
contribute to his success and efficiency. Finland is practi­
cally governed by the peasants for the peasants, and the 
fact that the Finns are essentially a highly educated peasant 
nation seems to have prevented any class distinctions in the 
ordinary sense of the word. This, combined with the fact 
that there is no great wealth and comparatively no poverty, 
has greatly contributed to that quality of solidarity to 
which I have already referred. 
Although the consumption of alcohol in Finland was 
the lowest in Europe before the war, the fact that drink 
incites Finns to perpetrate the more serious crimes, has 
led to the introduction of a prohibition policy. While 
some claim that crime has decreased since prohibition was 
introduced, others assert that the evil results of ' boot­
legging ' have produced the opposite result. It is difficult 
to say whether the crime statistics have been influenced 
to any appreciable extent by the prohibition laws, but 
there is little doubt that the peasants drink less than 
they did owing to the difficulty of obtaining liquor. I 
should say that the less the Finns drink the better, but 
the present system, which is not carried out effectively, 
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leads to contempt of the law. It seems that some form 
of liquor control would be more successful, but the 
position is such that no political party can oppose 
the prohibition movement without losing its power in the 
country, and the women's vote is the determining factor. 
Of all the serious problems which face the Finns in working 
out their own destiny, perhaps the most difficult are the 
language question and that of under-population. While 
it is impossible in a few words to describe the history of the 
Finnish and Swedish-speaking elements and their relation­
ship to one another, suffice it to say that the Swedish element 
is chiefly confined to the towns and to parts of the south, 
south-west and west, and only represents about 10 per 
cent of the population, while the Finnish element pre­
dominates in most of the country districts and Finnish has 
become the national language of Finland. Although the 
Swedish-speaking Finns form a small minority with privileges 
probably greater than any other minority in the world, they 
consider that they have a grievance and do not hesitate 
to make the most of it. It is a perfectly natural situation 
in which the Swedes, who previously held most of the 
important positions in the country and are now on the 
decline, resent the growing and vastly predominant influence 
of the Finns, and where the former, rightly or wrongly, find 
grievances in the attitude and actions of the latter. I would 
not go so far as to say that all these grievances are unfounded, 
but it seems that the Swedish minority are largely responsible 
for their own misfortunes and are making a profound 
mistake in not accepting a situation which they cannot alter. 
The generous policy of the Finnish-speaking people in this 
question is almost without parallel, but the Swedish minority 
have not yet realized that their true interests lie in co-opera­
tion with the majority, and prefer to rely on propaganda 
in their attempt to resist a movement which is the outcome 
of national evolution. Although there is this difference of 
language, there is complete unity of culture and nationality, 
so that, without a knowledge of either language, it is quite 
impossible to distinguish the one from the other. It is a 
question to be settled by time alone, and one in which 
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legislative measures are at present likely to do more harm 
than good, but there is little doubt that Finnish is destined 
to remain the language of Finland. Finnish-speaking 
students have long had direct relations with the leading 
European centres of learning, and it is a profound mistake 
to imagine that they have had to resort to Swedish as a 
medium for cultural relations with other countries. 
The other problems of under-population is one which 
cannot escape the notice of the most casual observer who 
penetrates any distance into the interior of the country. 
While two-thirds of the total population of Finland are 
concentrated in the south and south-western provinces of 
Uusimaa, Turku, Vaasa and Viipuri,1 the remaining third 
is scattered over an area nearly three times as great. 
Whereas the population per square mile in the province of 
Uusimaa is 105-8, it is only 6-o in the northern province 
of Oulu 2 which is almost as large as all the other provinces 
combined. In the northern districts it is possible to motor 
for long distances without seeing any sign of human habita­
tion, and even in Central Finland it is not unusual to travel 
for many miles without meeting a human being. But the 
fact that clearly stands out in all statistics is that the total 
population of Finland is only 26-4 to the square mile. This 
is a serious consideration for the Finns, who possess large 
tracts of undeveloped territory in the north, and need more 
man-power for the defence of a country which is nearly three 
times the size of England. The 'population question is one 
which the Finnish Government will have to face sooner or 
later, in order to strengthen the northern province of Oulu 
and to ensure that the utmost benefit is derived from the 
natural resources of the country. 
Few capitals express the character and mentality of a 
nation so well as Helsinki. While the ancient capital of 
Finland was situated at Turku, the Government was 
moved eastward to Helsinki owing to the destruction of 
the former city by fire. If Turku represents the Finland 
of the Middle Ages, Helsinki certainly represents the 
1 In Swedish—Nyland, Abo, Vasa, and Viborg. 
2 In Swedish—Uleaborg. 
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nation of modern times. The first object to attract the 
attention of the traveller approaching the Finnish coast is 
the massive stone edifice of the Lutheran Church of St. 
Nicholas, with its somewhat heavy architecture silhouetted 
on the sky-line. The entrance to the harbour, through 
myriads of small islands, leads one to expect an ancient city 
closely resembling the Hanseatic fortresses which adorn 
the eastern shores of the Baltic ; but time and circumstance 
have decreed it otherwise. Helsinki is one of the most 
modern cities of the world, and its chief characteristic is to 
be found in the heavy solidity of its buildings. The red 
Russian church with its gilded dome is a gentle reminder 
of the days of Russian rule, and the Government buildings 
have a certain likeness to those found in Central Europe ; 
but the great mass of new buildings which the Finns have 
erected in recent years have an architecture distinctly 
Finnish in style and construction. The railway station, the 
National Theatre, the banks, and the new commercial houses 
are built of hewn blocks of solid granite, and look rather as 
if they had been constructed to resist the attacks of man or 
nature. Even the ornamentation of the buildings is stolid 
in appearance, but owing to its sense of proportion it is not 
unbeautiful. Modern Helsinki is quite a new departure in 
architectural art, and if it does not yet please the eye of 
those accustomed to the more ancient architectural styles, 
it has the great merit of individuality and complete absence 
of vulgarity. Although the city is new and up to date, it 
has considerable dignity, and is fortunate to have a setting 
of great natural beauty. Built on a promontory, some of 
the newer residential quarters have their foundations resting 
on the solid rock, and the city has been enlarged by building 
on what were at one time regarded as impossible sites. The 
streets are paved with heavy cobble-stones in order to resist 
the severe winter, and the traffic rattles heavily over this 
uneven surface. Although the noise is considerable, this 
paving undoubtedly contributes to the remarkable clean­
liness of the city streets, which very seldom need to be 
repaired. There are no slums, and the workmen's dwellings 
are modern, airy, clean, and comfortable. The chief shop­
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ping centre is the broad boulevard of the Esplanaadikatu, 
on both sides of which are displayed goods of excellent 
quality, although there is a singular lack of luxuries, ' fallals 
and fripperiesIn the central gardens are cafes where 
Finns drink coffee at all hours of the day, and restaurants 
where a cheap and substantial meal can be enjoyed to the 
accompaniment of a Finnish military band. The harbour 
and its surroundings form the heart of the city, while the 
cobbled market-place is the starting-place of the small 
steamers which run to and from the numerous little islands, 
and is the site of the President's Palace. Helsinki is growing 
rapidly, and elaborate building schemes are being carried 
out in almost every street, while new quarters are springing 
up on the various outskirts of the capital, and a new Parlia­
ment House is in course of construction. What few traces 
of Russian domination ever existed have been almost 
obliterated, but the statue of the Tsar Alexander II still 
stands in the Senate Square, in remembrance of that ruler's 
sympathy for Finnish interests, and the imperial crown may 
still be seen over the door of one of the official reception halls. 
As a country Finland is unique owing to her enormous 
system of lakes and rivers, and these geographical features 
have their advantages as well as their drawbacks. The 
roads and railways have had to suffer from the peculiar 
configuration of the country. In the lake districts the roads, 
which are narrow and constructed of gravel, skirt the edges 
of the lakes, crossing here by a narrow neck of land barely 
wide enough to allow two cars to pass, and there by an 
artificial embankment built up across a shallow stretch of 
water. It often takes hours in a motor to reach a point 
a few miles distant, usually owing to the fact that a bridge 
or ferry has to be crossed at some place a long way off the 
direct route. The railways suffer from the same dis­
advantage, and train journeys are long and tedious affairs. 
Yet a great deal is being done to improve communications 
generally, special attention being paid to the roads, which 
are little adapted to the ever-increasing volume of motor 
traffic. The most important road just completed is that 
from Ivalo along the Paatsjoki River and across the moun­
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tains to Petsamo on a small estuary of the Arctic Ocean, 
and it is now possible to travel by motor from Rovaniemi, 
the most northerly point on the railway, to the Arctic coast 
by a road over 300 miles in length. Not only does this 
bring the ice-free port of Trifona within easy reach of the 
Finnish railhead at Rovaniemi, but it improves the political 
position of Finland by providing a northern sea communica­
tion with the outside world. The Finns will thus be 
enabled to open up virgin forests in their northern territories, 
to exploit the fisheries of the Arctic coast, and to shorten 
by twenty-four hours their communications with America. 
This new road, which constitutes a most important 
artery in Northern Europe, was commenced in 1916 in the 
neighbourhood of Ivalo, but work had to be suspended during 
the Finnish War of Independence, and it was not until 1921, 
after Finland took over possession of the Petsamo district, 
that operations were again resumed. Although the Finns 
only obtained possession of this new territory in 1921, in 
accordance with the Treaty of Tartu of the previous year, 
the Finnish claim had long been recognized by the Russian 
Imperial Government. In 1809, when Finland was united 
to Russia, there was a certain stretch of Arctic coast, border­
ing on Finland, Russia, and Norway, in which all three 
countries had long enjoyed common pasturage, hunting 
and fishing rights. But, by a Treaty with Norway in 1826, 
Russia arbitrarily fixed the frontier so that Finland was 
entirely excluded from the Arctic Ocean, and the Finnish 
population was subsequently forbidden to fish off the Russian 
coast. In 1863 the Finnish Senate raised the question of 
an outlet to the Arctic, and in the following year the Tsar 
promised to transfer to Finland a section of Arctic coastline 
in compensation for the district of Rajajoki (near Petrograd), 
which was illegally annexed to Russia on account of the 
Russian rifle factories established there. Up to 1920 this 
compensation had never been made, but the promise was 
still regarded as valid by the Russians; for even in the 
Peace Treaty of 1918 between the Soviet Government and 
the Finnish Reds provision was made to cede Petsamo to 
Finland. 
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I have recently made this journey, using a motor-boat to 
cover the distance where the road was then incomplete, and 
it is one of the most interesting and unusual journeys I have 
ever made. This new road is a broad, straight highway, 
stretching in places as far as the eye can see and lined with 
modern telegraph poles and neatly painted milestones. As 
the car swings along over the smooth surface and through 
the invigorating air of the vast pine forests, the fiery sunset 
blazes through the trees and only changes its colouring to 
form the first streaks of the rosy dawn. In summer there 
is no darkness and the days are all rolled into one, so that 
it is almost impossible to distinguish the days of the week. 
The homely inns of the Finnish Tourist Association, built 
of huge logs and fitted with electric light and telephones, 
are open day and night, and there is a constant coming and 
going of travellers who arrive and depart at the oddest 
hours. Breakfast at four in the afternoon and dinner (con­
sisting of porridge, salmon-trout and reindeer meat) at two 
in the morning is nothing out of the ordinary. One may 
travel great distances without meeting a single human being, 
while the only visible signs of habitation are the little wooden 
post-boxes, without locks or even lids, which speak well for 
the honesty of the few Finnish inhabitants. An occasional 
reindeer dashes across in front of the car, but 50 miles an 
hour can be maintained with perfect safety. Between 
Pitkajarvi and Salmijarvi the road was until recently under 
construction, so the first car was abandoned and the journey 
continued in a motor-boat down the Paatsjoki River, which 
carries huge masses of floating pine-logs on their way to 
the sea. This river forms the frontier between Finland 
and Norway, and contains such a bewildering number of 
small islands that many have been labelled according to 
the country to which they belong. From Salmijarvi a 
second car took the traveller still farther north through a 
bleak country, where mists hang low over the rugged land­
scape, and an occasional bear may be seen blundering through 
the undergrowth, until the golden domes of the Russian 
monastery of Alaluostari suddenly glitter in the morning 
sun. Although this little Finnish village is hundreds of 
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miles from anywhere and on the verge of the Polar regions, 
it has all the necessary conveniences of modern civilization. 
Besides the usual comfortable inn, there is an up-to-date 
branch of one of the Finnish banks and telephone com­
munication with the more populous districts of the south, 
while electric light is supplied from an efficient power station 
built and run by an old monk, who is the general provider 
of the district. 
Finland's chief source of wealth is her timber, and almost 
one-fifth of the total population of the country is mainly 
dependent on the timber industry, which is of special 
importance in Finland's foreign trade. Although the Finns 
have lost their principal market, Russia, they have more 
than made up for that loss by extending their commercial 
relations in Europe, in the American continent and in the 
Far East. Moreover, the volume of Finland's foreign trade 
is showing a steady tendency to increase, and Great Britain 
is one of her chief customers. About 40 per cent of Finland's 
total exports find their way to British ports, the greater 
proportion of which consists of timber and wood products ; 
but, while England is Finland's best customer, our export 
trade to Finland falls very short of what one might have 
reason to expect, although this unfortunate state of affairs 
is not entirely the fault of the Finns. Relatively, Finland 
is the most densely forested land in Europe, while absolutely 
she is surpassed only by Russia. The forests, which cover 
two-thirds of the surface of the country, provide an abund­
ance of raw material, and by the development of 
communications fresh tracts of timber land are now being 
brought within the reach of the wood-working industries. 
Spruce, pine, and a certain quantity of birch logs are cut 
up in the saw-mills; spruce and pine also find their way 
to the pulp and cellulose mills, and thence to the paper 
factories; while birch is used chiefly for the manufacture 
of plywood and bobbins, and aspenwood for match factories. 
The enormous quantity of timber, which is annually con­
verted into not less than 40 million saw-logs, is obtained 
partly from the forests of the timber companies and saw­
mill owners, partly from the state forests, and partly from 
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private forests whose proprietors are anxious to realize some 
portion of their timber. The trees are felled during the 
winter, and as soon as sleighing becomes possible on the 
roads the logs are hauled to the nearest waterways. The 
spring floods are used to float the timber down the streams 
and shallow rivers to the nearest lakes, where the logs 
collect to be lashed together in rafts of varying sizes and, 
in the course of the summer, towed across the great lakes 
to the rivers which carry them down to the sea. Here 
the rafts are divided up, and the current carries the logs 
down to the river mouths, where they are again collected 
and sorted, and afterwards distributed to the different 
saw-mills according to their different marks. On some of 
the large waterways, the transport of millions of saw-logs 
calls for a very extensive organization, and the rafting is 
carried out jointly by rafting associations ; but arrangements 
are different on the Saimaa waterways, where the logs are 
sawn up on the lakes and conveyed in lighters through the 
Saimaa Canal to the ports of shipment in the Gulf of Viipuri. 
A great many of the logs from the Saimaa waters are 
carried across the narrow necks of land to the waters con­
necting with the Kymi River ; while sawn wood from the 
Ladoga district has to be carried a long way in barges down 
the Neva, although the railway is also used to a fairly large 
extent for conveying it to harbours on the Gulf of Finland. 
The treatment which the timber undergoes in the saw-mills 
is of a purely mechanical nature, and consists of cutting 
up logs of varying shapes and sizes into straight planks of 
exact dimensions as to breadth and thickness. When the 
wood has been sorted according to dimensions, it is piled 
up near the saw-mill to dry and await shipment. But the 
saw-milling industry cannot be worked so that sales im­
mediately follow production. Shipments cannot as a rule 
be effected during the winter when the harbours are ice­
bound, for even if steamers could force their way out the 
ice prevents the carrying of goods by lighter from the 
wood-yards to the vessels in the harbour, and consequently 
a considerable proportion of the yearly output accumulates 
in the wood-yards. In spring, summer, and autumn 
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shipments are carried on at a brisk rate, so that under 
favourable conditions the stocks of timber should be 
practically exhausted by the time winter sets in. This, 
however, is seldom the case. The saw-mills number between 
four and five hundred, and are to be found all over the 
country, wherever rivers connect with large or small lakes, 
along the railways, chiefly in districts where new lines have 
opened up fresh tracts of forest land, and at the mouths 
of large rivers flowing into the Gulf of Finland and the 
Gulf of Bothnia. Viipuri, Kotka, the neighbourhood of 
Pori, and Kemi are the chief centres of the saw-milling 
industry, and account for a considerable proportion of the 
total output. The traveller in Finland finds wood in some 
form wherever he goes. He is either motoring through 
forests which seem interminable, or he is watching the 
incessant transport of logs in some form or another. It is 
a wonderful and inspiring sight to see the logs dashing down 
through the rapids and swirling round and round in the 
great pools below, where they often become cigar-shaped 
with the constant dashing against the rocks. Through the 
lakes there is an incessant traffic of lighters followed by 
log rafts of great length, and the larger and slower-flowing 
rivers are divided by logs lashed together into two channels, 
one for logs and the other for river traffic. The mills for 
the manufacture of pulp, mechanical and chemical, and the 
subsequent transforming of the same into paper, are often 
erected so near to one another that it is difficult to dis­
tinguish where one begins and the other ends. This inter­
twining of industrial activity and the dependence of the 
paper mills on the pulp mills for their supplies of raw material 
has naturally reacted on industrial organization, and all 
three branches of industry are often operated under uniform 
management. In fact, this system of combination has been 
extended to include saw-mills which use the same raw 
material and produce the waste products used in the cellulose 
mills, so that the Finnish wood industry really consists of 
a number of large organizations working with wide views 
towards a rational use of Finland's chief assets, which are 
to be found in her forests. 
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Water power ranks second as a natural asset, and the 
river rapids are a unique and valuable possession. There 
are over 40,000 lakes in the country, and most of these are 
connected by watercourses, so that waterways form an im­
portant means of communication between the inland forests 
and the timber ports of the Baltic. Where necessary, canals 
have been constructed, and by this means the water system 
of Saimaa has direct communication with the sea at Viipuri. 
Considering the conditions of the country the Saimaa Canal 
is a remarkable piece of engineering, although only small 
ships can pass through it. On its course from Viipuri to 
Lake Saimaa the canal passes through several small lakes 
where the water-level has been raised by damming, while 
in other localities its course is through cuttings and em­
bankments. The Finns are experts in putting water to 
the best use, and the exploitation of their natural resources 
is nowhere more prominent than in the new electric 
schemes, by which power is obtained from the swiftly flow­
ing rapids that are outstanding features of most of the 
Finnish rivers. The new power station at Imatra, where 
the rapids have been harnessed, supplies electricity to all 
Southern Finland. Of the two factors which multiplied 
together give the power available—the height of the fall 
and the volume of water—the latter is great and the former 
small in the case of the Finnish rivers. Waterfalls exceeding 
15 feet in height are rare in Finland, and the falls at Imatra, 
which are about 60 feet high, are distributed over a distance 
of about 1,500 yards. The harnessing of these rapids is, 
therefore, costly, and a large amount of capital is required 
for the conservation of their water-power. Although it is 
difficult to estimate the exact value of these vast resources, 
the fact remains that, in spite of the difficulties and expense 
involved, industry is greatly attracted towards a source of 
power which will never fail. The water power actually avail­
able for industrial purposes has been estimated at 2,300,000 
horse-power (including that of the rivers flowing into the 
Arctic Ocean), and of this only about 14 per cent has yet 
been utilized. Possibilities of future development are practi­
cally unlimited, and by the building of the power station at 
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Imatra, which is now completed, the amount of available 
and consumed water-power has been greatly augmented. 
While about 60 per cent of the area of Finland consists 
of forest land, about 10 per cent is cultivated, the remainder 
being occupied by lakes and swamps. Yet agriculture plays 
a very important part in Finnish life, and together with 
forestry is closely supervised by the Government so that 
Finland's natural resources are protected by legislation. 
Although it cannot be said that the country is at present 
self-supporting, there is little doubt that it could be made 
so in case of necessity. The Finnish farmer is progressive to 
a marked degree, due to the high value put upon land which 
has been made cultivable by immense labour. Indeed, 
there are few countries where scientific methods of farming 
have made greater progress in recent years, thanks to the 
enthusiasm with which the farmers and landowners have 
made use of the benefits of the co-operative system. Co­
operative societies provide almost all the farmer's needs, 
and assist him greatly in the disposal of his produce. Oats 
is the most important crop in Finland, while rye and wheat 
are grown as autumn crops, the former on a far greater scale 
than the latter. Rye bread is to be found almost every­
where, and it is with difficulty that ordinary white bread 
can be obtained outside the principal cities. It is, however, 
in the development of dairy-farming that the Finnish 
farmers have found their most profitable occupation, and 
it looks as if there is a great future in store for this form of 
produce. The export of butter and cheese is carried out 
on the most scientific basis, and my visits to dairies in the 
interior, as well as to the testing station at the port of 
Hanko, were a revelation of what the Finns have achieved 
by co-operation. The whole system of making, handling, 
testing, and exporting these dairy products has been raised 
to the highest pitch of perfection attainable under modern 
conditions. Although farming is carried on in most of the 
southern half of Finland, the northern half of which is 
almost entirely composed of forests, the chief areas of 
cultivation are situated in the south, the south-west, and 
west of the country, where the population is greatest. The 
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average area per holding in the south does not exceed 100 
hectares, while the farther north one goes the larger the 
holdings become, owing to the smaller percentage of cultiv­
able land. But the chief feature of agriculture in Finland 
is that the Finnish peasant is far above the ordinary peasant 
of continental Europe. He is a small farmer, but he is 
well educated, enterprising, and progressive, and he is getting 
the best out of the country in spite of disadvantages of 
climate and natural conditions. 
Although Finland is essentially an agricultural country, 
industry is an equally important consideration in this new 
republic. Industrial enterprise first appeared as a factor 
of importance in Finnish business life about 1870, so that 
it was not until long after England and the West European 
countries had witnessed the great industrial revolution, and 
the consequent radical changes in their national economy, 
that industrial concerns of any importance came into being 
in Finland. With such means of communication as then 
existed, Finland was very remote from the centre of com­
merce. A struggling iron industry had survived from earlier 
days, and the present up-to-date textile industry was then 
in its infancy, but it was not until the forests, the country's 
great natural asset, became the object of industrial enter­
prise that industry on a large scale obtained a firm footing. 
Steam then gained ground as the motive power in 
the saw-mills, and enterprising merchants ventured for 
the first time to let the great rivers carry logs from the 
interior down to the seaports ; the manufacture of woodr 
pulp was begun, and a newly awakened energy became 
apparent in all directions. The first railways were built in 
1868, and the Saimaa Canal was opened for traffic. During 
this period the first joint-stock banks were established, and 
the conditions necessary for industrial development were 
brought into existence for the first time. Finnish exports, 
which in 1850 did not exceed about 20 million Finnish marks, 
had by 1870 risen to practically 50 millions and were steadily 
growing. Ever since this critical time Finnish industry 
has made steady progress. New ideas have been rapidly 
adopted, output has risen both in quantity and quality, and 
4 
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industry must now be regarded as a most important factor 
in the economic life of Finland. About 130,000 workers 
are engaged in industrial occupations, the value of industrial 
products may be estimated at about £70,000,000, and the in­
dustries using the staple raw material of the country produce 
more than four-fifths of the whole value of Finnish exports. 
Up to the present very few deposits of important minerals 
have been found in Finland, but it is possible that the 
future will reveal some hidden treasures of that kind ; but 
industry has made use of the primary rock itself, and certain 
kinds of granite are quarried for building and various other 
purposes. Flax is cultivated in increasing quantities and 
provides a large part of the raw material for the only linen 
mill in the country, which has a very considerable annual 
output; and in recent years sugar beet has been grown for 
refinement in Finnish sugar factories. The above are the 
principal natural assets utilized by those Finnish industries 
which, by working up native raw material, produce goods 
for international commerce. But in addition to this first 
group of industries there exist a second class, the so-called 
import industries, which produce Finnish articles from raw 
or semi-manufactured materials brought from abroad, 
although about 60 per cent of the country's need of raw 
material is supplied from her natural resources. 
A further factor of vital importance to the growth of 
industry is sufficient capital. Finland has always suffered 
from lack of capital, which continues to the present day, 
and has undoubtedly handicapped industrial development. 
A shortage of money has also had an influence on the mode 
of financing large undertakings. It has not been possible 
to obtain large sums of money from private individuals, 
and usually the capital has had to be found by appealing 
to a number of small investors. In this way the joint-stock 
company has become typical of industrial activity in Finland, 
and private individuals are seldom found as the owners of 
important undertakings. Certain large industrial establish­
ments are state-owned, and the municipalities own various 
undertakings, but the joint-stock company predominates in 
Finnish industry. Bank credits still play a prominent role 
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in procuring the necessary funds, and it is significant that 
the greater part of the credit advanced is of Finnish origin ; 
but foreign capital has lately to a considerable extent con­
tributed to the rise and expenses of industry, almost exclu­
sively by long-term credit loans. As far as the currency 
is concerned, the position is now satisfactory. The Great 
War, of course, caused a period of serious monetary 
disturbance, and the depreciation of the Finnish mark was, 
at first, largely due to the strain which Russian war finance 
put on the Finnish banking system. Then, at the end of 
1917, Finland had to cover the increased expenditure 
incurred by her position as an independent state, and had 
to meet the expenses of the War of Independence in the 
spring of 1918. As there was difficulty in the collection 
of taxes owing to the disturbed state of the country, the 
Government resorted to increased borrowing, and part of 
the demand for credit was met by new note issues made 
by the Bank of Finland. During the period 1919-21 the 
exchange seriously declined, but towards the end of 1922 
the State Bank stabilized the exchange in relation to the 
dollar, and since then fluctuations have been slight. Finally, 
at the end of 1925, the Finnish currency was put on a gold 
basis, the exchange being approximately 193-23 Finnish 
marks to the pound sterling. 
The third essential of industrial activity is an adequate 
supply of human labour, which has never been lacking in 
Finland, though never superabundant. This factor has 
therefore not favoured the rise of industry, but has of late 
years occasionally presented a difficulty, as the necessary 
supply of labour has not always been with certainty 
available. As far as the technical side of the question is 
concerned, it may be said that, thanks to present-day 
communications, new ideas will rapidly find their way to 
Finland, and will be put into practice wherever feasible. 
It is now possible to obtain a thorough technical education 
and the establishment of the Central Laboratory of Industry 
in Helsinki, with the object of carrying out research work 
with regard to the more effective use of Finnish raw materials, 
illustrates the effort made to put scientific theories into 
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practice; while a visit to the industrial centre of Tampere 
is convincing of the energy and resource of Finnish industry. 
In few countries do the workers live under such favourable 
conditions. There has been no unemployment for many 
years, there is little illiteracy, and the cities have no slums. 
By means of education, technical instruction, and the 
co-operative movement, the status of the workers has been 
raised to a very high standard, while woman and child 
welfare is receiving scientific attention on the most up-to-
date lines. The position of women is a striking feature of 
the Finnish social system, and the women's contribution to 
the welfare and progress of the country is almost equal to 
that of the men. 
Owing to Finland's position as a next-door neighbour to 
Soviet Russia, the question of defence is one which not 
only occupies the serious attention of the Government, but 
is also of special interest to every Finn from one end of the 
country to the other. The army, recruited on the principle 
of universal service, is a military force in the making, which, 
thanks to a very efficient and up-to-date General Staff, is 
already showing signs of substantial efficiency founded on 
the best methods of the great European armies. The 
material from which the men are drawn is first-class, the 
Finnish non-commissioned officer and private soldier being 
very fine examples of manhood. They are mentally and 
physically healthy, and their national disposition is such 
that military service is not an irksome duty. The officers 
may be divided into three grades: the officers of the old 
Finnish army which was dissolved under the Russian regime ; 
those who have received a thorough military training with 
the Jager Battalion that went to Germany under the auspices 
of the Finnish national movement in 1915-17, and now form 
the nucleus of the new military organization ; and those 
who have become officers since that time and are receiving 
their experience in the new Finnish units. While the two 
former may be regarded as a highly trained and experienced 
corps of officers, the latter are being trained on a thorough 
and carefully thought-out system which should in time ensure 
a high standard of military knowledge. But national feeling 
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in the matter of defence finds expression chiefly in the 
Defence Corps, or volunteer Civic Guards, which are re­
cruited only from the most reliable citizens and occupy a 
very important position in Finnish national life. The train­
ing of these volunteer officers and soldiers is conducted on 
lines no less advanced than those of the army; and the 
methods of instruction, especially the system of indoor 
training devised for the long winter months, are striking 
in their novelty and attraction. The Lotta Svard, an 
organization attached to the Defence Corps, which deals 
with clothing and equipment of the troops, besides attending 
to their feeding during manoeuvres, is entirely in the hands 
of women. Throughout Finland the Defence Corps is 
exceedingly popular, and so enthusiastic are the people to 
support its interests that those who cannot serve in its ranks 
contribute to its funds in a most generous way. During 
my recent visit to Finland I was much impressed by the 
spirit of self-sacrificing patriotism which permeates the whole 
Finnish nation. Finnish patriotism is not one of the fine-
weather variety, but the kind that puts love of country 
before love of self and is one of the qualities that makes 
nations great. 
Perhaps the most valuable feature of the lake system in 
Finland is its defensive strength, which adds considerably 
to the security of the country against possible aggression. 
Military operations in such a country would be exceedingly 
difficult to carry out except by an army knowing well the 
peculiarities of the terrain, and for this reason an invading 
force would be at a great disadvantage. The Finns are fully 
aware of this factor in their favour, and are sparing them­
selves no effort to make the best use of the geographical 
features in order to make them a still more formidable 
obstacle. But, if the inland waterways are an obstacle to 
military movement in summer, they are the very opposite 
in winter ; for snow and ice convert the whole country into 
one great slippery crust over which men on skis can move 
with great rapidity. The Finns are expert ski-ers, and 
the pace at which they cover great distances in winter 
is almost unbelievable. Hence the whole Finnish army, 
i 
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including guns, transport and aeroplanes, takes to skis as 
soon as weather conditions permit, and swift offensive action 
becomes an even more important factor in military training 
than it is under conditions where natural obstacles are the 
dominating feature. 
Having given a rough outline of Finland's internal posi­
tion, her place in the international sphere must now be 
considered from the view that independence, political and 
commercial, is the chief axiom of her policy, which is framed 
to give expression to this precept. From one end of the 
country to the other there is strong opposition to any form 
of external alliances or to commercial relations which are 
likely to lead to foreign influences. The Finnish attitude 
towards Soviet Russia is friendly but cautious. The Finns 
are not afraid of Russia, but they are anxious to safeguard 
themselves against any attempts to force or attract Finland 
within the Russian orbit. Their strategical position, guard­
ing the northern side of the entrance to the Neva and 
separating Russia from Scandinavia, enables the Finnish 
Government to keep a sharp eye on the eastern horizon, 
and there is probably no Government in the world which 
has more accurate knowledge of Russian affairs than that 
of Helsinki. The Russian frontier is at a railway bridge 
near the station of Rajajoki. This frontier bridge, which 
is painted red on the Russian and white on the Finnish side, 
joins the banks of a strange river, so dark brown in colour 
that it almost has the appearance of blood ; and so great is 
the curiosity to gaze at the Bolshevists on their own soil that 
large numbers of people motor to the frontier every Sunday 
from the Finnish city of Viipuri. In fact, the Bolshevist 
soldiers have become so shy of the vast number of cameras 
that have been pointed at them that the taking of photo­
graphs is now forbidden by the Finnish authorities at the 
special request of Moscow. The contrast between the two 
sides of the river is most remarkable. While on the one 
side flies the fresh-looking flag of Finland (a blue cross on 
a white ground), on the other a red Russian ensign adorns 
a stunted and rather crooked flagstaff. But the greatest 
difference is to be found in the buildings. On the Finnish 
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side clean, tidy-looking cottages are clustered round the 
well-kept frontier station, and there are flowers in every 
window, yet a few yards farther east, across the bridge, 
there is nothing but a collection of broken-down wooden 
shacks surrounded by squalid little cabbage patches. 
Before the war this particular part of the country was a 
fashionable seaside resort for the wealthy Russians of 
St. Petersburg, which is so near to the present frontier that 
the fortress of Kronstadt is clearly visible ; but to-day the 
luxurious villas in which they lived are falling to pieces one 
by one, and chickens have made their home in some of the 
richly decorated rooms. Once this famous little bridge 
bore the burden of the heavy traffic between St. Petersburg 
and Helsingfors, and the Tsar crossed it as Grand Duke of 
Finland. Now that Finland is a progressive, independent 
state, it merely serves to separate European civilization 
from the barbarism into which the Bolshevists have dragged 
their gigantic country. 
Perfectly friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. are always 
maintained, and any measures inclined to be provocative 
are carefully avoided ; but, at the same time, the Finns 
will not submit to dictation from anyone, and any attempt 
in this direction is likely to produce an attitude of the most 
stubborn resistance. With Sweden the Finns have long 
been on the most friendly terms, and, the question of the 
Aland islands finally settled, relations between the two 
countries tend to become closer than ever. With Sweden 
Finland has a great deal in common politically, commercially, 
and strategically. Their interests in maintaining a peaceful 
Baltic and in remaining detached from such entanglements 
as might lead to trouble are very similar; they are both 
countries largely concerned with the timber trade and with 
the commercial policy which that involves ; and they have 
a common strategical significance with regard to potential 
enemies and disturbers of the status quo established after 
the Great War. Naturally Finland's position vis-d-vis 
Russia is more difficult than that of Sweden, and that 
country's moral support and friendly, though neutral, atti­
tude would be of considerable value to Finland in case of 
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emergency. For this reason Finland is inclined to adopt a 
Scandinavian orientation. But aggression is utterly alien and 
contrary to all political and moral ideas in Finland, and in 
military matters all Finnish efforts are strictly defensive. 
In her relations with the Baltic States the Finns show a 
marked degree of sympathy, and there is much similarity 
between Swedish-Finnish relations on the one hand and 
Finnish-Baltic relations on the other. If Sweden is ahead 
of Finland in culture and progress, Finland is equally more 
advanced than any of the new Baltic countries. It is with 
Estonia and Latvia that Finland is most concerned, and it 
is of the utmost importance to her that these republics should 
maintain their independence. Although the Finns have not 
concluded any defensive alliance with any of the states 
bordering on Russia, this in no way diminishes their close 
sympathy and consideration for those who share with them 
a common interest. I was specially struck when in Finland 
with the almost brotherly affection which the Finns have 
for the Estonians, whom they regard as their kinsmen across 
the sea. A great interest is taken in all Estonian affairs, 
and there is much coming and going between Helsinki and 
Tallinn. Marriages between Finns and Estonians are 
common, there is a similarity of language and race, and 
a keen interest on the part of the one in the welfare and 
prosperity of the other. In the case of Latvia, distance and 
a difference of race and language makes a common political 
interest the predominant feature of mutual relationships, 
but the Finns are deeply interested in what happens in 
Riga and heartily welcome the successes and achievements 
of the Latvian people. Naturally, these two Baltic countries 
are anxious that Finland should join them in a defensive 
alliance against Russia, and they never cease pressing their 
desires in this respect. In this they make a profound 
mistake, for by so doing they are much more likely to produce 
stubborn resistance than any modification of the Finnish 
view. With Lithuania the Finns have comparatively few 
dealings, but the relations between the two countries are 
very cordial, and the Finns have great sympathy with the 
Lithuanian people. Finland and Poland are geographically 
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far apart, but in Finland there has always been a very sincere 
admiration for the Poles in their immense difficulties of the 
past, and the Finns follow with the keenest interest the 
progress of Poland in her political and economic reconstruc­
tion and consolidation. Lately the commerce between these 
two countries has grown considerably, and this factor also 
tends to strengthen the old friendship between Finns and 
Poles. But the Finns very wisely prefer a policy of detach­
ment leaving them free to act according to circumstances 
when and if the need for a decision arises. 
Among the Great Powers Great Britain and the United 
States are the most sought after, and Finland hopes that 
their friendship and support will be valuable aids to her 
progress, besides being political and financial sources of 
strength to resort to in case of need. For both the British 
and American systems of national life the Finns have a 
profound admiration, and they carefully study all new 
developments in London and Washington with a view to 
finding ideas suitable for adaptation to the Finnish national 
structure. For Germany the Finns have a considerable 
admiration, partly owing to the German help given in 
their hour of need and partly to the sound characteristics of 
the German people. But the forward commercial policy 
of Germany finds little favour in Finland for reasons which 
I have already given. But Russia is the country on which 
Finnish eyes are always set. Fortunately, the geographical 
position of the country and the large number of forests, lakes 
and rivers of which the interior is largely composed render 
Finnish territory particularly suitable for defensive purposes, 
while the national characteristics of the Finns form an 
equally strong protection against the inroads of revolu­
tionary propaganda. Further, although the Finnish ports 
are connected by rail with Petrograd, they by no means 
fall under the same category of importance to Russia as the 
Estonian port of Tallinn and the Latvian ports of Riga and 
Libau; and the fact that Russia is no longer Finland's prin­
cipal market removes all question of economic pressure. It 
may, therefore, be assumed that the Finns are comparatively 
secure from any immediate danger of Russian aggression. 
CHAPTER III 
ESTONIA AS A SOVEREIGN STATE 
WHEN, however, one investigates the conditions prevailing in the Baltic States, a sufficiently marked contrast at once becomes apparent. But 
before judging these conditions in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania it must always be remembered that, unlike Fin­
land, these territories formed provinces of the Russian 
Empire, were completely under Russian domination, and 
had few autonomous institutions of any kind. The people 
were not even permitted to use their own language for 
official purposes, their culture was suppressed, and they 
were submitted to a considerable degree of oppression. 
Those who did not suffer at the hands of the ' Baltic barons ' 
were under the heel of the Russian officials, so that, when 
at last they found themselves free, they had little experience 
for the creation of the entirely new machinery of independent 
states. The difficulties, financial and otherwise, with which 
they had to contend were sufficient to tax the strength of 
the most resolute people. 
In the space at my disposal it is impossible to enter into 
details of Estonian history or to give even a general survey 
of the events bringing about the terrible oppression that 
afflicted the Estonians throughout the centuries, but the 
following rough sketch of events will supply some back­
ground for what has taken place since the termination of 
the Great War. The Estonians, the most progressive and 
enterprising of the western branch of the Finno-Ugrian 
family, settled in what is now Estonia during the early 
part of the Christian era. For eight to nine centuries they 
lived in their communities under chiefs or elders, who in 
time of war often commanded the united forces of the entire 
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country. When in A.D. 1208 a Crusade of German Knights 
of the Sword was formed against them, the ancient warlike 
traditions of the people were still very much alive, and it 
was only in A.D. 1227 that the whole country was subjugated 
by the German Order with the help of Waldemar II of 
Denmark, who built the castle of Tallinn where the State 
Assembly of Estonia now conducts its deliberations. After 
an Estonian revolt which they were unable to suppress, the 
Danes sold their Estonian possessions.in 1346 to the German 
Order, who thus obtained control of the whole territory until 
1561, when Ivan the Terrible destroyed the Livonian State 
and the whole country was overrun by the Muscovites. As 
the German Order was not strong enough to resist this 
powerful enemy single-handed, a part of its southern pos­
sessions was pledged in 1558 to Poland in return for military 
support and finally, when the military impotence of the 
Order became more than evident, the city of Tallinn, which 
already maintained a thriving trade between the East 
and West, joined with the nobility of Northern Estonia 
in an oath of allegiance to Erik XIV of Sweden. 
During the Livonian war (1558-83) Tallinn was twice 
besieged by the armies of the Tsar, and it was not until 
1583 that the country was finally freed from the invaders 
after the victories of the Swedish field-marshal Pontus de 
la Gardie, whose magnificent tomb still adorns the Dome 
Church in the Estonian capital. At this juncture Poland 
retained the southern part of the Baltic countries while 
Sweden occupied the north, but on the accession of Sigis-
mund III of Sweden and Poland both parts were united 
under one rule. But it was not long before the king's uncle, 
Duke Charles of Sodermanland, seized the Swedish throne 
from Sigismund, landed in Estonia and began hos­
tilities against his nephew ; and this was continued by 
his son, Gustavus Adolphus, who secured the eastern frontier 
by annexing Ingermanland in 1617 (or what is now the 
province of Petrograd), and finally conquered the southern 
territory. As in the previous century, Estonia had to sub­
mit to another Russian invasion ; for, when Charles X was 
engaged in a new war with Poland, the Tsar Alexis seized the 
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opportunity to break into the country. Tartu was besieged 
and taken, but the invaders made no further headway and 
were compelled to relinquish the occupied territory in 1661. 
During the period preceding Polish and Swedish dominion 
the position of the peasantry had become extremely difficult. 
Serfdom was almost general. The barons considered the 
peasants as their personal property, over which they had 
even the right of criminal jurisdiction, and these conditions 
were only alleviated in the seventeenth century by the 
intervention of the Swedish kings. In 1630 Gustavus 
Adolphus established the Royal Court of Justice at Tartu, 
granting to the peasants for the first time the right to raise 
complaints against the nobility, and two years later the 
rights of the landowners with regard to criminal jurisdiction 
were definitely abolished. The king further demonstrated 
his generous intentions by stating that he wanted peasants 
to be admitted to Tartu University, and he signed the 
statutes of the University shortly before the end of his 
promising reign, which was followed by a further period of 
hope. In 1680 the Stockholm Diet pronounced itself in 
favour of a reduction of estates held by the nobility as fiefs, 
with the result that 85 per cent of the estates owned by 
the nobility of Livonia (a province including the south of 
modern Estonia), 40 per cent of the estates of Estonia, and 
25 per cent of the estates of the island of Saaremaa, were 
taken from their owners. The work of the peasants on these 
estates was fixed and alleviated, schools were opened, and 
teachers, often chosen from the peasants themselves, were 
provided. One may imagine the conditions under which 
the peasants had been living, when even these moderate 
innovations caused this period to be spoken of as ' the good 
old Swedish times '. 
These social reforms embittered the nobility, who strove 
to undermine the confidence of the king (Charles XI) in 
his governor-general, and sent a special delegation to Stock­
holm under Johan Reinhold Patkul. The delegates were 
accused of high treason, and Patkul escaped to the Saxon 
court where, acting in the interests of the nobility, he was 
instrumental in bringing about an alliance of Russia, Poland 
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(then under August II of Saxony) and Denmark against 
Sweden. Patkul was indeed responsible for the first ill-fated 
campaign of the Saxons against Riga in 1700, shortly after 
which Tsar Peter appeared with a Russian army before 
Narva. Both armies were defeated within a short space of 
time owing to the military genius of Charles XII, but Estonia 
still remained open to Russian invasions. Tartu and Narva 
fell in 1704, being destroyed a few years later when part 
of their populations were deported to the interior of Russia, 
and it was during this time that Peter I conceived the idea 
of conquering the Baltic provinces, relinquished by August II 
of Saxony who was formerly to have received them as former 
Polish possessions. At the conclusion of this conquest the 
Tsar showed a remarkable leniency towards the Baltic 
nobility, and the Swedish reduction of the estates was 
abolished. Once more the landowner had absolute jurisdic­
tion over the peasant, and the nobility were confirmed in 
the right to form a Local Government which endured right 
up till 1917. The Treaty of Uusikaupunki,1 concluded in 
1721, finally gave the Baltic provinces to Russia. 
The eighteenth century was the ' dark age ' of Estonian 
history, and this was specially true of the first half of the 
century when the peasants were considered to be the pro­
perty of the landowners in terms of Roman law. The 
peasants sought consolation in religion, and the sect of 
Moravian brothers gained a large number of adherents in 
spite of official persecution. This movement exercised a 
strong influence on the spiritual life of the people for over 
a century. The attempts made by Catherine the Great of 
Russia to improve the conditions of peasant life failed owing 
to the resistance of the ruling class, and it was only in 1804, 
during the first liberal period of the reign of Alexander I, 
that the Livonian Peasant Law was passed, in some degree 
restoring the rights possessed by the peasantry during the 
period of Swedish rule. According to this law a peasant 
could no more be separated from his farm, only landless 
labourers and servants could be sold, and the peasants 
were given the right of private property and inheritance. 
1 Nystad in Swedish. 
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Also, the work of the peasants was determined so as to 
preclude arbitrary measures on the part of their masters. 
As was to be expected, this measure incurred the hostility 
of the conservative section of the nobility, who preferred 
individual liberation of the peasants to the partial surrender 
of their rights over peasant property, with the result that 
the peasants were liberated in Estonia in 1816 and in 
Livonia in 1819 without receiving any land, and the law of 
1804, according to which the peasants could no more be 
separated from their farms, was practically annulled. 
The liberal regime which followed in Russia the un­
successful Crimean War was the occasion of introducing 
several important reforms. The forcible annexation of 
peasant lands to the estates was stopped, and peasants were 
granted long-term leases and the right of purchasing land, 
but in order to provide land for the servants and labourers 
of the estates one-sixth of the peasant lands was still expro­
priated and added to the property of the big landowners. 
In 1868 the corvee (or forced labour) was finally abolished, 
and some years previously the nobles lost the right of 
inflicting corporal punishment on the peasants without a 
trial. Peasants were no longer compelled to ask the per­
mission of their landowners before marrying, and they could 
freely choose their profession and move from one place to 
another without hindrance. These were the last reforms to 
be introduced by the Russians, and right up to the revolution 
of 1917 peasant rights were entirely subordinate to those 
of the landowning classes. In many cases peasants were 
not entitled to have on their own land any mills, factories, 
shops, or other commercial enterprises, but they had to 
repair the roads, maintain postal communications, and 
provide money for schools and for the local government, 
which remained entirely in the hands of the nobility. 
During the second half of the nineteenth century the land 
question and education were the foremost claims of the 
Estonian popular leaders, and the first political newspaper 
was started soon after the peasant revolts in 1855. The 
liberal reforms of the 'sixties were hailed as the dawn of a 
new era, and the theory of co-operation with Russian 
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liberalism was proclaimed. This was, however, in vain, for 
with the accession of the reactionary Alexander III Russian 
liberalism lost its former influence. In the 'eighties a policy 
of ruthless Russificationwas adopted, and Russian superseded 
German as the language of all the schools, of the university, 
and of the courts of justice, with an increase in illiteracy 
as the result. Estonian officials were transferred to the 
interior of Russia to be replaced by Russians ignorant of 
the Estonian language and local needs. As these measures 
affected the nobility as well as the peasants, it was thought 
that a compromise might be effected for a common resistance, 
but in the early 'nineties the landowners forestalled this hope 
by themselves coming to an arrangement with the Russian 
administration. In return for assurances that they would 
be left in control of the local government they agreed to 
accept the policy of Russification, which lasted until the 
Russian Revolution in 1917. It therefore became increas­
ingly clear that other methods must be adopted if popular 
aspirations were to prevail, and economic independence was 
regarded as essential to political freedom. Vigorous co­
operative and educational movements sprang up, and 
national consciousness was further developed by the press, 
the new national literature, and by the national song festivals 
for which Estonia is famous. In 1904 the Estonians 
succeeded in wresting the municipal administration of 
Tallinn from the ' Baits V who had previously held it on 
the grounds of a conservative electoral law; and although 
the revolution of 1905 failed to fulfil expectations, the 
nationalist movement gained considerably in strength owing 
to the severity with which it was suppressed and the fact 
that the greater part of the nobility co-operated with the 
Russians in even the harshest of their measures. 
While political activities were restricted to the declarations 
of the Estonian members of the Duma, who claimed educa­
tion in the mother tongue, settlement of the land question, 
and the reorganization of the Local Government, the 
economic and cultural progress of the people continued 
unabated. Farmers' societies performed the functions 
1 Descendants of the Teutonic Knights. 
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neglected by the Local Government, while private schools, 
co-operative banks, and sales organizations were established 
in ever-increasing numbers. Although the Russian gover­
nors resorted to every possible device for curbing the 
Estonian National movement, they were unable to arrest 
its natural development. The national and democratic 
ideas of Western Europe permeated the whole mass of the 
people, who were merely waiting for an opportunity to 
create conditions of social and political justice. This 
opportunity was provided by the Great War, which came 
as a blessing to these sorely tried people. Having 
contributed their full share of men and material to the 
Russian army and navy, the Estonians never lost hope that 
the liberation of the hitherto oppressed peoples would be 
one of the results of the European upheaval. Their hopes 
were finally realized when the events following 1917 severed 
the bonds connecting Estonia with the Russian Empire, 
and when, immediately after the overthrow of the Russian 
Provisional Government, the Estonian Diet declared its 
supreme power and on the 24th February, 1918, proclaimed 
the independence of Estonia. 
A German occupation followed, which left the country 
depleted of leaders, arms and supplies, and was the fore-runner 
of another Russian invasion that led to yet a further struggle 
before independence was substantially assured. During 
these operations Estonia received many signs of encourage­
ment from the Western Powers, especially Great Britain 
and the United States, and active assistance in the dispatch 
of a British naval squadron and detachments of Finnish 
volunteers.1 Yet, Estonia with all her troubles was able 
to help her neighbour, Latvia, which had to face a still more 
desperate situation,2 until the excellent fighting qualities 
of the two nations finally crushed the Bolsheviks and 
Germans, and an armistice was proclaimed leading to the 
Peace Treaty of Tartu in February, 1920. 
It was only after the conclusion of this Peace Treaty with 
Russia that the Estonian people had a chance for the first 
1 There were also a few hundred Swedish and Danish volunteers 
2 Vide Chapter IV. 
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time of organizing the economic life of their country and 
setting their internal affairs in order. A constitution, 
closely resembling that of the German Republic, was passed 
by the Constituent Assembly in June, 1920, and under this 
law citizens of both sexes from the age of twenty have the 
right to vote or stand for election to the Diet. But the 
initiative for legislation does not lie solely with the Diet, for 
25,000 electors may claim a plebiscite or propose a new law. 
There is no possible doubt that the condition of Estonia 
before the Great War and on the conclusion of peace was, 
to say the least of it, deplorable, and that, taking this 
into consideration, the Estonians have achieved a very 
considerable measure of progress since they obtained their 
independence. It is, indeed, surprising that they have 
made so much headway, but there is still room for a great 
deal of improvement. That they have succeeded in setting 
up' a state based on justice, law, and liberty, for the defence 
of internal and external peace', cannot be disputed, and 
a comparison between the state of the country in 1918 and 
what one sees in Estonia to-day shows a very great advance 
in all directions. A stable democratic Government has 
been established where turmoil and insecurity ruled supreme; 
free education in the mother tongue exists where national 
culture was forcibly suppressed ; and conditions of social 
justice have replaced the disabilities under which the great 
majority of the people had suffered for centuries. Before 
the Great War and until 1919 over half of the country was 
in the hands of large landowners, whereas now most of the 
land is nationalized and split up into small holdings. By 
1927, 40,000 new farms had been created, which has gone 
far to eliminate the social unrest among the agricultural 
masses. As Estonia is essentially an agricultural country, 
and as discontent has mostly been connected with the land 
question, this reform has marked a very important advance 
in the right direction, and has been accompanied by a 
considerable increase in agricultural production and in dairy 
farming. 
If the radical policy of land reform in Estonia was the 
cause of undue hardship to the landowning classes, or Baltic 
5 
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barons, it was absolutely necessary for the organization of 
a free and independent state. The Baits had had their 
innings, which had lasted for centuries, and the time had 
now come when the peasants were to have their full share 
in the rights of citizenship. But the newly formed Estonian 
Government, to whom the very word ' landowner ' was 
anathema, were perhaps unduly harsh in their treatment of 
those who had to give up their homes and estates under the 
scheme of land reform. In Estonia more than in Latvia 
the hatred for the Baltic barons had become almost an 
obsession, so that when the estates were divided up the 
authorities saw to it that their former lords and masters 
were reduced to impotence. So much so, indeed, was this 
principle carried out that there are in Estonia to-day a large 
number of noble families living in circumstances of poverty 
and distress. In most cases former landowners have been 
allowed to remain on their estates, but they have to be 
content with a small farm or cottage, while the ancestral 
castle either falls to pieces or is used for some state purpose. 
Yet in judging the Estonians for their treatment of the 
former landowning class it must always be remembered that 
in this particular part of the Baltic Provinces of Russia 
the peasants came in much closer touch with the German 
landlords than they did with the Russian officials, and it 
was therefore against the former that they directed their 
strongest hatred. Although Russian rule was indirectly 
responsible for the extremely backward condition of the 
country and favoured the feudal system, to the Estonian 
peasants it was the Baltic barons who were directly re­
sponsible for their misfortunes. 
According to the Land Reform Law of 1919 the large 
estates belonging to the Baltic barons were seized, and, 
apart from those of the small peasant proprietors, the only 
lands allowed to remain were those belonging to cities, 
charitable and scientific institutions, local governments, 
and lands occupied by cemeteries, churches, and cloisters. 
All other property was nationalized, and a compensation 
law was passed providing for payment according to the real 
value of the land at the time of nationalization. When it 
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is realized that over 96 per cent of the total area of the 
large estates was handed over to the Estonian Government, 
it can be seen that this land reform was of a most revolu­
tionary nature. Once in the hands of the Government these 
lands were distributed as follows : (1) as farms on hereditary-
lease ; (2) as lands on long-term lease, chiefly to municipali­
ties, educational institutions, commercial and industrial 
enterprises or societies for co-operative farming ; and (3) as 
lands on short-term lease to private persons who wished to 
cultivate them as a means of livelihood or to supplement 
their incomes partly derived from other sources. Land 
suitable for cultivation, such as tillage and pasturage, was 
the first to be divided into small holdings, the price being 
based on actual value which could not exceed a fixed amount 
of 40 grammes of gold per hectare for field and meadow lands 
and 4 grammes of gold per hectare for pasturage and forest 
land. The annual rent has been fixed at 4 per cent of 
the value with an addition of a small amount to cover 
administrative expenses, and this is paid in instalments twice 
a year. In the case of purchase payment is arranged accord­
ing to the desire of the purchaser, and it may either be made 
in one lump sum or by instalments extending over a period 
not exceeding sixty years. In the latter case 4 per cent 
interest is charged, with 0-25 per cent for expenses and 
a redemption interest according to the terms of amortization. 
All income from the sale or lease of state lands, after deduct­
ing administrative expenses, goes to form a state colonization 
fund for use as the Government may decide. Provision has 
also been made for subsidies in the form of long-term loans 
for the construction of buildings, purchase of stock, and 
improvement of land ; while extensive improvements in the 
way of drainage, etc., are carried out at the expense of the 
state or local government in question. Nationalized forests 
remain at the disposal of the Government, while waste land 
and marshes form a land reserve, which in course of time 
will be reclaimed and rendered suitable for distribution in 
small holdings. 
The reorganization of agriculture, the drainage, stocking, 
equipment, and general capitalization of the new small 
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holdings, together with the training of the new peasant 
farmers and the establishment of agricultural co-operative 
societies, has been a formidable task for a Government with 
little previous experience. But while it is too much to say 
that success has already been achieved, a good beginning 
has undoubtedly been made and, considering the obstacles 
in the way of progress, the Estonian nation have done, and 
are doing, what would have been thought quite impossible 
ten years ago. The Estonians, with their faults and dis­
abilities, have ' put their shoulders to the wheel' and deserve 
every possible encouragement from those who can give them 
a helping hand. Before the Great War Estonia was one 
of the principal sources of St. Petersburg's food supply, and 
the port of Tallinn was one of Russia's main northern outlets 
to the sea, but since then an agricultural revolution has taken 
place and agriculture has lost its normal market. Yet, with 
the assistance of the co-operative societies, Estonian agricul­
ture is now developing on entirely new lines. The people 
are specializing in cattle-breeding, dairy farming, and flax 
production, while the export of butter is controlled by the 
state with a view to maintaining a definite standard of 
quality, and new markets have been found in Germany, 
England, and elsewhere. The fact that the land under 
forage crops amounts to about 60 per cent of the total 
cultivated area points to the importance of stock-raising 
in Estonia, which, from a pecuniary point of view, is the 
chief branch of farming. Although handicapped by a 
failure of crops in 1923, there has been a general increase 
in this branch since the war, and statistics show that there 
are now 28 per cent more horses, 18 per cent more cattle, 
43 more cows, 23 per cent more sheep, and 15 per cent more 
pigs in the country than there were in the days of Russian 
rule. In this, as in all branches of agriculture, the Estonians 
have set themselves to study the very best methods suited 
to their needs, and are directing their agricultural policy, 
educational and otherwise, so as to build up a sound founda­
tion for future development. During all the years since 
Estonia obtained her independence there has been a favour­
able balance in her agricultural foreign trade, even in the 
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bad year of 1923, and the part played by agriculture in the 
foreign trade of the country has been consistently increasing. 
It may, therefore, be concluded that the Land Reform of 
1919, although primarily intended as a measure of social 
justice, has also proved to be an economic success. 
Next to agriculture came the reconstruction of Estonian 
industries, which are chiefly centred at the port of Tallinn 
and at the frontier town of Narva ; and the restoration of 
equipment removed during the war and finding new markets 
are problems which still confront Estonian manufacturers. 
Before the Great War there had grown up at Tallinn, within 
easy reach of foreign coal, a considerable industry—ship­
building, metallurgical shops, textile mills, etc.—designed 
to supply the Russian market and largely to meet the 
requirements of the Russian army and navy. At Narva 
the Kraenholm Cotton Mills, with 500,000 spindles and 
4,000 looms, was, and still is, one of the largest mills in the 
world. In the first few years of Estonian independence 
the difficulties with which industry had to contend were of 
the first magnitude. It had lost its capital, its skilled 
workers were dispersed, its machinery partly evacuated 
and destroyed, there was no raw material, and there was 
neither fuel nor connections with the outside world. Yet 
high hopes were placed on the future of the larger industrial 
undertakings, and considerable sums were advanced by the 
State Bank, with the result that by 1923-4 the credit and 
banking situation of the country became highly critical 
and a considerable proportion of the gold reserve obtained 
from Russia under the Treaty of Tartu was lost. But, 
although industrial production has not yet reached the 
pre-war level, chiefly owing to the difficulty of replacing 
machinery and equipment destroyed or removed by the 
Russians and Germans, a substantial advance has taken 
place. The large establishments of the metal industry had 
suffered most, the greater part of their machinery having 
been forcibly removed to the interior of Russia, and con­
sequently they employ less than a quarter of the workers 
of pre-war times ; but the textile industry has partly 
succeeded in recovering its former position, and has been 
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adapted to foreign markets. As the largest pulp mill in 
Estonia, with an annual production of 60,000 tons of sulphate 
cellulose, was completely destroyed by the Russian army, 
the production of the paper industry is less than before the 
Great War, but it is significant that all the remaining mills 
have succeeded in increasing their output. The general 
tendency is on the upward grade, and, although it is too 
soon to speak of anything approaching industrial prosperity, 
the energy of the people, assisted by sound technical 
education, is making itself felt in all departments of industry. 
Estonia also possesses certain raw materials, which may 
possibly constitute the basis of a new industrial development 
in the future. Of these the most important are wood and 
oil shale, the latter of which is unusually rich in oil and is 
already used in its crude state in factories and on the railways 
in place of coal, while the former constitutes an additional 
source of fuel, besides supplying the raw material of the 
saw mills, ply-wood factories, and paper industries. During 
the last few years the amount of timber employed in these 
three industries has steadily increased. 
The economic progress which the country has achieved 
may be judged from the growth of the total exports from 
over 2 milliard Estonian marks in 1921 to 9! milliard in 
1925, although this increase is to some extent due to the 
depreciation of the Estonian mark and the rise of prices. 
Direct fiduciary inflation ceased in 1921, and the exchange 
improved slightly during the next two years. With the 
bank inflation of 1923-4 the exchange depreciated from 
about 340 to 460 to the U.S. dollar, but by the end of 1924 
the State Bank had succeeded in bringing down the rate 
to about 373 to the dollar, or 100 Estonian marks to the 
Swedish crown. From January, 1925, onwards the ex­
change remained stable, and in 1928 a new currency basis— 
the f Kroon ', equivalent to 100 Estonian marks, was intro­
duced. The measure of success which have attended 
Estonia's economic reconstruction, in spite of great initial 
difficulties, highly critical periods and inevitable errors in 
policy, has been largely due to the fact that since 1921 she 
has managed to balance her budget. Indeed, not only has 
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the budget been balanced, but the capital outlay necessary 
for her economic reconstruction has been largely met out 
of current revenues. Economically, Estonia has come 
through very heavy weather, but with the help of a British 
financial adviser she has gone far towards reaching a sound 
financial basis, while it is noteworthy that the final stabili­
zation of the currency has been effected without any dis­
location. 
Important though the foregoing considerations may be 
to the Estonians themselves, it is the seaports which form 
the most outstanding feature of the country from an inter­
national point of view. Tallinn was known for centuries 
as the most important harbour of Estonia and one of the 
best commercial ports in the Baltic, having entered the 
Hanseatic League in the thirteenth century and long 
enjoying the privilege of local government with a view to 
developing its commercial importance. In 1870 Tallinn was 
connected by rail with St. Petersburg and became one of 
the principal ports for the Russian import trade ; but during 
the last decades of Russian rule the commercial development 
of the city was hampered by the deliberate policy of the 
Russian Government, which recognized in Tallinn a naval 
base for the Baltic fleet, and endeavoured to prevent the 
expansion of trade by tariff rates on the state railways 
connecting that port with the interior of Russia. When, 
however, Estonia was liberated, these obstacles were re­
moved and a new development began. In recent years 
the harbour has been greatly improved by the construction 
of new quays, storehouses, railways, and by the development 
of other transport facilities, as result of which the working 
and storage capacity of the harbour has been doubled. In 
most years it is possible to keep the port open by means of 
ice-breakers, while sometimes navigation is not hampered 
by ice at all. 
Tallinn is a peculiar city, and it takes some time to orient 
one's impressions of the Estonian capital. There, on the 
shores of the Gulf of Finland, stands this ancient Hanseatic 
city with its noble buildings as witness of its former greatness 
and prosperity. The massive walls, the heavy bastions, the 
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roughly cobbled streets and the northern dignity of the 
churches recall the days when the Teutonic Knights fought 
in the name of the Church to develop commerce and accumu­
late worldly wealth. The gilt-domed Russian church on the 
heights overlooking the main part of the city reminds the 
visitor of centuries of Russian domination. There is a 
distinct German feeling in the air, and yet there is something 
else that takes time to diagnose. In spite of the up-to-date 
tramcars, motor vehicles, and electric light, there is an 
atmosphere of obstinate stagnation. Tallinn is a gloomy 
city, probably owing to the fact that the stone of the older 
buildings is very dark in colour, and the newly erected 
edifices of the new Estonian State stand out in marked 
contrast to the ancient background. Yet these modern 
buildings in no way clash with the old Hanseatic houses, 
all huddled together in the mediaeval quarter, or with the 
old Danish castle on the hill that now flies the Estonian flag 
and houses the State Assembly and a number of the 
Government offices. 
The important fact to bear in mind in connection with 
Tallinn, as indeed with most of the ports of the Baltic States, 
is the fact that the transit trade with Russia is one of the 
foundations on which its prosperity must to some extent 
depend. The Estonians realize that their future much 
depends upon their ability to make Russia feel that she is 
not cut off from the Baltic ports, and their policy in this 
situation has been broad-minded. They are doing every­
thing possible to facilitate Russian transit, without going 
too far, and the improvements of the port of Tallinn have 
been with this end in view. Yet this dependence on 
Russian trade makes the position rather difficult for a 
country with Estonia's situation on the map, although 
the port of Tallinn figures less prominently in Russian 
calculations than the port of Riga farther south. East 
of her frontier at Narva lies that enormous area of Euro­
pean and Asiatic Russia stretching to the shores of the 
Pacific Ocean, and Estonia, lying on the western fringe 
of these countless acres, cannot ignore the ebb and flow 
of Russian affairs. Even if she were to open up entirely 
ESTONIA AS A SOVEREIGN STATE 73 
new markets for her goods, the situation could never be 
entirely changed. 
Although decreasing, the Russian influence still exists in 
no small degree in Estonia, and it is difficult to see how the 
present generation can completely throw it off ; in fact, 
it looks as if Estonia will remain more or less under that 
influence until a new generation comes which never knew 
the conditions of Russian domination. The people show 
unmistakable signs of the conditions to which they had to 
submit for centuries, and it is too much to expect a complete 
transformation in the short space of ten years. Yet the 
standard of education among the Estonians has for some 
time been of a high order, and so much attention is given 
to this department that there is even a fear lest the number 
of university graduates should become out of proportion to 
the population of the country. In the University of Tartu, 
which was reopened in 1919 as a national institution, there 
are over 4,000 students, when the total population of 
Estonia only just exceeds 1 million. Hitherto German has 
been the language of commerce, and Russian is chiefly used 
for communication with the nationals of other Baltic 
countries, but recently it has practically been decided to 
adopt English in the schools as a second language in place 
of German. Estonia, however, is a poor country, and the 
people can ill afford either to buy English books in quantity 
or to pay sufficient salaries to English teachers. Moreover, 
the cost of living in England is so much higher than in Estonia, 
so that Estonians find it very difficult to come to study in 
this country. It is sincerely to be hoped that Lord Cecil's 
recent appeal1 for English books will induce British universi­
ties, libraries, and private individuals to send as donations 
some of their surplus literature. By so doing they would 
not only be helping a gallant little state that is struggling 
to progress with the help of the English language, but they 
would also be making a notable contribution to British 
interests in the Baltic. The Estonians have in the past 
received valuable support from Great Britain, financial 
and otherwise, and their eyes are now turning towards these 
1 The Times, 25th June, 1929. 
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shores for cultural influence as well as moral and material 
support. The foundations of prosperity undoubtedly exist, 
the country is one that lends itself to development, and the 
will of the people is on the side of progressive endeavour ; 
but the lack of funds and the necessary expert advice in 
technical matters stand in the way of a strong forward 
policy. Estonian enterprise exists in a somewhat con­
spicuous degree, but it needs the support and encourage­
ment of others to set it running on sound and profitable 
lines. Railway improvements, roads, town planning, urban 
and rural development, and building are among the depart­
ments calling for urgent attention ; and there is ample 
scope for those seeking new openings, provided that the 
Estonians themselves see the necessity of encouraging 
external help. 
The Estonians are a young nation and are, therefore, 
inclined to be unduly optimistic. After gaining their 
independence they found themselves practically penniless 
owing to the crash of the Russian rouble. They had to 
organize their country from top to bottom, and, however 
critical one may be, it must be admitted that their achieve -
ments during the last decade have exceeded even the most 
optimistic expectations. Not only have the Estonians 
shown great enterprise, but they have been remarkably 
firm in their handling of internal affairs. As neighbours 
of Soviet Russia, they have naturally been an object of 
communist propaganda directed from Moscow, but they 
have met all attempts to disturbances and difficulties with 
a strong hand, so that the Bolshevist virus does not 
find a fertile field in Estonia. But Russia's eyes are 
never off the port of Tallinn, although she has no 
immediate need of it for export purposes. The Estonian 
people have many good qualities. They are honest, 
straightforward, patriotic, and hard-working people, who 
have since the war been struggling to overcome the 
most formidable difficulties ; but they have been work­
ing under natural disadvantages, relying entirely on 
their own strength and resources. The great and in­
creasing weakness of Russia at the present time is perhaps 
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the most important consideration in Estonia's favour, 
and her opportunity lies in consolidating her position before 
Russia begins to regain her strength. Her best course is 
to attract the political and economic support of others to 
enable her to achieve this while that opportunity lasts. 
CHAPTER IV 
LATVIA: THE KEY OF THE 
BALTIC STATES 
IN the case of Latvia and Estonia, two countries inhabited by peoples of very different race but with a history that had much in common, the struggle "for freedom and 
for national independence was even more remarkable than 
it was in the case of Finland. The severest phases came 
after the exhaustion of the Great War, when both states 
were fighting against both Germany and Russia and had 
little previous experience of constructive statesmanship. 
Although it is not yet possible fully to appreciate the true 
significance of this desperate struggle for national existence, 
there is little doubt that the achievements of Latvian and 
Estonian patriots will receive the unqualified admiration 
of future generations. 
As the past history of these former provinces of Imperial 
Russia are similar in so many respects, I have confined 
myself to pre-war history in the case of Estonia and to more 
recent events in dealing with Latvia ; and my reason for 
adopting this course is because the land question before 
the Great War was more acute in the northern province 
than it was in the more industrial area of the south, and 
because Latvia suffered more in the Great War than her 
more northern neighbour, who was farther removed from 
the centre of general hostilities. 
It would be a mistake to suppose that the political 
situation in these two Baltic provinces about the time of 
the Allied Armistice with Germany was the direct result 
either of the war, or of the fact that a Communist Govern­
ment had been set up in Russia, or of the declaration of 
the Allies that they were fighting for the interests of small 
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nations, or even of the idealism wrapped up in the theoretical 
expression ' self-determination \ It was rather a case of 
these circumstances providing the conditions in which 
national consciousness, which had distinctly come into 
existence in these provinces during the 'sixties of the previous 
century, rapidly developed into maturity and expressed 
itself in significant action. This deepening desire for free­
dom of economic and. cultural development had already 
shown itself in the rising of 1905, and proved itself to be a 
very substantial reality in the defence of Latvian and 
Estonian territory against the Germans, and later against 
the pro-German Bermondtists and Bolshevists alike. 
From the spring of 1915 right up to the spring of 1920, 
Latvia was almost continuously a theatre of military 
operations, and practically the same conditions prevailed 
in Estonia. In their retreat the Russians spared no effort 
to convert this once flourishing country into an area of 
desolation. Owing to the removal of machinery and raw 
materials to the interior of Russia, and the deliberate 
destruction of all that remained, together with a wholesale 
evacuation of the industrial population, the large industries 
of Latvia, and particularly of Riga, were entirely destroyed ; 
so that in this respect Latvia suffered more than any other 
region of the former Russian Empire. Attempts were made 
to remove rolling-stock and all means of transport by sea 
or river, and whatever was left behind, either in this direction 
or in the form of grain, cattle or supplies, was seized by the 
German occupational authorities and either used by them 
or transferred. to Germany, together with large quantities 
of timber. Although troops that were recruited from these 
regions fought magnificently in defence of what was their 
native land, no real defence of Courland or Livonia was 
attempted by the Russians. But the fight put up by two 
battalions of Latvian reservists before Jelgava1 inspired the 
idea of raising purely Latvian detachments in the Russian 
regular army. Permission was obtained from the Russian 
commander-in-chief, and, in July, 1915, the Latvian dele­
gates of the Duma issued a recruiting appeal which led to 
1 Formerly known as Mitau. 
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the formation of eight regiments from the Latvian refugees 
and from nationals transferred from other Russian regiments. 
The gallantry shown by these troops on various occasions 
during the years 1915-17, and especially before Riga, was 
such that Hindenburg referred to them as the ' eight stars 
on the Riga front', which would have to be extinguished 
before that city fell into his hands. Yet the Russians con­
tinued to retreat, and the circumstances of the evacuation of 
Riga, in September, 1917, produced a profound impression, 
and deepened the conviction that there had been a systematic 
betrayal of these regions by the Russian Supreme Command. 
Two-thirds of the inhabitants of Courland were now refugees 
all over Russia, but many returned to fight for Latvia, and 
the Latvian organization charged with the care of these 
refugees, operating from Petrograd as long as this was pos­
sible, not only kept alive their national feeling, but proved 
a good training ground for those who were later called upon 
to create and mould the new Latvian State. 
After the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, and 
especially after the Bolshevist coup d'etat, it became clear 
to the Latvian patriots that they could expect nothing 
from Russia, and that they must take the destinies of their 
country into their own hands. And this was more evident 
still when the commander of the German forces of occupa­
tion, after the fall of Riga, called into existence various 
Landtags and Landesrats, arbitrarily composed of representa­
tives of the German baronial class, who began to plan for 
some form of annexation to, or incorporation in, the German 
Empire. Accordingly, the Latvian National Council, com­
posed of representatives of the different democratic political 
parties, outstanding national organizations, and individuals, 
constituted itself at Valk 1 on the 16th November, 1917, 
and proceeded to take steps for proclaiming and establishing 
the independence of Latvia. At the All-Russian Constituent 
Assembly, which met in Moscow on the 5th January, 1918, 
the Latvian Deputy, Goldman, announced that Latvia now 
regarded herself as an autonomous unit, whose position, 
international relations, and internal organization were 
1 Now a town on the Latvian-Estonian frontier. 
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matters for the decision of her own Constituent Assembly ; 
and the Latvian National Council held a second session in 
Petrograd on the 17th and 18th January, 1918, at which 
Latvia (formerly Courland, South Livonia, and Latgalia) 
was declared to be separated from Russia. Protests were 
also made on behalf of the Latvian people against any 
attempt to divide up the country, as also against any attempt, 
at a conclusion of peace, to limit the rights of peoples to 
self-determination. In the same way, representatives of 
the Estonian people had met at Tallinn in November, 
1917, and in the name of the right of self-determination 
had proclaimed Estonia a sovereign state, and carried the 
resolution into effect by the establishment of a Government 
at Tallin on the 24th February, 1918. 
Meanwhile, during the interruption of the peace negotia­
tions at Brest-Litovsk, the Germans occupied Estland and 
Livonia, so that, with the exception of a part of Latgalia, 
the whole of Latvia and Estonia was in German hands. In 
accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 
Courland, together with the district and city of Riga, was 
placed under a German protectorate ; the remainder of the 
country (as also Estland) was to remain under German 
occupation until peace and order were restored, while the 
destiny of Latgalia was to be decided later. The agitation 
for union with Germany was carried on energetically by 
the various Rumps of the Landesraten, that of Courland 
imploring the Kaiser to accept the grand-ducal crown of 
Courland, and expressing the hope that Courland, Livonia, 
Estonia, and the island of Oesel might be formed into a state 
and united to Germany. To these and similar representa­
tions made at Berlin the Kaiser replied that he would 
' mit Rat und Tat zur Herbeifuhrung dieses Zustandes helfen '; 
and between requisitions, wholesale arrests, suppression of 
the press, and restriction of personal liberty, the occupation 
assumed everywhere the character of a regime of ' terror 
The foregoing details illustrate and tend to confirm the 
conviction, expressed at the time by certain observers, that 
Germany' was really more interested in her eastern than in 
her western frontiers; that Courland was the last of the 
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occupied territories that she would wish to surrender ; and 
that at the time of the Armistice negotiations no less 
attention ought to have been given by the Allies to the 
situation on the eastern frontiers than was given to the 
situation in the west. 
During the spring and summer of 1918 it became apparent 
that the countries where Bolshevism made least appeal 
were those of new-born nationality. They were so taken 
up with their newly acquired individuality that disorder 
and class warfare had no interest for them. It, therefore, 
seemed that the best policy against Bolshevism, at that 
particular stage, was the support of incipient nationality 
wherever it began to show itself. An examination of the 
Baltic border states revealed the existence of a will to resist 
Germanism and Bolshevism alike, to which there was 
nothing comparable in any part of Slav Russia proper. So 
there developed in certain quarters the idea of helping the 
non-Slavonic Russian border states, both in the Baltic and 
in Trans-Caucasia, in their struggle for independence. That 
this was partly in the interests of self-determination there 
is little doubt, but it was also with a view to stabilizing 
conditions in a zone surrounding Russia, from which food 
and industrial necessities might be introduced into that 
unfortunate country. It is to the lasting credit of Great 
Britain, to whom these border states had looked for guidance 
and assistance, that she was the first of the Great Powers 
to adopt a policy of interest in them as a whole, although it 
was regrettable that this policy was not more extensively, 
opportunely, and energetically carried out. The opposition 
of France and the United States, based on reasons which 
have since proved to be unjustified, presented an element 
of difficulty, but the Latvian Provisional Government was 
recognized de facto by the British Government on the nth 
November, 1918, and similar recognition was given to the 
Estonian National Council on the 3rd May, 1918. 
When hostilities ceased between Germany and the Allies, 
the Germans had overrun the Baltic provinces, and from 
the terms of the Armistice Convention of the nth November, 
1918, it became clear that the attention directed to the 
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conditions on the eastern border had been based on in­
adequate information, although sound information was in 
fact available. The French and Italian political representa­
tives on the Council of the Allies were, unfortunately, of the 
opinion that belief in a Bolshevist danger to the Baltic 
States and elsewhere was ' to let ourselves be deceived by 
German propaganda '. Unfortunately also, Mr. (now Lord) 
Balfour withdrew his more energetic and practicable pro­
posals in view of Marshal Foch's opinion that they were 
not realizable. The French were naturally chiefly interested 
in their own frontier, and much less so with the eastern 
frontier of Germany, with the result that, while the principle 
of the evacuation of territory by Germany in east and west 
was agreed upon, an Allied Commission was appointed to 
superintend that evacuation in the west, but no correspond­
ing commission was appointed for the east. Not only was 
this the case, but clauses XII and XIII in the Armistice 
convention, under which that evacuation was regulated, were 
so clumsily drawn up that their ambiguity was easily 
exploited by the Germans in their endeavour to hold on to 
the fruits of their conquest in the east. Under Article XII 
of the Armistice Convention the Germans were to withdraw 
from territory which formed part of the Russian Empire 
in August, 1914, ' as soon as the Allies shall consider this 
desirable, having regard to the interior conditions of these 
territories', while under Article XIII the evacuation was 
to commence ' at onceMeanwhile a ' Progressive Bloc ' of 
Latvian patriots, representative of many parties, who, under 
the leadership of M. Ulmanis, had been secretly organizing 
the life of their country as well as protesting against in­
corporation with Germany, were now joined by the members 
of the National Council, who had been expelled from Petro-
grad by the Bolshevists ; and a conjoint National Assembly 
was held at Riga on the 18th November, 1918. This 
Assembly, presided over by M. Tschakste, proclaimed the 
sovereign independence of Latvia, and elected a Provisional 
Government to take charge of affairs until a Constituent 
Assembly could be elected on a normal basis. By this time, 
however, the Bolshevists had crossed the Narva on the 
6 
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northern Estonian border, and a few days later crossed the 
Latvian frontier at various points. The Germans wished 
to avoid all conflict with the Bolshevists, yet they did 
everything in their power to hinder the Estonian and Latvian 
Provisional Governments in their endeavours to organize 
local forces of resistance. The German maintenance of 
control of telegraphs and railways, together with their 
removal of arms and ammunition, was all part of a policy 
directed in the hope that the Estonians and Latvians would 
seek their assistance in the imminent struggle, thereby 
providing the legal excuse which they required for remaining 
in these countries, in which they had established themselves 
on the grounds of protection and to introduce peace and 
order. Thanks to the general attitude of the Allies as a 
whole, there was more than one occasion when it looked as 
if the local German nobility, with the aid of the occupational 
forces, might succeed in their design of crushing the young 
nationalist governments or rendering them helpless against 
the Bolshevist invaders, with whom the Baits might have 
come to terms later with the help of the German Govern­
ment. Great Britain was, however, giving assistance with 
arms, ammunition and supplies, while the presence of units 
of a Baltic naval squadron at different times at Tallinn 
and Liepaja gave both active and moral support. Fin­
land also rendered valuable assistance to Estonia in the 
forms of a volunteer force and a loan, while Danish 
and Swedish volunteers fought side by side with the 
Estonians against the invaders. In Latvia the conditions 
were for a time even harder, the country being still entirely 
under German control, while a movement of slow retreat 
from Estonia had begun. The Provisional Government 
had no funds, and only a few companies of badly armed 
soldiers. 
By January, 1919, the Government was compelled to 
evacuate Riga and retire to Liepaja, the Germans having 
retreated to the line Liepaja-Skrunda-Kuldiga. In and 
around Liepaja the Latvian Government strove to build 
up an army of defence from the patriotic students and 
peasants who were concentrating on that centre, but common 
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action on the part of the Latvian army with the Baits and 
Germans against the Bolshevists was hindered by the fact 
that Von der Goltz, the German commander, made it 
apparent that he wished to be master of the country. His 
idea was to try still to carry out the eastern policy of Ger­
many, which had been upset by the recent course of events, 
by coming to an understanding with the White Russians 
under the common standard of a campaign against the 
Bolshevists. By this means he hoped to arrive at a close 
understanding with the Russia of the future. Russia, 
after the destruction of her intelligentsia, would need German 
merchants and technical men, while Germany needed land 
for many of her ex-soldiers ; and it seemed to Von der 
Goltz that the settlement of the latter in the devastated 
border provinces would soon restore the prosperity of these 
regions. By promises of land out of the third part of their 
estates which the Baltic barons agreed to devote to this 
purpose, Von der Goltz was able to maintain an effective 
force of German volunteer soldiers alongside of the Baits, 
prepared to achieve his purpose on these conditions, even 
when the growing pressure of the Allies began to insist on 
the evacuation of these provinces by the German forces. 
The only obstacles to success were the young national 
governments, which the German commander did everything 
in his power to overcome. Although at first unsuccessful, 
he succeeded with the aid of the Baits in overthrowing the 
Latvian Provisional Government, which took refuge in a 
ship at Liepaja under British protection. He then pro­
ceeded to attack the Bolshevist forces, and with the 
assistance of the Baits and also of some Latvian national 
units which saw the necessity of ridding the country of the 
Russians, he recaptured Riga on the 22nd May, 1919. 
Meanwhile in the north of Latvia a mixed force of Latvians 
and Estonians had been successful in their operations against 
the Bolshevists, but they formed an obstacle to the German 
commander's project of a reconquered Latvia, which was 
to be supplemented by the stirring up of a revolution against 
the Provisional Government in Estonia, with the result that 
there was a re-alignment of Estonian and Latvian national 
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forces against the Germans and Baits leading to the defeat 
of the latter in June of the same year. 
By this time an Allied Commission had been appointed 
to supervise matters in the Baltic States, and under its 
authority the Latvian Provisional Government was re­
instated and concluded an armistice with the Germans, 
who agreed to withdraw from Riga and to evacuate Cour­
land. As soon as the Provisional Government returned to 
Riga they concentrated their attention on the task of 
consolidating the Latvian army; and an endeavour was 
made to conciliate the Bait element by offering them repre­
sentation in the Government, and to secure their co-operation 
in the common struggle against the Bolshevists. The purely 
German forces failed to carry out the terms of the armistice 
by remaining in Courland, where they were reorganized and 
joined by units composed of Russian prisoners of war. 
Eventually the Allies insisted on Von der Goltz's recall, but 
his successor, Bermondt-Avaloff, continued for some time 
to inspire this ' Russian Army of the North-West', which 
was as dangerous to the young border states as in its original 
purely German composition. This force very quickly proved 
itself to be anti-Latvian rather than anti-Bolshevist, and 
by the 8th October it was marching once more on Riga. 
The Latvian army, however, succeeded with the help of 
Allied warships in holding the mouth of the Daugava,1 and 
although the city was under fire for at least a month, 
Bermondt's rabble eventually had to retreat owing to want 
of supplies. This retreat was carried out in the most 
disgraceful manner, and the Bermondtist army thereby 
earned the distinction of excelling both the Germans and 
Russians in the degree of vandalism and wanton destruction 
to which it descended. But this time Courland was com­
pletely evacuated, so that the Latvian army could now 
concentrate on driving the Bolshevists out of Latgalia, the 
only part of Latvia still remaining in their hands. Again 
success crowned the Latvian effort, but the operations were 
carried no farther than strictly ethnographical, rather than 
strategical, reasons demanded. Elections were held for the 
1 Formerly known as the Dvina. 
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Constituent Assembly in the middle of April, and at its first 
meeting on the ist May, 1920, M. Tschakste, the president 
of the National Council, was elected President of the 
Assembly. At the beginning of the following year, on the 
26th January, 1921, both Latvia and Estonia were recognized 
de jure by the Supreme Council of the Allies, and on the 
22nd September were admitted as members of the League 
of Nations. 
Latvia covers an area of about 25,000 square miles, slightly 
less than that of Austria, and is traditionally divided into 
four provinces, each of which has its individual char­
acteristics. Although these provinces have preserved their 
old names of Vidzeme, Kurzeme, Zemgale, and Latgale,1-
they are no longer administrative divisions, and their 
significance is more cultural than anything else. Before 
the Great War there were over 2\ million people in Latvian 
territory, but this number was reduced by 40 per cent as 
a result of the fighting in this area. Since, however, the 
establishment of an independent state, the population has 
steadily increased owing to the return of war refugees from 
Russia, where they had fled during the advance of the 
German armies. From 1919 to August, 1924, 220,000 
refugees and other people of Latvian origin returned from 
Russia to assume Latvian citizenship, and the present 
population of the country is nearly 2 millions. As regards 
occupation, nearly 80 per cent of the total population is 
engaged in agriculture and fishing, while the remainder 
devote their energies to industry, commerce, and transport 
services. Latvia is essentially an industrialized agricultural 
country. In character the Latvians differ widely from the 
Estonians and, although with the meagre resources at their 
disposal they have to some extent succeeded in their 
agricultural policy as well as in other directions, certain 
national shortcomings are making their task one of no small 
difficulty. The German families seem to play an important 
part in the country, while the Latvians are impregnated 
with certain racial qualities which make good government 
difficult of achievement, render the country liable to external 
1 Otherwise known as Livonia, Courland, Semgalia, and Latgalia-. 
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pressure, and encourage the activities of foreign commercial 
adventurers. Yet, in face of all these difficulties, some of 
which are very hard to remove, this courageous little nation 
has put her shoulder to the wheel in a most remarkable way. 
Her statesmen and administrators have failed in some 
directions, but that has not prevented them from trying 
other ways and other means to bring prosperity to a land 
that was laid desolate by the ravages of war. Although 
the Government have made grievous mistakes involving 
financial losses which they can ill afford, there is a marked 
change for the better since the days of Russian rule. Indeed, 
it is necessary to judge the present conditions prevailing in 
all these Baltic States from the standpoint of their pre-war 
backwardness. The casual observer, arriving in Tallinn or 
Riga, is liable to be disappointed, and it is not until he 
compares the conditions of life under the new republican 
governments with the dark days of Tsardom that he begins 
to realize that these people have been working like slaves 
to bring their countries into line with the completely civi­
lized nations of Europe. If they have not yet succeeded, it 
is through no want of effort on their part : it is due rather 
to immense difficulties, racial, financial, educational, and 
material, which have rendered their task almost superhuman. 
Should the Latvians succeed—and there is every hope 
that they should do so—they will deserve the unstinted 
admiration of all who attach any weight at all to the value 
of human endeavour. 
Since the birth of the Latvian Republic, an important 
agricultural reform has been carried out, by which the large 
estates of the landlords, chiefly Baltic barons, have been 
split up to provide lots for landless peasants wishing to 
develop the land. Before the war 72 per cent of the popu­
lation was landless, and the bulk of the land belonged to 
the owners of large estates. Even before the war these 
agrarian and social conditions caused the rural population 
to be dissatisfied, and this was noticeable as early as the 
disturbances of 1905. Then the Great War, the Russian 
Revolution, and the Bolshevist ' reign of terror' brought 
severe suffering to estate-owners, with the result that many 
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landlords deserted their estates, while others left them on 
account of the fighting round Riga and the Bermondt 
invasion of 1919. The Latvian Government had, therefore, 
taken under their control nearly half the estates in Latvia 
before the enforcement of the new Agrarian Law. At the 
end of 1920 the Government had taken over about 600 
estates, with an area of over 800,000 hectares. As result 
of the reform, over 4 million acres of land were obtained for 
distribution, and over 90 per cent of this has already been 
apportioned. The result of this has been that as many as 
87,000 new farms, from 5 to 50 acres each, have sprung 
up in different parts of the country. The acreage under 
cultivation has greatly increased, compared with pre-war 
figures. In 1923, the acreage under cultivation, which had 
been considerably reduced by the ravages of the war, rose 
to 2,610,000 acres,.as compared with 2,580,000 acres in 1913. 
Production is steadily increasing with a marked increase in 
the use of agricultural machinery. The motor-plough, which 
was practically unknown before the war, has been introduced, 
and at the end of 1923 there were in actual use 127 tractors, 
1,929 complete and 369 single threshing machines, 474 
traction engines, and 55 wind turbines. Live-stock has 
also increased steadily in the last ten years. The increase 
in the number of horses and cattle is particularly large, the 
former having risen by 100,000 in the course of six years. 
During the same period, the number of cattle increased by 
187,000 head, and exceeds pre-war level by 45,000 head. 
Pig-breeding, on the other hand, has developed much more 
slowly, but it may be assumed that progress will also be 
made in this direction, as the export of bacon is producing 
very satisfactory results. Owing to climatic conditions, 
sheep-breeding is not very successful; pedigree stock cannot 
endure the winter conditions, while Latvian breeds are not 
very productive. It is, therefore, to be expected that sheep-
breeding will continue to decline, and will ultimately be 
replaced by an increase in cattle. 
Latvian agriculture has been turning more and more from 
the raising of crops to stock-breeding, and the export of 
meat under state control is gradually developing. But the 
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most striking results have been achieved in dairy farming. 
In 1926, over 10 million kilos of butter were exported, 
compared with just over 7 million in the previous year, 
and the whole industry is under Government control in 
order to maintain a high standard of produce. As there 
are now about 200,000 farms in Latvia, the country may be 
regarded as one of small farmers who work in co-operation 
with an organized agricultural industry. 
But, besides the branches of industry connected with 
agriculture, there are various other industries dependent on 
the import of raw materials. Before the war, Latvia was 
one of the most industrialized parts of Russia, and the 
factories of Riga alone provided employment for about 
100,000 workers. Various kinds of raw material were 
imported for the construction of machinery and rolling stock, 
an d for the building of ships ; while such articles as rubber 
goods, cement, cellulose, textiles, chemicals, foodstuffs, and 
household requirements were manufactured for export to 
Russia and other countries. Riga was, in fact, the industrial 
centre of the former Baltic Provinces of Russia, as well as one 
of the leading commercial ports of the whole Russian Empire. 
Riga's industrial development was largely due to the 
economic policy of Count Kankrin, Russian Minister of 
Finance, who tried to encourage, as far as possible, the use 
of raw materials on the spot, and was lavish in the granting 
of state support for this purpose. The construction of the 
railway lines—Riga-Daugavpils 1 and Riga-Vitebsk—in the 
'fifties of last century also contributed to the industrial 
development of the whole country by extending the hinter­
land of the Baltic border and reviving Baltic trade and 
industry. During the period 1870-90 large industrial under­
takings were established, including the first branches of 
German enterprises, and by the end of that period Riga was 
already an industrial centre with which Russian consumers 
had to reckon. Unfortunately, the rapid progress of the 
border industries was subsequently checked by the economic 
policy of the then Minister of Finance, who aimed at in­
dustrializing the interior of Russia ; but the crisis was soon 
1 Formerly known as Dvinsk. 
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overcome by the success of Riga manufacturers in adapting 
themselves to new conditions, and by competing in such 
a way that the privileged industries of the interior were 
eclipsed by the organization, reliability and precision of 
the merchants of Riga. Moreover, the crisis was all the 
more easily overcome owing to an influx of foreign capital, 
which was invested in various branches of local industry. 
Foreign manufacturers chose Riga on account of the efficient 
auxiliary industries existing in that centre, and because of 
the highly qualified workers, both of which were entirely 
lacking in the interior of Russia. These new, and financially 
strong, undertakings naturally stimulated the whole in­
dustrial tendency of Riga. The population of the city grew 
in proportion to the expansion of industry, and from 170,000 
in 1870 the population increased to 500,000 in 1913. Before 
the outbreak of the Great War, there were in Riga 370 
factories and over 100 small and medium-sized enterprises. 
The value of the output amounted to 19-7 million pounds 
sterling in 1910, as compared with 12*1 million pounds 
sterling in 1900. 
The Great War entirely destroyed Latvian manufactures. 
The final collapse came in 1915, when, under pressure of 
the advancing German forces, the Russians decided to 
evacuate everything. About 60,000 wagon-loads of 
machines, valued approximately at 1 milliard of roubles, 
were transported to the interior of Russia to go to rack 
and ruin ; and only a very small proportion of all this 
valuable plant was returned after the creation of the Latvian 
Republic. Indeed, the evacuation was so thoroughly carried 
out that not only the industrial plant, but raw materials, 
manufactured goods, and even the technical personnel, were 
included in the clearance. In some cases the entire staff 
was removed en masse to the interior. 
In 1918 it was impossible to think of restoring the 
shattered industries, as the new state started with practically 
no resources, and had to face great difficulties that were only 
partially overcome by a circumspect and energetic financial 
policy. As Latvia is essentially an agricultural country, 
agriculture had to receive first consideration, but after 
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three years it became possible to support industry to 
some extent. The textile industry, one of the most im­
portant factors in the economic life of the country, was 
reconstructed in a comparatively short space of time. But 
Latvian manufacturers practically had to start all over 
again, and their difficulties were increased by the fact that 
Russia, which was their chief market before the war, was 
no longer a purchaser to any considerable extent. It is 
only recently, as result of the Latvian-Russian Treaty of 
Commerce, that there has been a slight change for the better. 
By 1926 the number of workers employed in factories had 
reached over half the pre-war figure, but there is a shortage 
of the necessary working capital to extend operations and 
bring about a corresponding increase of output. This is 
partly due to the inability of the Riga Municipality to meet 
a heavy debt contracted before the war, and the consequent 
want of confidence in Latvia's financial position. Yet there 
are reasons to believe that foreign capital is gradually finding 
its way to Latvia, although the conditions of the country 
are not yet as inviting as they might be. 
Riga has also lost most of its transit trade with Russia, 
although its geographical position ensures for this port the 
largest share of that trade, in so far as central Russia and 
the Ukraine are concerned. The river Daugava is a most 
convenient means of communication, and is specially im­
portant for the transport of lumber, which is floated down 
its course to the shores of the Baltic. Moreover, the railway 
lines connecting the three large Latvian ports of Riga, 
Liepaja, and Ventspils 1 with the principal manufacturing 
centres and agricultural districts of Russia may almost be 
regarded as a guarantee of the successful development of the 
transit trade. The Riga-Moscow line is the shortest line 
connecting the central industrial regions of Russia with a 
port on the Baltic, while the Riga-Tsaritsin railway gives 
access to the most fertile grain-producing areas. Yet to-day 
Riga, deprived of its vast hinterland, has been transformed 
into an empty shell: hundreds of factories are lying idle, 
and the activities of the port are a mere fraction of what 
1 Formerly known as Windau. 
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they were in former times. The Russians are concentrating 
their attention on a huge city which appears to be a 
distinct national debit, and one which may prove too 
burdensome for the young Latvian State to bear. If Russia 
has one eye on Tallinn, she has both eyes on Riga, which 
was formerly one of the most important cities of the whole 
Russian Empire and her chief port on the Baltic ; and not 
only is this the case, but the conditions existing in Latvia 
in general, and in Riga in particular, are such as provide 
little resistance to Russian endeavour. Latvia is in the 
unfortunate position of having to depend on Russia for her 
trade more than any other Baltic country, and in possessing 
as her capital a top-heavy city that practically constitutes 
the ' Key of the Baltic States It, therefore, seems that 
Latvia is rather heavily handicapped in her struggle for 
advancement, and that Riga is unlikely to retrieve its 
prosperity unless as a city much reduced in size or with the 
help of foreign enterprise. 
Riga is a great solid-looking city with broad boulevards, 
imposing squares, and spacious parks. In part, it is still a 
typical city of Imperial Russia, with long straight streets 
paved with cobble-stones and lined with severe buildings of 
heavy dignity and yet of monotonous simplicity. I have 
never been in Petrograd, but I should think that the more 
modern parts of Riga closely resemble the architecture intro­
duced into the former Russian capital by Peter the Great. 
On the other hand, there are quarters that make Riga a 
mediaeval relic of the Hanseatic League. Indeed, the 
ancient and beautiful churches with their Gothic spires, the 
quaint-looking guildhalls, and the heavy masonry of the 
older buildings recall the solid power of the Teutonic Knights 
that governed the destinies of the Baltic in the Middle Ages. 
Modern Latvia has made but a small impression on the 
general atmosphere of the city, and the monuments of 
former regimes seems almost to overpower the struggling 
efforts of the Latvians to introduce their reorganization into 
this former Russo-German stronghold. The Latvian langu­
age is fairly general, but Russian, German, and Yiddish are 
still much used as languages of commerce. Although both 
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the Latvians and Estonians dislike Russia and everything 
Russian, they have to resort to the Russian language in 
communication with one another; I know of no other place 
in the world that can be compared with Riga. It is a great 
city, and it even has the air of a metropolis, but modern 
activity seems to be circulating in a setting that belongs 
to entirely different conditions. There is none of that 
great contrast between the ancient and the modern, which 
is to be found in Rome, Athens, or Constantinople ; yet 
there is that which represents the great difference of tempera­
ment between what is Slav and what is not. Riga impressed 
me as a city that ought to be the capital of a vast country, 
a centre of gaiety and brilliant gatherings, but it is neither 
the one nor the other. For some obscure reason, one has 
in Riga the feeling of ' being all dressed up and nowhere to 
go At the Hotel Petersbourg, which is situated facing 
the austere edifice of the Castle, one half expects to witness 
the arrivals and departures of mediaeval landlords with large 
retinues of servants, and to find a meeting-place of noble 
families from hundreds of miles around. Although before 
the war this was to some^extent a rendezvous of the Baltic 
barons, who came to Riga to attend the Landsraten, it is 
no longer so to-day. The old hostelry seems half dead. An 
occasional Bait strolls in to read a German newspaper, a 
few travellers arrive from the station in a taxi, and an English 
commercial gentleman comes to drink a whisky-and-soda, 
for which he pays a high price. Living is expensive in 
Latvia, compared with Finland and Estonia, as the local 
currency has been stabilized on the basis of the gold franc, 
or 25 lats to the pound sterling. 
In her financial policy Latvia has been singularly success­
ful. When the Republic was formed in 1918, the country 
was greatly impoverished owing to the requisition of corn, 
cattle, horses, etc., by the German armies of occupation, 
though part of the supplies, which could not be removed, 
were sold back to the peasants on the evacuation of the 
troops. In April, 1919, a new paper currency, the Latvian 
rouble, was issued by the Government to replace the ost-
roubles and tsar-roubles previously used in different parts 
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of the country. This means of finance was continued for 
a considerable time, with the result that the exchange in 
terms of sterling rose from 215-5 roubles in January, 1920, 
to 2,000 to 2,400 roubles in May, 1921. After the 
demobilization of the army in the autumn of 1920, the fresh 
issues of currency were mainly for production purposes, and 
such produce as hides, flax and linseed were bought by this 
means from the peasants. The sale of the stocks thus 
acquired brought in 2,000 million paper roubles to the state, 
and enabled the Finance Minister, Ringold Kalning, to 
raise the value of the rouble to 1,140 to the .pound sterling, 
at which point it was stabilized. The currency was backed 
by gold to the value of 15 million gold francs and by foreign 
balances amounting to 7,730,000 gold francs. The lat, 
which is equal in value to one gold franc, was fixed at 50 
paper roubles, and the 2,270 million paper roubles in circula­
tion were thus covered to the extent of about 50 per cent 
in gold. In 1923, the Bank of Latvia was founded and 
provided by the state with a capital of 10 million lats. 
Banknotes may be issued only for such an amount as there 
is available security in gold, stable foreign currency (pounds 
sterling and U.S. dollars), and short-term bills. Besides 
the Lat notes issued by the Bank of Latvia, a small quantity 
of Treasury notes in Latvian roubles, secured by state 
property, are still in circulation, the rate of exchange of 
the roubles being fixed at 50 roubles to the Lat. The 
budget is balanced, and the National Debt, incurred during 
the first period of the country's existence, has to a con­
siderable extent been paid off during the last few years, so 
that the indebtedness of the country does not exceed 35s. 
per capita. 
Although Latvia is geographically in a difficult position 
and financially at a disadvantage, the conditions such as I 
have described hold out hope of a prosperous future, provided 
that foreign capital and enterprise are introduced into the 
country. There are sufficient openings to induce foreign 
firms to establish themselves, if the Latvian Government 
recognize the necessity of adopting an attractive policy, and 
are prepared to accept external advice and some measure 
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of financial control until the country has accumulated 
sufficient strength to work out its own destiny. 
Latvia's commercial policy is based on the principle 
of ' most favoured nation' treatment, limited by the 
so-called f Baltic and Russian' clause, which stipulates 
that the rights and privileges granted by Latvia to 
Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Russia do not fall within 
the scope of ' most favoured nation ' treatment, and may 
therefore not be claimed by third countries in virtue of the 
general ' most favoured nation ' clause. The conception of 
this regional limitation has a double object in view. On the 
one hand, it represents the formal guarantee of economic 
co-operation among the Baltic States, possibly preparing 
the way for the creation of larger economic units and an 
eventual customs union ; on the other hand, it represents 
the desire of Latvia and the other Baltic States to reserve 
to themselves the right to renew closer economic relations 
with Russia. Although these new states are politically 
separated from Russia, they hope to regain some part of 
their former importance as producers for the Russian market 
and as intermediaries in the traffic between Russia and the 
West. With regard to Russia, the Latvians are economi­
cally in a very delicate position. They do not want to be 
attracted within the Russian orbit, yet they realize that good 
commercial relations with Moscow are essential to their 
prosperity. It would be foolish for Latvia to allow political 
considerations completely to outweigh her economic interests, 
and there i$ little doubt that the principles underlying 
Latvian policy in this direction are sound. Whether there 
is wisdom in the means adopted for carrying out these 
principles is another matter, and only time will show what 
results are forthcoming. A Russo-Latvian Commercial 
Treaty was signed in June, 1927, and criticism was evoked 
both in Latvia and in Estonia by the terms of this instru­
ment. The Latvian commercial community criticized it 
partly on the ground that the liberty of action accorded 
to Russian commercial organizations in Latvia was not 
accorded reciprocally in the same measure to Latvian 
citizens in the U.S.S.R., and partly on the ground that it 
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invested several of the members and portions of the premises 
of the Soviet trade agency, which was to be established in 
Latvia, with diplomatic immunities which had been notori­
ously abused in other countries—in Germany in 1924 and 
in Great Britain at the very time when the Russo-Latvian 
negotiations had been taking place. The Estonians, on the 
other hand, contended that this commercial treaty would 
render unworkable the recently concluded customs union 
between Estonia and Latvia. As this economic arrange­
ment with Russia came right on the top of the initialling 
of a Russo-Latvian non-aggression pact, Latvian policy 
became the object of strong criticism in Estonia ; but it 
neither had the effect of disturbing Baltic solidarity nor of 
re-attracting Latvia into the Russian fold. If the Latvians 
have somewhat committed themselves, it has been through 
force of circumstances ; and should there be reason to 
suppose that they have gone farther than was necessary, 
allowance should be made for the difficulty of their position. 
In dealing with the U.S.S.R., there is always the danger 
that a small neighbouring country may be drawn farther 
than it intends to go ; and it is not easy to negotiate matters 
so that national interests are promoted in one direction and 
safeguarded in another. If Latvia had European backing 
of some sort, her difficulties vis-a-vis Russia would be 
immensely simplified. 
The economic relations between England and Latvia are 
of long standing, dating back for centuries. Even in early 
times large English commercial houses established branches 
in Latvian seaports, and were soon followed by firms which 
settled in Riga and other towns. The descendants of these 
early pioneers have their homes in Latvia to-day, and it is 
noteworthy that the first industrial undertakings in the 
country were the result of British initiative. After the 
creation of the republic, England became the leading 
consumer of Latvian produce, and it is significant that 
the first commercial treaty of first importance concluded 
by the new Latvian Government was that with Great 
Britain. Since then conditions have changed, but for 
many reasons it is to be hoped that British interest in 
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Latvia's future will steadily increase for the benefit of 
both countries. 
Perhaps the most hopeful feature of the situation in Latvia 
—and this applies equally to Estonia—is the fact that, while 
Russia is at present waning in political and economic 
strength, these two Baltic States are slowly increasing in 
vigour. Their great opportunity lies in consolidating them­
selves before a new situation arises which may make their 
task more difficult; and it is impossible to over-estimate 
the immense benefit which would accrue to them from the 
political and economic support of some foreign Power or 
Powers, in whose interests it would be to establish stepping-
stones to the Russian market of the future. With the 
assurance of security and the ways and means of material 
progress, there is no reason why their misfortunes of the 
past and their uncertainty of the present should not lead 
to prosperity in the future. 
• * * * * 
Let us now consider the international relations of Finland, 
Estonia, and Latvia, before pursuing this study farther 
south. Obviously the most important problem of foreign 
policy confronting each of these states has been their relations 
with Russia, who could be to each of them a profitable 
friend or a dangerous enemy, although Finland's position 
is now very much modified by the fact that the bulk of her 
export trade is with Great Britain and the United States. 
In theory, the Bolshevists fully recognized the doctrine of 
self-determination; but it was their policy to use this 
doctrine in order to reconstitute the former Russian Empire 
under their own system by bringing the seceding states 
together again as a federation of autonomous Soviet 
Republics. This could be achieved if in each of these 
countries there was a strong communist movement; for, 
even if the local communists were in a minority, internal 
revolutions might be organized and the seceding states 
brought into the Soviet system. For this reason the 
relations of these states with other countries were closely 
connected with their own internal affairs. In the cases of 
Finland, Estonia, and Latvia, the declaration of in­
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dependence had been preceded and followed by a civil war 
between the ' Reds ' and other parties; and the Govern­
ments in all these states had to be constantly on their guard 
against a revival of communist agitation, as it was a foregone 
conclusion that any movement of this kind would be encour­
aged and directly assisted by the Government of Moscow. 
The independence of these countries, therefore, largely 
depended on the skill with which they consolidated them­
selves at home ; and in Estonia and Latvia this task was 
all the more difficult because their recent achievement 
of independence had involved not only a political but an 
agrarian revolution. 
The independence of Finland had been recognized by 
Russia at a comparatively early stage of the Revolution, 
but a state of war had arisen between the two countries and 
had continued until the signature of a Peace Treaty at 
Tartu on the 14th October, 1920. This treaty not only 
fixed Finland's frontiers on the Russian side and dealt with 
the status of East Carelia, but made provision for many 
other matters. The new Finnish-Russian frontier was 
approximately identical with the old boundary between 
the Grand Duchy of Finland and the former Russian Empire, 
except that Finland acquired a narrow strip of additional 
territory between Murmansk and the eastern frontier of 
Norway, which gave her an ice-free outlet in the Arctic and 
the site for a port at Petsamo. 
Meanwhile, Estonia and Latvia had declared their in­
dependence, but could not obtain Allied recognition until 
after the conclusion of a Russo-Estonian Peace Treaty at 
Tartu on the 2nd February, 1920, and a Russo-Latvian Peace 
Treaty at Riga on the nth August of the same year. These 
Treaties included a formal recognition of independence, and 
it is interesting to observe the actual wording of the clause 
in the case of the latter. The Treaty of Riga makes the 
following provision: 
' By virtue of the principle proclaimed by the Federal Socialist 
Republic of the Russian Soviets, which establishes the right to 
self-determination for all nations, even to the point of total separ­
ation from the states with which they have been incorporated, and 
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in view of the desire expressed by the Latvian people to possess 
an independent national existence, Russia unreservedly recognizes 
the independence and sovereignty of the Latvian State and volun­
tarily and irrevocably renounces all sovereign rights over the 
Latvian people and territory which formerly belonged to Russia 
under the then existing constitutional law as well as under inter­
national treaties, which, in the sense here indicated, shall in future 
cease to be valid. The previous status of subjection of Latvia to 
Russia shall not entail any obligation towards Russia on the part 
of the Latvian people or territory.' 1 
These Treaties, like the Treaty with Finland, also fixed 
the frontiers between these two states and Russia. 
In the mutual relations between Finland, Estonia, and 
Latvia, the lead was naturally taken by Finland, as the 
strongest and longest established state, when the conduct of 
Finnish foreign affairs was in the hands of Dr. Holsti, now 
Finnish Minister at Bern and representative at the League 
of Nations. At first there seemed to be a movement in 
favour of Finland entering a Scandinavian bloc, but eventu­
ally Dr. Holsti began to work for a definite alliance between 
his country and the Baltic States. A series of conferences 
took place between representatives of the various countries 
having a common interest vis-a-vis Russia, and the idea of 
a Baltic Alliance was accepted in principle ; but the path 
was not so easy as it seemed, which was abundantly clear 
when the relations between the aforementioned countries 
and Poland came to be discussed at Warsaw in March, 1922. 
The prevailing feeling in Finland was that of avoiding any 
commitments that might involve the country unnecessarily 
in a conflict with Russia, while at the same time it was 
necessary to look for external support in case of trouble. 
As the Scandinavian countries were determined to avoid 
Russian complications, a Polish orientation had to be taken 
into consideration by all these Baltic countries. As result 
of the Warsaw Conference, an agreement was made by which 
the parties undertook ' to observe benevolent neutrality 
towards any of the signatory states which might be attacked 
without provocation, and to consult immediately with regard 
1 The wording was a little different in the Treaty of Tartu. 
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to subsequent steps to be taken This, however, went 
farther than Finnish opinion approved. The Finnish Diet 
refused to ratify the agreement, and Dr. Holsti was forced 
to resign, which may be said to have definitely put an 
end to proposals for anything in the nature of a general 
military alliance between Finland, Estonia and Latvia, and 
Poland. 
On the other hand, Estonia and Latvia were drawn 
together by the special circumstances in which they were 
affected by the Russian menace. Not only were they weaker 
than either Finland or Poland in territory, resources, popula­
tion, and political experience, but, unlike their northern 
and southern neighbours, they barred the way between 
Russia and her natural outlets on the Baltic. I have already 
dealt with the difficult position of these two countries in 
this respect, and it may well be imagined how alarmed their 
peoples became at the continual activity of communist 
agitators, and how apprehensive they were of Russia's 
intentions. This brought about a strong movement in 
Estonia and Latvia in favour of a Baltic bloc, including 
the Scandinavian States ; or failing that, of a union including 
Poland. But if these two Baltic States were anxious to 
devise some plan for their common protection, there were 
others who did not wish to burn their fingers with Soviet 
fire. And so it came about that the first of the foregoing 
proposals was doomed by the refusal of Sweden to support 
it, while the second was hindered by the reluctance of 
Finland to commit herself to a combination that might 
land her in difficulties later on. Moreover, the impasse 
which had been reached in Polish-Lithuanian relations over 
the question of Vilna had the effect of bringing Estonia 
and Latvia into closer and more intimate contact with one 
another. A political and • military agreement had been 
concluded between the two states in July, 1921, and two 
years later a Defensive Alliance 1 was signed, the essential 
points of which were that the two Governments should 
pursue a purely pacific policy towards all nations, and 
especially towards the neighbouring countries ; that they 
11st November, 1923. 
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should concert together and give each other mutual political 
and diplomatic support in their respective international 
relations ; that if either were attacked on its existing 
frontiers without provocation, the other state should at 
once come to its aid with armed assistance; and that 
neither state should conclude an alliance with a third party 
without the consent of the other. Agreements of an 
economic nature were also signed, binding the two countries 
yet closer together, but there was a strong desire, which 
exists to this day, for the support of Western Europe, and 
especially of Great Britain. The British Government, how­
ever, was disinclined to accept any definite commitments 
or to make any engagements other than those incurred by 
membership of the League of Nations. 
Like Finland, Estonia and Latvia have consistently 
pursued a wise and moderate foreign policy, while they have 
established themselves by means of commercial treaties in 
the general economic system of Europe. At the same time, 
both states did their utmost to foster the important transit 
trade between the Baltic ports and the Russian hinterland, 
fully realizing that their future much depended on their 
capacity to make Russia feel that she was not cut off from 
her sea outlets. They have done, and are doing, everything 
possible to facilitate Russian transit, and Tallinn harbour 
is being enlarged and improved with this end in view. This 
policy is broad-minded and, although Russia is inclined to 
play one port off against another, it is the best insurance 
policy against the realization of Russian ambitions at their 
expense. But, apart from the fact that Estonia and Latvia 
have become close friends and allies, the situation in the 
Baltic States has been greatly influenced by the Polish-
Lithuanian dispute. Any effort by Estonia or Latvia 
towards a rapprochement with Lithuania is regarded as un­
friendly to Poland, while Russia's attitude in that troubled 
area makes commitments to Poland dangerous. Moreover, 
Poland's relations with Germany have been more or less 
strained on account of the ' Corridor ' and Upper Silesian 
questions, while the Baltic States have a commercial interest 
in remaining Germany's friends. Such is the tangled skein 
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of Baltic politics, and the farther south one travels the 
- more tangled it becomes, with Lithuania as the sort of 
connecting link between the northern states and those of 
North-Eastern Europe. 
CHAPTER V 
LITHUANIA AND HER TROUBLES 
WHILE Estonia and Latvia, who are bound by a political treaty, can be considered more or less together on account of their geographical 
positions as well as their political interests, Lithuania must 
be regarded as a separate entity, partly owing to her past 
history and partly to her different orientation. To attempt 
anything approaching an adequate description of Lithu­
ania's past history would mean poking about in the dim 
ages before the Christian era, and a digression of this sort 
would scarcely be in keeping with the object of this book. 
I will, therefore, confine my attention to a very brief summary 
of the events, spread over centuries, which form the back­
ground of the new Lithuanian republic. 
At some period between the seventh and fifth centuries 
B.C., various kindred tribes, forming an entirely separate 
branch of the Indo-European family, settled on the shores 
of the Baltic between the Dvina and Vistula Rivers. Here, 
protected by primeval forests and impassable swamps, 
they dwelt in peace for centuries, trading with their neigh­
bours, but being little influenced by those by whom they 
were surrounded. They were a simple agricultural people, 
deeply attached to their ancient language and customs, 
and especially to their religion, by which they worshipped 
the forces of nature, their chief deity being Perkunas, the 
god of sky and thunder. These tribes first appear in 
history as Aestians or Baits, and later as Lithuanians, 
Borussians, and Letts. Tacitus in his Germania refers to 
them as Aestii; he calls their country the ' Land of Amber '; 
and he states that their language is entirely distinct from 
German. The period of comparative peace ended with 
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the dawn of the eleventh century, and frorn that time forward 
the Lithuanians have had a most eventful history. Yet, 
in spite of the repeated invasions of Teuton and Slav, of 
foreign domination and unbearable oppression, the Lithu­
anian nation has maintained its individuality to this day 
and, what is still more remarkable, it has preserved its 
language in a very pure form. To-day the Lithuanian 
tongue, closely related to Sanskrit and bearing many 
resemblances to Latin and Greek, enjoys the distinction 
of being one of the oldest living languages in Europe. In 
this connection it is interesting to note that, while Estonian 
is akin to Finnish, the Lithuanian and Latvian languages 
are closely allied. 
Unlike some of the other border states, Lithuania is not a 
new political formation, but, like Poland, is a state restored 
under new conditions. The Lithuanians had formed a 
state in more or less the present meaning of the term by 
the middle of the thirteenth century. Up to that time 
the various Lithuanian clans had their own political and 
military organizations under the leadership of their own 
chieftains, who became later known as ' dukes ', and usually 
joined forces when threatened by a common enemy. At 
the beginning of the thirteenth century the Lithuanian 
peoples were distributed as follows : To the west, in East 
Prussia of to-day, lived the Borussians or Old Prussians, 
who had their own dialect and an original pagan culture, 
but towards the end of the tenth century the first Christian 
missionaries had visited this area. They had, however, 
achieved little success, and had lost two of their number 
in the martyrdom of St. Adalbert and St. Bruno-Boniface. 
To avenge their death, the Polish king Boleslaus Chrobry 
had undertaken military campaigns against the Old Prus­
sians, which lasted with intervals during the whole of the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries. But the Old Prussians 
were a formidable enemy and were so successful in these 
campaigns that the Pope intervened, and summoned the 
Christian chivalry of Europe to arms against these 
northern pagans. All these efforts were, however, unsuc­
cessful, until in the year A.D. 1230 the specially summoned 
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Teutonic Order (Orden der Ritter des Hospitals S. Marien 
der Deutschen zu Jerusalem) began a systematic extermina­
tion of the Old Prussians, thereby laying the foundations 
of German Prussia on the ruined homes and graves of these 
pagan people. The Old Prussians fought with heroic 
desperation for their faith and liberty, but the Teutonic 
Order was too strong for them, and they were practically 
exterminated to make room for a ' Christianized ' country 
mainly composed of smouldering ruins and widespread 
desolation. This mission once achieved, the conquerors 
were free to turn their attention to the central Lithuanians. 
South of the line Niemen-Grodno-Suvalki and the 
Masurian Lakes, between the Bobr and Narev Rivers 
and the Bieloviez Forest, lived a second Lithuanian tribe 
known as the Jotvingians, who became victims of their 
Russian and Polish neighbours at about the same time 
as the Teutons subdued their Old Prussian kinsmen, and 
disappeared from history as their lands were occupied by 
the invaders. To eastward the Lithuanians came in contact 
with the Russians. With the fall of the power of Kiev, 
the Lithuanian chiefs were often drawn into the continued 
strife among the lesser rulers of the Duchy of Polock, but 
they did not fail to take advantage of Russian chaos to 
occupy Russian territory. Hence, by the beginning of the 
thirteenth century, the extensive territories of Polock, 
Turov, and even of Smolensk, had fallen into the hands of 
the Lithuanian dukes, who saved the Russians in these 
territories from the Tartar yoke, often at the price of much 
of their own blood. 
In the north the Lithuanians had the kindred Lettish 
tribes for neighbours. The Latvians, or Letts, then occupied 
much the same territory as they do to-day. The river 
Dvina was the ancient route to the east used by German 
traders, who travelled under the protection of German 
knights as a safeguard against the attacks of Letts and 
Livonians, and here also the Pope proclaimed a crusade 
against the pagans. The crusaders founded Riga as a 
military base, and in A.D. 1204 formed the ' Order of the 
Warrior Brethren of Christ', which later became known 
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as the ' Knights of the Sword'. Here, as in Old Prussia, 
the pagan inhabitants were baptized with fire and sword, 
and the crusaders devoted much more attention to the 
acquisition of goods and territory than to the promotion 
of the Christian faith. As most of the knights had returned 
but recently from the Holy Land or from some centre of 
plunder in Europe, they were distinctly demoralized. By 
the year 1235, the Order had conquered almost all Latvian 
territory, a large part of Estonia, and a part of Courland ; 
and the Knights of the Sword tried to establish direct com­
munication with the Knights of the Cross (the Teutonic 
Order) in Old Prussia, by way of Klaipeda,1 thereby cutting 
off the central Lithuanians from access to the sea. And 
so it came about that the latter, attacked by the Germans 
from the west and north, and by the Russians and Poles 
from the east and south, were compelled to forget their 
differences and unite in a strong defensive organization. 
In this way the energetic Duke Mindaugas succeeded in 
uniting all the lands inha'bited by Lithuanians into one 
principality, and became the founder of the Lithuanian 
State. 
The new state had, however, to face a long period of 
bitter warfare with the Teutonic Orders, who became their 
hereditary enemies. Yet, in spite of the continual fighting 
with the Teutons in the west, a succession of Grand Dukes 2 
tried to obtain a strong foothold in the east. By occupying 
extensive Russian territories which, undermined by internal 
dissension and threatened by Tartar invasions, sought aid 
and protection, Lithuania reached the summit of her power 
and prosperity in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, 
and her territories in those days extended from the Baltic 
to the Black Sea. They comprised not only territories later 
included in the provinces of Vilna, Kaunas, Suvalki and 
part of Grodno, at that time inhabited mostly by Lithuan­
ians sensu stricto, but also vast areas inhabited by various 
Slav tribes, now represented by the Soviet provinces of Minsk, 
1 Formerly known as Memel. 
2 Gediminas (1341), Algirdas (1377), Kestutis (1382), and Vytautas 
(i43o)-
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Mohilev, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Cheznihov, Poltava, Kiev, 
Volhynia and Podolia. But this expansion was fatal to 
Lithuania, which was too weak a state to hold this immense 
territory. Continued warfare reduced the strength of the 
nation and forced it into an alliance with Poland against 
the Germans, who were a common enemy. The union 
between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania was brought about in 1386 by the marriage 
of the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jagello to the Polish Queen 
Hedwiga, thus establishing a political combination in which 
Lithuania was three times the size of Poland. The con­
tracting parties were to retain their names, laws, adminis­
trative institutions, and financial and military organiza­
tions, and it was not until the pact of Lublin in 1569 that 
the foreign ministries of the two countries were amalga­
mated. An analogy may be found to some extent in the 
union between Austria and Hungary, the Lithuanian 
element in the former case bearing much the same relation 
to the Poles as the Magyar element in the latter case bore 
to the Teutons. 
The first consequence of the union was the reception 
of the new king and the entire population of Lithuania 
into the Roman Catholic Church, which remains the religion 
of the country to this day. But it roused the bitter opposi­
tion of many chiefs under the leadership of Vytautas, who 
became Grand Duke and devoted his life to trying to secure 
Lithuanian independence. Vytautas wished to convert 
Lithuania into a kingdom and to receive a royal crown, 
an idea inspired by Sigismond, Emperor of Germany and 
of the Holy Roman Empire, with a view to shattering the 
alliance between Lithuania and Poland. This plan was 
never realized, and the Lithuanian patriot had to content 
himself with the defeat of the Teutonic Order at Griinwald 
by Polish-Lithuanian forces under King Jagello. 
As time passed, Lithuania was weakened by long and 
difficult wars with Russia, who tried to free and unite 
the various Russian territories, while Polish influence 
increased and finally led to the Union of Lublin in 1569. 
Under this pact a federation was formed under one king, 
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who was also elected Grand Duke of Lithuania. There 
was a common Senate and Diet and a common foreign 
policy, but Lithuania had her own government, treasury, 
law courts, army, and administration. The union did 
create a certain feeling of cordiality between the two 
states, but the Lithuanians, many anxious to break away 
from the sway of Poland, gradually sank into a state of 
dependence. Polish culture, always infectious, made great 
headway among the nobility and educated class, and 
created an important gulf between them and the common 
peasants, who remained faithful to their native tongue and 
traditions. Indeed, the ruling classes in Lithuania became 
so impregnated with Polish civilization that it was only 
with the recent growth of Lithuanian separatism that it 
was possible to tell the difference between an educated 
Lithuanian and an educated Pole. Many of Poland's 
most distinguished men are of Lithuanian origin, and 
even Marshal Pilsudski himself acknowledges himself to 
be a Lithuanian Pole. Meanwhile, internal chaos and 
repeated appeals for foreign intervention provided the 
powerful neighbours of the federation with a pretext for 
dividing its territories among themselves, and in this way 
the dual state was involved in a common downfall. The 
final partition of Poland in 1795 marked the end of Polish 
and Lithuanian independence, and while Lithuania Minor 
had long before been annexed by Prussia, historic Lithu­
ania came under the domination of Russia. 
The period during which the country was subject to 
Russia, from 1795 to 1915, was the darkest period in Lithu­
anian history. The name was erased from the map of the 
world, and the territory was known merely as the North-
West Provinces of Russia. It is difficult for us in England 
to realize the terrible burden of Russian oppression. Only 
Russians took part in the administration of the country 
and the towns ; only Russians were eligible for employment 
on the railways, in the post offices, or even to repair the 
roads. The Russian language was forced upon the people ; 
the Russian state religion was substituted for Roman 
Catholicism ; and the people were not even allowed to pray 
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in their own language. The insurrections of 1830 and 1863 
only made matters worse, and gave the Russians a pretext 
for closing the schools in Lithuanian and prohibiting all 
printing in the Lithuanian language. Determined com­
pletely to Russify their former conquerors, the Russians 
nowhere used such cruel methods of oppression as they did 
in this unfortunate country. But no amount of persecution 
could extinguish the national spirit of the masses which, 
fostered by intellectual men of peasant origin, grew in 
strength towards the end of the nineteenth century. Lithu­
anian books were smuggled into the country, the children 
were taught secretly at home, and national individuality 
became more and more consistent. An opportunity for 
the public expression of national aspirations came in 1905 
with the wave of revolution that swept over Russia after 
her defeat by Japan; and a Lithuanian congress was 
convened at the ancient capital, Vilna, at which over 2,000 
delegates from all classes demanded extensive autonomy 
for their country restored within its ethnographic bound­
aries, with Vilna as the capital. The Russians agreed to 
these demands and made promises which they had no 
intention of carrying out, but the hope of liberty only 
gathered strength for a better opportunity of expression 
on the occasion of the Great War. 
With the outbreak of the Great War, Lithuania became 
the scene of extensive military operations, and the country 
was devasted many times over. Towns and villages were 
razed to the ground ; farmlands were ruined ; large areas 
of forest were destroyed; and the country's resources 
in live-stock were depleted through constant requisitioning, 
not only for the needs of the German army of occupation 
but also for the purposes of export to Germany. But the 
Lithuanians were no less determined to become an inde­
pendent sovereign state. In September, 1917, a representa­
tive gathering was held at Vilna during the German occu­
pation, at which the Taryba or National Council was 
elected, and expression was given to the demand that 
Lithuania should become ' an independent State, organized 
on democratic principles within her ethnographical frontiers 
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It was with the greatest difficulty that arrangements were 
made with the military authorities for the holding of this 
conference, but the Germans agreed on the understanding 
that there were to be no elections. German policy, though 
ultimately favourable to cultural autonomy, was at this 
time inclined to favour annexation, and it therefore seemed 
desirable to create some sort of Lithuanian Council that 
might be persuaded or forced to co-operate with the military 
authorities as an auxiliary body with limited powers. The 
Lithuanian difficulty was how to concede that measure of 
agreed co-operation with the Germans, which was laid 
down as a condition of their being allowed to hold a con­
ference at all, without endangering the primary object of 
national independence. 
The Taryba at once set to work on its two principal 
tasks of creating and organizing the Lithuanian State, 
and of attempting to restore the economic and social con­
dition of the country. This meant that it had to protest 
vigorously against the heavy requisitioning that was half 
starving the population, the banditism of escaped Russian 
prisoners of war, exploitation of the forests, forced labour, 
and against the attempt to introduce the compulsory teach­
ing of German in primary schools. All these protests had 
to be made with the prospect of the Taryba being forcibly 
dissolved by the local German authorities. Attempts were 
also made to get in touch with Lithuanians abroad, to put 
the national case before the representatives of the Allies, 
and to establish relations with the Central Government 
in Berlin. Germany made it quite clear that independence 
would have to be purchased by a perpetual alliance with 
Germany, and the negotiations on this basis were un­
satisfactory. Meanwhile, on the 16th February, 1918, the 
Taryba proclaimed national independence ' founded on a 
democratic basis, with Vilna as capital, and the dissolution 
of all political connections that had existed with other 
peoples/ The Taryba declared at the same time that ' the 
basis of this State and its relations with other States will 
be definitely fixed by a Constituent Assemblywhich should 
be convoked as soon as possible. 
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In the following month the Kaiser signed an Act recogniz­
ing the independence of the country, and in July, 1918, 
the Taryba rather rashly decided to invite Duke William 
of Urach to accept the Lithuanian throne ; but events 
were moving in a direction that tended to weaken the Ger­
man grip on Lithuania. Following the speech in the 
Reichstag of Prince Max of Baden,1 who replied to President 
Wilson that the German Empire saw no objection to nations 
organizing their state and government in their own way, 
by virtue of their right to self-determination, the President 
of the Taryba was informed of the German decision to 
delegate legislative and administrative power to a Lithuanian 
Government, which was now the business of the Taryba 
to organize. The Taryba worked out the basis of a pro­
visional constitution, and empowered its President to 
nominate a President of the ministers who should con­
stitute the Provisional Lithuanian Government. Accord­
ingly, on the 5th November, Professor Valdemaras was 
appointed President of a Cabinet which he formed a few 
days later, and the Taryba dropped its resolution with 
regard to Duke William of Urach, referring the final decision 
of the regime to the Constituent Assembly. 
After the Armistice the Germans showed almost as 
little desire to evacuate Lithuania as they did in the case 
of Courland; and the new state, still unrecognized by the 
Allies, found her position increasingly precarious. While 
the Provisional Government was devoting their energies 
to organizing the state, they were confronted by three 
enemies. Towards the end of 1918, the Bolshevists began 
to advance into the country on the heels of the retreating 
Germans. Still weak and without a vestige of outside 
help, the Provisional Government had to leave Vilna and 
retire to Kaunas,2 but soon the newly raised army of volun­
teers succeeded in driving back the Bolshevists along the 
whole front, and by April, 1919, were closing in on Vilna. 
At this point a new enemy appeared. The Poles, who had 
been fighting in the district of Grodno, occupied Vilna 
x5th October, 1918. 
2 Formerly known as Kovno. 
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by a rapid manoeuvre, and thereby provoked the greatest 
indignation on the part of the Lithuanians, who addressed 
a strong protest to the Allied Powers. In order to prevent 
armed conflict between the two countries, the Supreme 
Command of the Allied Powers established a line of demar­
cation on the 26th April, 1919, but this line was promptly 
violated by the Poles, as well as that laid down by Marshal 
Foch in July of the same year. 
While matters in the east and south were still unsettled, 
a third enemy appeared in the west. The Russo-German 
forces under Bermondt-Avalov were ostensibly marching 
to the aid of General Judenich against the Bolshevists, 
but in reality their object was to restore the rule of the 
Baltic barons in Latvia with Lithuania as a base of operations. 
For the Lithuanians the situation was one of immense 
difficulty, and it was remarkable how they managed to 
extricate themselves from this threefold mess. By Novem­
ber, 1919, the Bermondtists were utterly routed, and early 
in the following year the Russians offered to make peace. 
Negotiations were begun, and on the 12th July, 1920, a 
Peace Treaty was signed at Moscow by which Russia 
recognized Lithuania as an independent sovereign state, 
with Vilna as her capital. Meanwhile, the Constituent 
Assembly, elected by universal suffrage on the system of 
proportional representation, took the place of the Taryba, 
and decided that the state was to have a republican form 
of government. It was not, however, until the autumn of 
1922 that the Assembly, having completed the land reform 
and drafted the state constitution, gave place to a regular 
Parliament. Lithuania became a member of the League 
of Nations on the 22nd September, 1921, and was recognized 
de jure by the leading Allied Powers on the 20th December 
of the same year. 
After seizing Vilna in April, 1919, the Poles remained 
in possession until the summer of 1920, when under Bol­
shevist pressure they were forced to evacuate the city, 
which the Bolshevists handed over to the Lithuanians. 
In August, however, the fortunes of the Russo-Polish war 
completely changed, and the retreat of the Bolshevists 
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brought the Lithuanians for the first time into direct contact 
with the victorious Poles. From this time forward the 
history of the Lithuanian State became entangled with 
that of the Polish State, which at that time was suffering 
from a very aggressive attitude towards any of her weaker 
neighbours, but I will return to the Vilna dispute in the 
course of another chapter. 
Looking back on these critical days, one wonders how 
the Lithuanians managed to raise an army capable of defend­
ing the country from so many enemies. It was a most 
remarkable achievement, and reflects the highest credit 
on the military qualities of this fighting race. At the 
end of 1918 the first Lithuanian regiment was raised at 
Vilna. The Provisional Government had little money, so 
that the question of providing barracks, uniforms, rations 
and arms was not easily solved, while almost the only 
officers available for staff duties were students or profes­
sional men who had been promoted to commissioned rank 
in the Russian army during the war. There were few 
regular or staff officers, because under the Russian regime 
only a few Lithuanians were allowed to enter the military 
schools, and none were permitted to attend the highest 
military institutions. Yet these young officers began their 
work with great enthusiasm and, with the help of Lithu­
anians who had been non-commissioned officers in the old 
Russian army, succeeded in training thousands of volunteers 
from all parts of the country. Practically all the work 
of organization had to be carried out under the most difficult 
war conditions until February, 1919, when the Compulsory 
Military Service Act was passed and the army came under 
a Ministry of Defence with a General Staff. From that 
time forward the organization was carried out under more 
or less normal arrangements, although war conditions 
still prevailed. The result is that Lithuania now has an 
army of efficient, smart-looking officers and men, the former 
being trained either in the military school at home or at 
similar institutions abroad, while the latter are raised from 
illiteracy to educated men and also made into soldiers in 
the newly formed regiments of the Lithuanian army. The 
LITHUANIA AND HER TROUBLES 118 
recruiting material consists of fine able-bodied youths who 
lend themselves easily to military training. Probably the 
cavalry is the most efficient branch of the service, and, 
if the regiment I saw in the neighbourhood of Kaunas is 
a typical example, there is little to criticize in the general 
appearance of both horses and men. 
Kaunas, the present Lithuanian capital, has sprung from 
humble origin. A Russian fortress before the war and, 
therefore, limited to buildings not exceeding one story in 
height, Kaunas was until six years ago little more than a 
large village. Even to-day it has a distinct Russian atmo­
sphere, which is only relieved by an equally striking likeness 
to an agricultural town in Western America. The streets 
are straight and paved with cobble-stones, and primitive 
trams drawn by one tired-looking horse rumble along at 
irregular intervals. Those who knew Oxford in the days 
of the horse trams can picture Kaunas to-day, but the 
Lithuanian species of this relic of antiquity is a much 
queerer-looking object than anything Oxford could produce. 
I tried to photograph one of these curiosities outside the 
railway station, but a skinny-looking horse responsible for 
the movements of another tram tried to bite my behind 
just as the shutter clicked, and a blur was the result. 
Evidently these beasts have a certain prestige to uphold. 
The town is rather depressing and there are few buildings 
of any prominence, except the Russian garrison church 
and one or two other ecclesiastical establishments; yet 
new buildings and improvements generally are beginning 
to show themselves in several directions, which seems 
to indicate that the Lithuanians regard Kaunas with some 
degree of permanence. Although M. Valdemaras governs 
as a dictator and personally settles even the most minor 
details of the administration, a Parliament building (which 
is not shown to visitors) is in course of construction; 
an imposing edifice has been built to house the Bank of 
Lithuania ; and a new bridge is being built over the Nemu-
nas.1 Besides this, good progress is being made in the 
development of a residential area on the high ground over-
1 Formerly known as the Niemen. 
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looking the river, and Kaunas generally is beginning to 
assume the characteristics of a small, and perhaps rather 
primitive, European capital. Although the Lithuanians 
prefer to build their houses of wood, the Government have 
decreed that in certain areas only stone or brick buildings 
are allowed, and in course of time it is hoped that all the 
wooden houses in the city proper will be replaced by solid 
stone edifices. Until recently the hotel accommodation in 
Kaunas was of the most primitive order, and it was only 
the general outcry of outraged and flea-bitten diplomat­
ists that led to the building of what is now a moderately 
comfortable hotel. When a certain frontier commission 
visited these parts to draw lines of demarcation, they chose 
the middle of the night to arrive in Kaunas, and the only 
member of this august body who could obtain any accom­
modation at all at first was one who is said to have found 
une petite amie in the town. Otherwise, the members of 
the Commission had to go shares in the most odd billets 
vacated by others at a few moments' notice. Yet Kaunas 
is on the main railway line between Berlin and Riga, and 
has an excellent train service by the Nord Express. 
It is impossible to visit Kaunas without realizing that 
Lithuania is a very poor country, but there are distinct 
signs of industry and of a determination to make the best 
of circumstances. But Lithuania is devoting the best part 
of her energies to defence, and it looks as if the greater 
proportion of her resources in men and money is being given to 
the army to the detriment of internal progress. The question 
of defence occupies the minds of government officials to an 
abnormal degree, and there is little doubt that efficiency 
has reached a much higher standard in the army than in 
any other department of the state. The reason of this 
is not far to seek, and will be explained later in this narrative. 
Lithuania is an agricultural country, in which about 
80 per cent of the people are peasants, and illiteracy is very 
prevalent. When the Republic was established, about 
one-third of the landed property belonging to the nobility 
lay fallow, and matters were even worse as far as buildings 
and live-stock were concerned. The landlords or their author­
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ized agents were, for the most part, absent either in Russia 
or Poland, while many of those actually living on their 
estates gave little heed to the land, but devoted their 
energies to helping the Polish legions to occupy the country. 
In view of these circumstances the Provisional Government 
brought in a land reform much on the same lines as in the 
other Baltic States, and issued a series of decrees under which 
the Government (i) took over the estates which were 
obviously abandoned by their owners, and operated or 
rented them to the local inhabitants so that the land might not 
remain uncultivated; (2) established a guardianship over 
all the forests of the country ; (3) prohibited the sale of the 
land of the larger estates without special permit; and (4) 
promised land to those who fought for the liberty of Lithu­
ania, and who were children either of the landless or of small 
landowners. Parcels of land, from 5 to 20 hectares, partly 
state and partly private property, were allotted, so that 
those who received them might immediately begin farming 
on their own account. In 1920 the Constituent Assembly 
ratified all the land measures taken by the Provisional 
Government, and these decrees served as a basis for the 
present agrarian law which is designed to provide land 
for the landless, and to increase the holdings of those who 
possessed an insufficient quantity. Other aims of this 
reform are to create conditions favourable to the develop­
ment of small and medium-sized farms, and to place under 
state control those national resources which in private 
possession tend to be wasted. With this end in view the 
state is gradually taking over the so-called ' majorats 
or entailed estates and lands granted by the former Russian 
Government either in fee simple or on privileged conditions ; 
certain lands belonging to the former Peasants' Land Bank 
and Nobles' Bank; lands of private persons who own 
more than 375 acres in the first place, and more than 200 
acres in the second place, leaving the owners with 200 
acres which they can choose themselves. While the 
' majorat' estates and lands granted by the former Russian 
Government, together with the lands of the above-mentioned 
Banks, are taken over without indemnity, the rest are 
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purchased by the State at a pre-war price. These lands will 
serve to create farms of from about 20 to 50 acres, and in this 
way it is hoped to settle between 35,000 and 40,000 families. 
Although the country around Kaunas is fairly fertile, 
there are very few industries in the modern sense of the 
word, and there are few means of converting such produce 
as exists into marketable goods. The Government has 
little money for development, and such funds as are not 
spent on defence and are available for improvements are 
squandered on imposing public buildings instead of being 
devoted to the more urgent needs of the country. A new 
Mint has been built, although quite out of keeping with 
the financial condition of the country, and some of the new 
premises would be a credit to the architecture of either 
London or Paris. With few resources, Lithuania is notable 
for her economic backwardness and low culture, while it 
is usually found that those Lithuanians with real knowledge 
or experience are either of German origin or have spent a 
considerable time in America. The monetary unit, the 
' litas ', is equal to one-tenth of a United States dollar, 
is divided into 100 cents, and it has not depreciated since 
it was introduced in 1922. Most of the industries are 
closely connected with agriculture or forestry, and they 
suffered very severely from military operations during the 
war. Buildings were destroyed, machinery removed, and 
capital was lost either through the nationalization of the 
Russian banks or the catastrophic fall of the Russian and 
German currencies then in circulation in Lithuania. After 
the war, capital to restore the industries of the country was 
unobtainable, yet such industries as existed before 1914 
have been restored in spite of the immense difficulties 
which had to be faced. But Lithuania was always a back­
ward country, and it is backward to-day. Her exports 
consist chiefly of live-stock, eggs, grain, meat, and dairy 
produce, together with such raw materials as sawn wood and 
wood pulp, and semi-manufactured goods such as hides, 
furs, and bristles. As far as manufactured goods are 
concerned, her exports are practically confined to hardware, 
perfumery, and amber. The finest amber in the world 
LITHUANIA AND HER TROUBLES 117 
comes from near Klaipeda, where magnificent blocks are 
found containing specimens of insect life. Flies which 
were caught in the gum thousands of years ago look exactly 
the same as those that crawl up and down the window-
pane to-day. 
It is the fashion nowadays for new nations to demand 
as their right an access to the sea, and Lithuania's claim 
has been satisfied in this respect, although the process of 
settling the question was far from simple. At the mouth 
of the river Nemunas lies Klaipeda (or Memel) with an 
economic hinterland extending across Lithuania into Poland 
and Russia, the principal export being timber floated down 
the river. Politically, Klaipeda is now an autonomous 
district of Lithuania, although the population of the town 
itself is almost entirely German and has been so since the 
thirteenth century. It had belonged to the Kingdom of 
Prussia as part of its inheritance from the Knights of the 
Teutonic Order. Before the Great War, the town of Klai­
peda, with a strip of territory east of the river, belonged 
to Germany, while the hinterland belonged to the Russian 
Empire ; but under the Versailles Treaty Germany ceded 
all her territory east of the river to the Allies who occupied 
it and took over the administration. A provisional regime 
with a French High Commissioner lasted for three years, 
the delay in settling the matter being chiefly due to the 
Vilna dispute and the consequent delay in the official 
recognition of the Lithuanian Government; and it was 
not until the autumn of 1922 that the question was taken 
up by the Conference of Ambassadors. Meanwhile, it 
had been suggested that Klaipeda might be given a status 
in regard to Lithuania analogous to that given to Danzig 
in regard to Poland. But this was unacceptable to the 
Lithuanians, as the population of the country districts 
of Klaipeda was Lithuanian in nationality, while the port 
was almost the only possible sea outlet for the new state. 
Having seen the Poles seize Vilna in 1920, the Lithuanians 
thought they would play the same game. The Poles had 
brought off their coup without any evil results to themselves, 
so in January, 1923, the Lithuanians copied the Poles 
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and seized Klaipeda. The French garrison evacuated the 
town. What could be more simple ? And, what is more, 
Klaipeda is still in the possession of Lithuania. The Con­
ference of Ambassadors proposed that the Allies should 
transfer the sovereignty over this territory to Lithuania, 
subject to local autonomy and freedom of transit for Poland ; 
but so many difficulties arose between Poland and Lithu­
ania that the case was referred to the League of Nations. 
To cut a long story short, a Convention was signed in 
March, 1924, constituting the Klaipeda territory as a unit 
within the sovereignty of Lithuania, with a clearly defined 
measure of administrative and financial autonomy, and 
with a governor to be appointed by the President of Lithu­
ania. The port was defined as one of international concern, 
to which the provisions of the Barcelona Transit Con­
ference apply, and was placed under a harbour board 
including a technical expert of neutral nationality appointed 
by the League of Nations. All this seems a lot of fuss 
about a small place, but we live in times when it is often 
the smaller the place the greater the fuss. 
The Lithuanians claim that one of the great advantages 
of Klaipeda is that it is ice-free in winter. A year ago 
I believed in the ice-free claims of many Baltic ports, 
but not so to-day. Last winter (1928-9) every port in 
the Baltic was frozen stiff. Before the war, Klaipeda was 
mainly a timber port for wood floated down the Nemunas 
from the Lithuanian and White Russian forests, and it 
is expected that it will play an important part in the Russian 
transit trade as soon as the Polish-Lithuanian frontier is 
reopened, besides providing an outlet for Lithuanian trade. 
The Government are, therefore, doing all they can to 
restore the port and adapt it for the export of agricultural 
produce, so that general trade may not suffer from the 
fact that Klaipeda is primarily a timber port. In this as 
in many other directions the Lithuanians show undoubted 
enterprise, but everything seems to be against them. I 
have a keen sense of sympathy for these people, who have 
few friends in the world. The will to progress is present, 
but the materials are absent. There is a certain tragedy 
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in the air of Lithuania to-day, and there is a feeling that 
the people are slowly bowing to some inevitable fate apart 
altogether from Vilna. But it is difficult to analyse one's 
impressions in this direction. The Lithuanians are good-
natured, religious, hard-working and patriotic, and there seems 
no apparent reason why with time and perseverance they 
should not succeed in building up a nation. They need 
help, and there is little doubt that this would be forthcoming 
if they would change their general attitude. Formerly, 
they had many sympathizers both in this country and 
elsewhere, but M. Valdemaras has succeeded in turning 
nearly all their friends against them. Perhaps in recent 
years there has been a tendency to over-estimate the 
cultural qualities of the Lithuanians, and to believe too 
readily that they could weld themselves into a homo­
geneous whole. Their weakness in absorbing foreign cultures 
as easily as they do does not hold out any very hopeful 
prospect for the future, and it seems that they are now 
struggling to achieve their cultural independence with 
materials that scarcely exist. With the best will in the 
world it is impossible to construct an edifice without 
materials, and it almost seems as if some sort of advisory 
system would be beneficial from several points of view 
until such time as Lithuania has advanced sufficiently to 
thrive as an independent state. At present the Vilna 
question is absorbing all her energies, and the people are 
inclined to look back on the glories of the past and the 
standard of their culture in the Middle Ages, ignoring the 
period during which they have lived under the heel of 
Russia. Unless they are prepared to face the perhaps 
rather unpleasant reality of their position, and submit to 
the advice of those who are honestly anxious to help them, 
there seems little hope that they will be able to resist 
absorption by their neighbours. Although there is practi­
cally no Communism in the country and their territory 
holds out few inducements for Russian aggression, the 
Lithuanians are so placed on the map of Europe that they 
have dangers enough without being threatened from the 
Soviet direction. 
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In the strictly geographical sense, Finland, Estonia, 
and Latvia were not the only Baltic countries derived from 
the Russian Empire. Lithuania and Poland also pos­
sessed short seaboards on the Baltic—Lithuania just to the 
north of Klaipeda, and Poland just to the west of Danzig 
—but these two countries could not be regarded primarily 
as Baltic countries or exclusively as states derived from 
Russia. Both were essentially inland states, and the access 
to the Baltic which they had obtained by the reconstruction 
of Eastern Europe on the basis of linguistic nationality was 
considered inadequate to their economic needs. Lithuania 
wanted an additional outlet at Klaipeda and Poland at 
Danzig; and the fact that the nationality of these two 
ports was neither Lithuanian nor Polish, but German, 
created two problems difficult of solution. And neither of 
these problems was merely local in character, for these terri­
tories, inhabited by German populations, previously belonged 
to the German Empire ; so that, if Lithuania and Poland, 
like Finland andj the two Baltic States derived from Russia, 
had to fear the revival of Russian power on their eastern 
front, they were also threatened on the west by the possible 
revival of Germany, and their newly won independence 
could hardly survive a hostile combination of these two 
Great Powers such as was foreshadowed in the Treaty of 
Rapallo in 1922. Hemmed in as they were between Russia 
on one side and Germany on the other, they had every reason 
to hold together like Estonia and Latvia, and this immediate 
common interest had its counterpart in a common historical 
tradition ; but, unfortunately, these considerations did not 
prevent the ancient city of Vilna from bringing them into 
complete estrangement, if not into open hostility. 
* * * * * 
From an international standpoint, Lithuania is a country 
of considerable importance, and for this reason neither 
her internal condition nor her relationships with Poland 
over the Vilna question can be treated with indifference. 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania form a chain of buffer states 
between Germany and Russia, and it is important that they 
should develop as sound political structures independent, 
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if possible, of Russian and German influences. The military 
qualities of these three nations are not to be despised, and 
it must not be forgotten that the Imperial Russian Navy 
was chiefly manned from those shores of the Baltic. But 
the somewhat backward conditions at present prevailing 
in these countries make them a source of weakness, and in 
many respects Lithuania is the most backward of all. 
One of her chief dangers is to be found in the susceptibility 
of the Lithuanians to the cultures of their more powerful 
neighbours—Russia, Germany, and Poland. The extension 
of Russian or German influence across the frontier of Lithu­
ania would convert the country into a bridge for uniting 
these two nations, and a Russo-German combination is 
a political possibility which can only be viewed with the 
strongest disfavour from the point of view of European 
peace. While it is possible that Russia may seek an oppor­
tunity to re-establish herself on the coast of the Baltic, 
it is not unreasonable to assume that Germany, stripped 
of her former colonies, is looking for some suitable line of 
expansion in a northerly direction; and these two Powers 
may discover some basis of mutual understanding in the 
situation created by the present condition of the Baltic 
States. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the obstinate 
policy of M. Valdemaras has not been entirely disconnected 
with Russian and German influences. 
If, on the other hand, Lithuania were to be absorbed 
by Poland, Germany and Russia would be provided with a 
different incentive to join hands directly against Poland, 
and indirectly against such small nations as have common 
interests with Poland vis-d-vis either or both of the two 
greater Powers. The enhanced prestige of Poland, with a 
further access to the sea, would be inacceptable to Russia, 
while the precarious position created for East Prussia would 
tend to precipitate a crisis between Germany and Poland 
over the already delicate question of the Polish Corridor, 
in which Russia could not but support the German claims. 
Although it is at present impossible to foresee the course 
which the Russo-German policy encouraged by the late 
Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, until recently German Ambas­
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sador in Moscow, will take, it is sufficient to bear in mind 
the following considerations to realize that it is not a matter 
to be treated lightly. First, Russia badly needs the help 
of foreign capital and organizing ability to reorganize 
her economic life, and is making great efforts to attract 
foreign enterprise ; secondly, Germany is nearer and in 
a more favourable position than any other nation to supply 
Russia's wants, and she may consider it to be in her political 
and economic interests to do so ; thirdly, for centuries 
Germany and Russia co-operated in a sense through the 
Baltic barons in the control of these Baltic provinces, and 
Germany is to-day steadily increasing her economic influence 
in these states; fourthly, Germany favours the policy 
of trying to draw Russia westward rather than of allowing 
her to drift towards Asia ; and, fifthly, Germany and Russia 
have similar interests in certain of the many problems 
comprising the general Baltic situation, of which the Vilna 
question and that of the Polish Corridor are conspicuous 
examples. It is therefore not surprising that in the minds 
of Northern statesmen and diplomatists the Russian danger 
is considerably augmented by the possibility of a Russo-
German combination, aiming to make these two Powers 
masters of the Baltic. Hence, there are abundant reasons 
why the Baltic States in general, and Lithuania in particular, 
should receive external support sufficient to enable them to 
preserve their independence and to prosper as political 
entities strong enough to resist the pressure by which they 
are surrounded. 
CHAPTER VI 
POLAND AND VILNA 
WITH the retreat of the Bolshevists in 1920, the Vilna boundary dispute between Poland and Lithuania added a new controversy to the troubles 
of Eastern Europe ; and this question has never since ceased 
to act as a disturbing factor in the whole European system. 
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VILNA AREA 
The Vilna question by itself is a comparatively small matter, 
but the situation and character of the dispute is such that 
it directly or indirectly affects other European problems of 
first importance, and thereby involves the interests of most 
of the European Powers. Although the dispute seems 
interminable and nearly exhausts the patience of statesmen 
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in Western Europe, it has to be treated seriously and as a 
question with dangerous possibilities. Vilna is to-day one 
of the danger points of Europe, and it is only necessary to 
visit this area to realize that there is enough explosive 
material on these rolling plains to set the whole of Europe 
ablaze once more. 
Prior to the Third Partition of 1795, the territories in­
habited by Polish and Lithuanian populations had con­
stituted politically a single unit; their political union 1 
had been voluntary and gradual; and it had been accom­
panied by an equally voluntary and gradual' Polonization 
in the social sense, of the Lithuanian ruling class. Even 
the linguistic barrier had been confined to the unpolitical 
peasantry, and was to some extent neutralized by the 
stronger bond of their common Roman Catholic faith, which 
they also shared with the White Russian peasantry in the 
district of Vilna. The city of Vilna, which had been the 
capital of Lithuania before the Union, had afterwards 
become a local centre of Polish culture. The separate 
consciousness of Lithuanian nationality on a linguistic basis 
only developed during the nineteenth century, when the 
Poles and Lithuanians were politically isolated from one 
another 2 under varying degrees of Russian rule ; but this 
made the conflict all the more acute when the two nations 
emerged from the debris of the German, Russian, and 
Austro-Hungarian Empires. The Poles expected the Lithu­
anians to return voluntarily to the situation of 1795, and 
resented their new form of nationalism, while they wanted 
the outlet across Lithuania to the Baltic as an alternative 
to the Danzig Corridor. The Lithuanians', on the other 
hand, resented this attitude of the Poles, fearing that they 
1 Personal union of the crowns in A.D. 1386 and the constitu­
tional union of the two states in A.D. 1569 and total unity in 
A.D. 1793-
2 During the rare intervals between the years 1795 and 1918, 
when a mutilated and incompletely independent Polish State was 
re-established (e.g. the Duchy of Warsaw 1807-14 and the Kingdom 
of ' Congress Poland ' 1814-30), it never included more than a 
small part of Lithuania. 
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would try to use their superior military strength and their 
special diplomatic influence with the chief Allied Powers 
in order to force upon Lithuania the Polish conception of 
what Polish-Lithuanian relations should be. 
On the 8th December, 1919, the Supreme Council in 
Paris laid down a provisional eastern frontier for Poland, 
the so-called ' Curzon line', which followed linguistic 
boundaries as closely as was possible in view of the very 
mixed character of many of these border districts and the 
doubtful validity of some of the available statistics of 
population. The northern sector of this line would have 
formed the frontier between Poland and Lithuania, and 
would have excluded from Poland not only the significant 
Polish minorities in the long corridor extending north­
eastwards through and beyond Vilna, but also the sub­
stantial Polish minority in the city of Vilna itself. For 
the moment the potential problem thus created remained 
in abeyance ; for the ' Curzon line ' was only provisional, 
and Polish forces were almost everywhere in occupation of 
territories far to the east of it, including at this time the 
district of Vilna. This district underwent many changes 
both during and after the Great War, and it is as well to 
re-state them shortly here. It was occupied in 1915 by 
the Germans, who, on their retreat in November, 1918, 
handed it over to the Lithuanians. The Lithuanians estab­
lished Vilna as their capital and convened their National 
Assembly in the city ; but their stay was short, for in January, 
1919, they were driven out by the Bolshevists. The Poles 
then captured Vilna in April, 1919, and remained in 
possession until July of the following year, when it was 
re-taken by the Bolshevists in the course of their great 
advance into Poland. The Russians thought this an 
opportune moment to secure Lithuanian support, and 
accordingly signed the Peace Treaty of Moscow, providing 
for the cession of Vilna to Lithuania. Under this Treaty 
the Bolshevists handed over the city and the greater part 
of the province, but the Lithuanians still had to reckon 
with the Poles, who by August of that year were flushed 
with their victory over the Bolshevists. The Bolshevists 
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had legally given Vilna to Lithuania, but they were no 
longer present to enforce the execution of the Treaty. As 
was to be expected, it was not long before there was a 
collision between Polish and Lithuanian troops in the 
vicinity of SuValki, as result of which the Poles made up 
a case of ' Lithuanian aggression ' which they laid before 
the League of Nations. 
Although Lithuania was not yet a member of the League, 
she accepted the necessary obligations for the purposes of 
this dispute, and eventually agreed to recognize the ' Curzon 
line ' provisionally as the frontier between her territory 
and that of Poland. While this involved a sacrifice of her 
claims under the Moscow Treaty in the Suvalki sector, it 
had the advantage of strengthening her title to the more 
important territories coveted by Poland to the east of the 
' Curzon line ' which the Moscow Treaty had assigned to 
Lithuania. Poland, on her side, now undertook to respect 
these territories as neutral so long as their neutrality was 
equally respected by the Russians ; and both Governments 
agreed to refrain from further hostilities, and consented to 
the appointment of a Military Commission of Control to 
secure the respective withdrawal of both forces to the limits 
assigned to them. Under the auspices of this Commission, 
representatives of Poland and Lithuania signed at Suvalki, 
on the 7th October, 1920, an armistice convention providing 
for a line of demarcation between the respective forces. The 
new line corresponded closely with the ' Curzon line ' in 
the Suvalki sector, and then turned eastward till it reached 
a point on the Lyda-Vilna railway, leaving the city of 
Vilna well within Lithuanian territory. It was arranged 
that this agreement should come into force on the 10th 
October, but on the previous day General Zeligowski, an 
independent Polish commander, drove the Lithuanians out 
of Vilna city and reoccupied the greater part of the province 
for the Poles. Although this coup de force was formally 
disowned by the Polish Government as having been carried 
out without any authority, there is little doubt that it was 
in reality the subject of much rejoicing in Warsaw, and 
the fact remains that the Poles have since steadfastly refused 
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to regard Vilna in any other light than as a Polish city. 
Whatever view may be taken of the Polish claim to Vilna, 
the Poles cannot be excused for this high-handed action. 
If they disapproved of their signature at Suvalki being 
dishonoured by Zeligowski, they should have proved their 
indignation by the usual disciplinary action. This they 
not only failed to do, but the subsequent Polish attitude 
in the matter showed fairly clearly that it was a ' put-up 
job The Poles paid a big price for Vilna, for confidence 
in Poland dropped and Europe began to wonder whether, 
after all, a Polish State was conducive to general peace. 
Now, fortunately, the Poles realize that the Zeligowski coup 
was a grave mistake and, as they could probably have 
obtained Vilna without it, they regret it as an action leaving 
a tiresome stain on their national prestige. 
This coup de force not only violated the Suvalki agree­
ment, which the Poles had signed, but ignored the authority 
of the League of Nations and of the Commission which it 
had set up. The League was powerless, as words were its 
only weapon, and they did not make much impression where 
vital interests were at stake. All it could do was to summon 
the two parties to Geneva, where the Lithuanians protested 
violently against the action of General Zeligowski. The 
Poles took up the attitude that it was a fait accompli with 
which they could not interfere, and that in any case it was 
outside the scope of the original dispute referred by them 
to the League. On the 28th October, the League Council 
decided that the destiny of the Vilna area should be deter­
mined by a plebiscite to be held under League auspices, 
and to this both Governments agreed ; but it was clear that 
no plebiscite could be taken until the district was evacuated 
by General Zeligowski and taken over by a neutral army 
of occupation. Therefore, during the winter of 1920-1, 
attempts were made to collect a mixed international force, 
but results, or rather lack of results, showed that no 
European Power was prepared to become mixed up with 
an uncompromising Polish general and an unknown popula­
tion in an obscure and isolated corner of Europe within a 
few miles of the Bolshevists. The prospect was not inviting, 
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and little more was heard of it, as difficulties rapidly grew 
like fungi on the plebiscite proposal, which was finally 
dropped in favour of direct negotiations between the Poles 
and Lithuanians under the presidency of M. Hymans 
(Belgium) as the representative of the League. In this 
dispute the League showed in a conspicuous way its utter 
inability to enforce its decisions, and it continued to talk 
to deaf ears, which made its position extremely difficult. 
The next phase lasted from March, 1921, to January, 1922, 
when M. Hymans exhausted his own patience and that of 
the League in constant and untiring efforts at conciliation. 
His idea was to promote a general rapprochement between 
the two countries as a prelude to the discussion of the local 
dispute over Vilna. He hoped to induce Poland, in return 
for a permanent military and economic alliance with Lithu­
ania, to agree to the incorporation of Vilna in Lithuania 
as a separate autonomous canton subject to special 
guarantees. The time, however, was not propitious for 
negotiations of this sort. The Lithuanians, exasperated 
beyond measure by the Zeligowski coup and by the failure 
of the League and of the Allied Powers to take effective 
counter-measures, were not disposed to listen to counsels 
of reason and moderation ; while the Poles, whose ambitions 
were almost completely realized by the status quo, were 
unlikely to yield without some more attractive inducements 
than M. Hymans had to offer. The consequence was that 
all his proposals were rejected by either one or both parties 
concerned, and finally the Council decided to withdraw 
the Commission from Vilna. 
By this last decision the League practically admitted 
its incapacity to solve the Vilna question, and left events 
to take their own course. Although the question was on 
the agenda several times in 1922, and the Spanish Consul-
General in Brussels was sent on behalf of the League to 
investigate the position once more on the spot, no progress 
was made beyond the recommendation of a definite, though 
provisional, line of demarcation based on the status quo, 
which was, of course, accepted by Poland and rejected by 
Lithuania. 
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Meanwhile the Poles had been in possession of Vilna 
for more than two years; they had already organized a 
local Diet which, in the circumstances, was naturally of 
Polish composition; and they thought that the time had 
come for obtaining from the Powers an official recognition 
of their gains. On the 15th February, 1923, the Polish 
Government appealed to the Conference of Ambassadors 
and found that the political atmosphere in that quarter 
was propitious for their rather audacious proposal. Every 
one was sick of the controversy, and the Allied Powers 
represented at the Conference were unlikely to court disaster 
by proposing'any solution that involved the use of armed 
force. On the 15th March the Conference, in virtue of 
Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles, fixed in detail the 
frontiers between Poland on the one hand and Russia and 
Lithuania on the other. As between Poland and Russia 
they simply recognized the line already traced and delimited 
by the two parties ' on their own responsibility' in Nov­
ember, 1922. As between Poland and Lithuania, they con­
firmed the ' Curzon line ' in the Suvalki district, between the 
East Prussian frontier and the Niemen, while between the 
Niemen and the Dvina1 they laid down a definite frontier 
approximately coinciding with the provisional line of 
demarcation previously recommended by the League 
Council.2 Basing their action on ' the de facto situation 
resulting from ' that recommendation, and thus seeking to 
invoke the authority of the League in support of their 
decision, the Conference of Ambassadors proceeded to award 
to Poland the district which had been lawlessly occupied 
by General Zeligowski two and a half years before. The 
Lithuanian Government refused to accept this award and 
continued to regard itself as being in a state of war with 
Poland; but it had weakened its position by having re­
quested the principal Allied Powers on several occasions 
to intervene in its favour in virtue of Article 87 of the 
Versailles Treaty, which it has thus appeared to recognize 
by implication; and it had displeased the League Council 
1 These two rivers are now known as the Nemunas and Daugava. 
2 3rd February, 1923. 
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by attempting to arraign it before the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. The Lithuanians contended that 
the Ambassadors' decision was incompatible with the 
principles previously laid down by the Council; but the 
Council took the view that both parties had admitted the 
Ambassadors' competence to settle their dispute, and 
declined to submit the resolution to the Permanent Court for 
an opinion on its legality. Lithuania raised both questions 
once more in the autumn of 1923, but the only result was 
an adjournment of the discussion to the following year. 
By the end of 1923 it looked as if the protracted con­
troversy over Vilna had at last been brought to an end. 
The de facto situation created by the Zeligowski coup had 
been endorsed and regularized by the Allied Powers, and 
Lithuania was not in a position to alter it by force of arms. 
But the Vilna dispute is still with us at the time of writing, 
and it looks as if it will continue to haunt the chanceries of 
Europe for some considerable time. Bitterness and bad 
feeling, resulting chiefly from the circumstances in which 
Vilna passed into the hands of the Poles, have tended to 
obscure the real issue, and at times it is indeed difficult to 
find any definite connection between the city of Vilna on 
the banks of the Vilja and the voluminous orations delivered 
by the shores of the Lake of Geneva. Year after year this 
same question appears on the agenda of the League, and 
year after year it is either adjourned or referred to some 
committee or conference. Nothing is done, although words 
are not wanting. The Vilna dispute is to the League what a 
Scottish night is to the House of Commons—an opportunity 
for sleep, often well earned. The fact of the matter is that 
mistakes have been made on all sides, and each party con­
cerned wants to justify its own position in the eyes of the 
world. This is not a very high ideal, and one would have 
expected the League of Nations to be above this sort of 
thing. But the League is not yet strong enough to adopt 
a candid and bold attitude in such matters. It is difficult 
to conceive that so many mistakes could have been made, 
and one can only attribute the general bungle to the 
abnormal and strained circumstances in which all post-war 
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negotiations were carried out at that time. Human beings 
were called upon to deal with situations almost beyond the 
scope of their capacity, and this at a time when brains were 
at the point of exhaustion and nerves were exceedingly 
frayed. It was only war-weariness that saved the situation, 
but it is very doubtful whether the decisions of these tired 
old gentlemen will survive a generation with fresh vitality 
and a new outlook on life. That, however, remains to be seen. 
Let us now have a look at the scene of all this trouble, 
and put negotiations, conferences, committees, and talking 
machines in the background. I can thoroughly recommend 
the neighbourhood of Vilna and Kovno 1 for natural beauty, 
human interest, mediaeval architecture, romance, humour, 
and good food. There you have the best train services and 
the worst; plenty of languages you cannot understand; 
nice people in both countries ; a queer mixture of religions ; 
a good ration of indescribable ignorance ; and an atmosphere 
entirely different from that of Western Europe. There is 
no want of variety. The Vilna dispute assumes rather a 
different aspect when viewed from the surroundings of its 
birthplace ; for it has now become so bound up in questions 
of ' Haute Politique ' that the more local considerations are 
apt to become obscured by the larger political problems, of 
which they form a factor of no small significance. Yet the 
local aspect is at the present moment of the greatest import­
ance, partly because it directly affects the more immediate 
aspect of the question—the frontier impasse and the future 
of diplomatic relations between Poland and Lithuania— 
and partly because it indicates the lines of thought 
behind the stubborn policy of M. Valdemaras. If my visit 
to Vilna and Kovno did not inspire any great degree of 
hope, it was instructive in many new directions and showed 
that important influences exist, which tend to explain what 
would otherwise seem to be a wholly unreasonable^ and 
uncompromising attitude on the part of the Lithuanians. 
Whenever I think of Poland my thoughts instinctively 
travel to Vilna, that majestic little city whose atmosphere 
is such a relief from the rude rush of the twentieth century. 
1 Now known as Kaunas. 
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It is one of these places in the world that takes the visitor 
completely by surprise, grips him, and sends him away with 
much to think about and a longing to return. As I 
approached Vilna in the Polish train from the direction of 
Dvinsk,1 I expected to find a dirty, rather tumble-down 
town of little interest, with few modern conveniences, and 
an hotel providing little more than the bare necessities of 
life. It was in the evening that I drove from the station 
through the narrow byways with Hebrew signboards on all 
sides, and I began to wonder whether I had come to Jeru­
salem by mistake. There was a distinct resemblance. 
Then the car passed down a small street with people kneeling 
on the pavements: there were candles burning and there 
was a faint smell of incense in the air. Every one seemed to 
be bare-headed with hat in hand. The chauffeur took off 
his hat, and I followed suit. Was this an open-air church, 
or a funeral, or was I suffering from delusions ? Presently 
the car passed through a great open square, turned into a 
sort of boulevard with trees on either side, and drew up 
at an hotel where there were bright lights, sounds of music, 
and Polish officers in uniform passing in and out of the door. 
After much juggling with various languages, I was escorted 
to a spacious bedchamber by a small boy not more than 
eight years old; and after struggling feverishly with a 
Polish menu, which was mainly composed of the letters c, z, 
and w, I succeeded in obtaining one of the best dinners I 
have ever eaten. The restaurant was gaily decorated, the 
officers were resplendent in their uniforms and decorations, 
the orchestra played divinely, and the ' tournedoes ' melted 
in my mouth. Every one looked good-natured and happy, 
and I will not easily forget the Hotel Saint Georges at Vilna. 
A visit to the Governor next morning, and a subsequent 
tour of inspection with an eminent professor of the Univer­
sity, dispelled all my illusions about the place. Not only 
is Vilna an ancient and a very beautiful city, but it is a 
holy city. Magnificently situated on a series of prominences 
overlooking the bends of the river Vilja, and rich in 
architectural treasures and historical associations, it is a 
1 Now known as Daugavpils. 
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city with well-defined characteristics and with a distinct 
atmosphere of its own. Although it is situated in the north, 
its nature is essentially of the south, and its medievalism 
differs widely from that usually found in Western Europe. 
The Russians made determined efforts to give Vilna the 
character of a Russian provincial town, but the Latin 
influence was so strong that it overcame all resistance and 
remains to this day the dominating feature of the city. This 
is reflected in the large number of very beautiful churches 
with which Vilna is adorned, and these masterpieces of the 
Gothic and Renaissance styles are considered to be among 
the finest examples of their kind in the world. As far as 
external beauty is concerned, nothing in the city can surpass 
the church of St. Anne, a Gothic building of brick which 
appealed so strongly to Napoleon that he arranged to have 
it transported to Paris, and was only prevented from doing 
so by the circumstances of his retreat from Moscow. But 
the most impressive building internally is the church of 
St. Peter and St. Paul, the interior of which is as striking 
in richness as it is perfect in simplicity. The blending of 
these two qualities in Italian Renaissance has produced a 
carved effect in stucco which is almost unbelievable. And 
fortunate, indeed, is the visitor who happens to pass by the 
Cathedral at midday, where he can witness a time-honoured 
custom that is as beautiful as it is inspiring. As he admires 
the classic lines of the ancient and rather weather-beaten 
edifice, he will suddenly hear the strange music of trumpets 
playing a Mass as if from nowhere. At first this phantom 
music is bewildering, but a glance at the round Italian 
campanile reveals two military trumpeters standing at 
attention and sounding the sacred call of the Angelus. One 
would imagine that a Mass played on trumpets would 
produce a somewhat crude effect, but this is not so ; for 
the sweet notes that ring through the Cathedral square are 
as solemn and mellow as the music of any organ. 
Besides being an archbishopric of the Greek Orthodox 
Church and an archbishopric of the Church of Rome, the 
city has an ancient University, founded by the Jesuits 
about A.D. 1570, which is equal in status to the University 
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of Krakow, so that Vilna may be regarded as a centre of 
religious and educational culture of some considerable stand­
ing. These university buildings greatly suffered from crude 
reconstruction work carried out later by the Russians, but 
even to-day the principal court and that of the theological 
faculty are striking examples of that majesty and solemnity 
which are the main features of the ' Baroque ' style. There 
is an impressive dignity about these vaulted passages and 
cloisters, with their visible reminders of the hours of trial 
through which Vilna has passed both in mediaeval and more 
recent times. The union of the two countries is represented 
in the arms of the University displayed on the outside wall, 
where the Polish eagle is quartered with the Lithuanian 
knight. 
But, apart altogether from this cultural aspect, the city 
has long been a centre of religious devotion to Poles and 
Lithuanians alike, and the miraculous image of the Blessed 
Virgin situated over the Ostra Brama Gate is greatly 
venerated by Greek Catholics as well as by followers of the 
Church of Rome. Indeed, the street leading up to this 
gateway is usually thronged with people, kneeling before 
the shrine, while all passers-by, irrespective of creed, take 
off their hats while walking or driving along this thorough­
fare. On the southern wall of the gateway—that which is 
not occupied by the sacred shrine—the heraldic devices of 
both Poland and Lithuania are displayed over the gate itself, 
as may also be noticed elsewhere. Yet there is no doubt 
whatever that, although Vilna was once the capital of 
Lithuania in mediaeval times and was a centre of Lithuanian 
culture, the outward and visible signs of culture in the Vilna 
of to-day are entirely Polish in character and construction. 
But the Poles are not unreasonable over the religious aspect 
of Vilna, and readily acknowledge the right of the Lithu­
anians to share in the devotions connected with the Virgin 
of Ostra Brama. In fact, on the occasion of the ceremony 
of the ' Coronation of the Virgin ' 1 they opened the frontier 
to the Lithuanians, who availed themselves of the 
courtesy to a certain limited degree, although there was no 
1 2nd July, 1927. 
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doubt a feeling of satisfaction in the Polish mind that the 
Lithuanians were coming to honour ' Our Lady of Poland 
This, however, is not the only sense in which Vilna may be 
regarded as a holy city, for it is a centre of eight different 
religious communities. Besides the followers of the Roman 
and Greek Churches, there is an ancient Orthodox sect, a 
large community of Jews headed by a Grand Rabbi, a sect 
of Jews which is noted for its rejection of the Talmud, a 
moderate number of Lutherans and Calvinists, and a settle­
ment of Mohammedans with a Grand Mufti, who are 
descended from prisoners taken in the wars against Turkey 
and the Tartars of the Crimea in the sixteenth and seven­
teenth centuries. These Turks and Tartars settled on the 
land and, although they completely lost their old nationality 
and became Poles 200 years ago, they still adhered to their 
Moslem faith. All these Mohammedan families were ennobled, 
and now comprise about 10,000 people. Not only are they 
very patriotic Poles, forming in 1920 a special cavalry regi­
ment known as the ' Tartar Cavalry', but they have gained 
considerable distinction in all departments of social life. 
Vilna must, therefore, be regarded as one of those cities 
which possess, as most holy cities do, certain features 
scarcely conducive to political peace ; and this influence, 
together with the city's natural dignity and cultural associa­
tions, makes it a pride of the Poles and an object of natural 
envy on the part of the Lithuanians, whose capital it is 
claimed to be on grounds which are not altogether unjustifi­
able. The Lithuanians do not merely want to possess Vilna 
as their capital city, but they feel that a centre with so 
strong a religious and cultural influence would be a national 
asset of no small significance. For the same reason the 
Poles are equally anxious to retain the city within the 
frontiers of Poland. 
Although Vilna has a strong Jewish element in the popula­
tion, which is very noticeable amongst the townspeople and 
shopkeepers, it is obvious even to the casual observer that 
it is a Polish city. The Polish language is predominant, 
French, German, or Russian being spoken by a very small 
proportion of the people, while Polish history has left its 
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mark deeply engraved on most of the buildings of any 
importance. While it is true that the period of union 
between Lithuania and Poland in the Middle Ages is repre­
sented to some extent in the ancient buildings of Vilna, it 
is equally true that there are to-day few traces of anything 
that was definitely Lithuanian. 
Yet Vilna has the air of a decadent city. Its glory and 
prestige belong to the past, and its present appearance is 
that of a town commercially and economically dead. In 
ancient times it was an important trading centre between 
the Baltic and the Black Sea, and fifteen years ago it derived 
most of its trade from the main railway lines connecting 
Petrograd with Warsaw and Libau 1 with Rostov ; but the 
Great War practically killed Vilna. Before the war it was 
the headquarters of a Russian army corps, and to-day it 
is a Polish military centre, but to describe it as associated 
with great military activity is to indulge in exaggeration. 
When I was in Vilna in August, 1928, certain military 
exercises of a very ordinary nature (corresponding somewhat 
to our brigade training) were in progress, and there were 
a good number of Polish officers in evidence, but there was 
certainly nothing to justify the reports of mobilization which 
appeared in sections of the European press and brought 
special correspondents from afar to ask the Governor for 
war news. Judging from the conversations which I had 
with the Governor of the Province of Vilna and other 
prominent Poles, the Polish attitude seemed to be essentially 
pacific ; and there was even a feeling of sympathy for the 
Lithuanians, provided that the main dispute was left out 
of account. Poland's position in Europe is such that she 
could not possibly afford to embark on any more aggressive 
ventures, apart altogether from any obligations which she 
has undertaken. 
M. Valdemaras,2 on the other hand, firmly believed in a 
Polish policy of creating a Greater Poland, incorporating 
Ukrainians, White Russians, and Lithuanians, and he re­
garded the Polish seizure of Vilna as merely the beginning of 
1 Now known as Liepaja. 
2 M. Valdemaras resigned on the 19th September, 1923. 
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a general Polish movement supported by France, who wants 
to see a strong Power between Russia and Germany. He 
was duly alive to the fact that the Lithuanians are a people 
with little culture of their own, who only too readily absorb 
the cultures of their neighbours, and he feared that, with an 
open frontier, the Poles would not be slow to take advantage 
of this weakness for their own benefit. But when M. 
Valdemaras talked of Polish aggression it did not necessarily 
signify military action, and there is little doubt that the 
aggression that is feared is of a threefold nature. First, 
the Lithuanians fear an attempt, on the part of the Poles 
to force their culture on the country ; secondly, they expect 
this to be supported by economic penetration ; and, thirdly, 
they foresee the climax in a military occupation of their 
country, possibly without actual fighting, when once the 
way has been well prepared from the cultural and economic 
standpoints. In fact, the Lithuanians anticipate a slow 
and methodical process culminating in the arrival of Polish 
troops in Kovno, when there will be so many Poles in the 
city and its surroundings that they will be received with 
acclamation. In order, therefore, to protect his country from 
Polish influence, M. Valdemaras has insisted on keeping the 
frontier closed, while he stirred up a strong national enthusi­
asm over Vilna in order to counterbalance the low culture 
and economic backwardness of the Lithuanian people. But 
a strong national sentiment, such as now exists in Lithuania, 
without any economic backing is liable to run riot, especially 
when high tension exists between the people and their next-
door neighbours, and incidents are apt to occur which may 
have far-reaching consequences. The Lithuanians are a 
fighting race which supplied some of the best troops in the 
Russian army, and the qualities of their soldiers to-day are 
of a high order. M. Valdemaras apparently entertained the 
hope eventually of securing Vilna, but his immediate object 
was to prevent the Poles from penetrating farther into 
Lithuania and to avoid doing anything that would constitute 
an admission of Poland's right to Vilna. He contended that 
direct communications between the two countries are quite 
unnecessary from the Lithuanian standpoint, while their 
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reopening would benefit only the Poles, both economically 
and in a political sense. The foregoing circumstances, added 
to a natural desire to render Vilna as useless as possible to 
the Poles, constitute the chief reasons why M. Valdemaras 
refused to come to terms with Poland over the frontier 
question. But for reasons for his supreme obstinacy it is 
necessary to look farther afield. 
Although it cannot definitely be stated that Russia and 
Germany are supporting Lithuania, there is reason to believe 
that Russia is not disinterested in her opposition to Poland, 
and that Germany would be glad to see the question kept 
open for some years, in order that she may use her influence 
when her position is stronger and thereby promote her 
interests in other directions. While it is a mistake to think 
that M. Valdemaras was relying on external support, yet he 
felt that his policy of obstinately refusing to consider the 
question of reopening the frontier and of delay in any form 
of settlement regarding Vilna was acceptable in certain 
quarters, which might be in a position to help him later on 
if it is in their interest to do so. He regarded the Vilna 
question as forming part of a much larger problem—the 
future settlement of Eastern Europe—and he thought that 
it will be many years, possibly twenty or thirty, before this 
more comprehensive question can be solved. Meanwhile, 
the Lithuanians expect Polish aggression in some form or 
another, not necessarily in the immediate future, but as 
opportunity occurs, and they have persuaded themselves 
that no one will protect them in the event of such aggression. 
This feeling is particularly noticeable in Kovno, where the 
people give the impression that they consider themselves 
doomed to fight a forlorn hope. Certainly up to date they 
have had no reason to expect that any Power or Powers would 
protect them, and the fact that Poland broke the previous 
lines of demarcation without any serious consequences to 
herself, and was not requested to evacuate Vilna as a 
preliminary to negotiations, makes them very apprehensive 
of the future. As far as Vilna is concerned, M. Valdemaras 
has stirred up a marked enthusiasm among the politically 
minded classes and throughout the schools, and he reached 
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a position from which he could not easily draw back. 
Indeed, he carried his Vilna policy so far that it was doubtful 
whether his life would have been safe if he had compromised 
with Poland. He has taught the Lithuanians to hate the 
Poles, and he related to me himself in Kovno how it was 
believed that Poland had resolutely opposed Lithuanian 
independence, had betrayed his people during the war to 
the Russians and Germans, and that natural animosity 
was the result. While it seemed that the prospect of M. 
Valdemaras attaining the object of his ambition was not 
very bright, he believed that time was all on the side of 
the Lithuanians, and he was pursuing a policy which he 
believed to be for the good of his country by doing everything 
in his power to safeguard what remains of Lithuania. This 
fear of Polish aggression, which seems to be the keynote of 
the present situation, has become an idee fixe almost obscur­
ing the question of recovering Vilna, but it is sapping all 
the energies of the people, who trust no one and, therefore, 
cannot see the world in its proper perspective. 
A study of the merits of the two respective claims is 
essential. From the standpoint of linguistic nationality, the 
Lithuanian claim to Vilna was unfounded. In the city 
itself the Lithuanian population was almost negligible, and 
there was only one district (Troki) in the whole province 
that had a clear Lithuanian majority. The only fairly 
reliable statistics available were those of the Russian census 
of 1897, and it was believed that these figures, though out 
of date, were free of prejudice. All later figures, whether 
compiled by Russians, Germans, or Poles, were incomplete 
and produced to support some particular political conten­
tion. The 1897 figures gave the following approximate 
percentages: 
PROVINCE (including city1) CITY OF VILNA 
Russians . 
White Russians . 
Poles . . . . 
Lithuanians . 
Jews . . . . 
Others 
5'°o 
56-05 
8 - i 8  
17-59 
12-72 
0-46 
Russians . 
White Russians 
Poles . 
Lithuanians . 
Jews . 
Others 
20-50 
4-20 
3090 
2-00 
4°'30 
2-IO 
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From the above it is fairly obvious that the province was 
more White Russian than anything else, and that the city 
of Vilna had a preponderance of Jews. In fact, neither Poles 
nor Lithuanians headed the list in either case. But, 
eliminating the Jews in the city, there were fifteen times 
as many Poles as Lithuanians in Vilna itself; while in the 
province there were twice as many Lithuanians as Poles. 
The distribution of nationalities, however, showed that the 
Lithuanian majority was all concentrated in one district, 
and did not justify a claim to the province as a whole. The 
distribution of the population according to districts is given 
in the following table, which was compiled from the 1897 
census : 
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Vilna, total 1,591,207 — 4-94 o-O6 56-05 8-I8 17-59 0-24 12-72 0-23 
City of Vilna 154,532 9-3 20*2 0'3 4-2 30-9 2-0 I-I 40'3 I-O 
District of Vilna 
(not including 
city) . . . 208,781 — 3-3 — 42-0 I2-I 35*0 0-2 7-4 — 
District of Disna1 204,923 — 5*9 — 8I-2 2-4 0-3 o-i IO-I — 
District of Lida . 205,767 0-9 1-2 — 73-2 4-6 8-7 — 12-2 o-i 
District of 
Oszmiany . 233,559 0-2 2-3 — 8o-i 1-7 3-8 — I2-I o-i 
District of 
Svenciany . 172,231 __ 5'4 — 47-6 6-0 33-8 — 7-1 o-i 
District of Troki 203,401 1*6 4-6 O'l 15*8 II *2 58-1 0-2 9-5 o-5 
District of Vileika1 208,013 0-9 
— 
87-0 2-5 9-5 o-i 
1 These districts were excluded from Lithuania by the Treaty of Moscow, 1920. 
Of course these figures do not represent the position 
to-day. The Polish population has naturally increased 
considerably, and the Lithuanians have not been encouraged 
to remain in Vilna ; but it must always be remembered that 
the merits of the respective cases rest, not on present 
conditions, but on those prevailing at the time when the 
dispute arose. The latest Polish figures for what they 
describe as the ' Region de Vilna ' in 1919 are as follows : 
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P o l e s  . . . . . . . .  3 4 1 , 4 9 1  
J e w s  . . . . . . . .  6 1 , 0 1 2  
White Russians . . . . . .24,531 
Others ........ 70,206 
Total . . . . . . . 497,240 
These last statistics are unsatisfactory, but as they do 
not affect the case they are only given as a matter of interest. 
On historical grounds the Lithuanians claim their right 
to Vilna by producing material regarding the position in 
the Middle Ages, when Vilna undoubtedly was the capital 
of the Lithuanian Empire. But the Lithuania of to-day 
has no more resemblance to the Lithuania of the fifteenth 
century than the modern Kingdom of Iraq has to the ancient 
Kingdom of Babylon. Juridically, however, their claim 
had a much more solid foundation. It was beyond question 
that the Vilna territory had been under Russian sovereignty, 
and that it was ceded to Lithuania by the Soviet Government 
under the Moscow Treaty of the 12th July, 1920, although 
that Government had not been recognized by any of the 
existing Great Powers as the de jure Government of Russia. 
While it is true that the Soviet Government subsequently 
recognized the rights of Poland over territory lying to the 
east of the district of Vilna, this was not incompatible with 
their previous cession of the Vilna district to Lithuania, 
and cannot be considered to have annulled the rights of 
Lithuania under the Peace Treaty of Moscow. 
The Polish claim, on the other hand, rested, in point of 
nationality, on the fact that there were many more Poles 
than Lithuanians in the city itself, although the Poles 
themselves were outnumbered by the Jews. Moreover, 
although the Polish population throughout the remainder 
of the province was small in numbers, it included a larger 
proportion of the landowning class. Juridically, the Polish 
claim rested on the decision of the Conference of 
Ambassadors, which was based on the provision in the 
Treaty of Versailles to the effect that ' the boundaries of 
Poland not laid down in the present Treaty will be sub­
sequently determined by the Principal Allied and Associated 
Powers '. But the question arises whether the Allied Powers 
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had any legal right to make over to the Poles former Russian 
territory, which had been ceded to the Lithuanians by formal 
treaty. In a situation bristling with so many irregularities, 
it seems only logical that the outcome should be an irregular 
decision, and that is what happened at the Conference of 
Ambassadors. Yet this decision seemed to be the best 
solution at the time in that it gave Vilna to the country most 
represented in the city, and the only country that was 
capable of dealing successfully with the mixed population. 
Moreover, the district of Troki has been so divided that 
Lithuania has received the larger portion, with a Lithu­
anian majority, the part included in Poland having a Polish 
maj ority. Vilna was at the time essentially a Polish city and 
a long-established centre of Polish culture ; and I think it is 
fairly obvious to most people that in this question it is the city 
and its characteristics that really count. Even Ludendorff 
admitted that ' Vilna, Grodno and other towns were Polish ', 
and writes as follows : ' On August 28th the Secretary of 
State, after consultation with a Polish gentleman from Berlin, 
made certain proposals with regard to the territorial configur­
ation of Poland and the regulation of our relations with her. 
In the first place, he wanted to give Vilna to Poland, as it 
would always be an alien body in a Lithuanian State.'1 
From the economic standpoint, however, the Lithuanians 
have put forward arguments that are worthy of considera­
tion, and I think it would be an injustice to withhold them. 
The river Niemen and its tributaries, they contend, 
constituted a natural system of navigable waterways, by 
means of which Lithuanian products reached the sea ; and 
the Niemen basin, in which was situated nearly the whole 
of Lithuania, formed an indivisible whole geographically as 
well as from the economic point of view. For working these 
waterways, the country was generally divided into the 
following four parts: 
1. The Upper Niemen (Grodno). 
2. The Vilja (Vilna). 
3. The Middle Niemen (Kovno). 
4. The Lower Niemen (Memel). 
1 Erich Ludendorfii,My Reminiscences of the War 1914-18. Berlin, 1919. 
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These divisions of the navigable rivers, with the lands 
which they water, were closely united in every respect, and 
the success of the river development and transport depended 
in each case on the prosperity of the others. Vilna was the 
principal junction of the Lithuanian railway system, and 
the division of this network of rails in the Niemen basin 
into two parts was calculated to have a disastrous effect 
on the working of the railways, and consequently on the 
whole economic life of the country. Vilna was the principal 
economic centre of the Niemen basin, whose prosperity 
had a direct influence on the prosperity of the city, which 
therefore formed economically an integral part of Lithuania. 
The Lithuanians further argued that to divide these Lithu­
anian territories in the Niemen basin would be to dissect 
a living economic organism, and that the amputation of the 
southern part of the basin would bring about the ruin of 
the separated territory. Indeed, they foresaw that Vilna, 
separated from its economic surroundings and annexed by 
Poland, would be transformed into a little provincial town 
far from the centre of that country, and would become a 
dead city. While this forecast regarding Vilna has proved 
to be more or less correct, there are other factors which have 
contributed to the undoing of Vilna. The result of the 
Great War, together with the closing of the Polish-Lithuanian 
frontier on the west and the present condition of Russia 
on the east, have rendered the city lifeless through the loss 
of its transit trade. While the present economic situation 
in that region is most unsatisfactory, there seems no reason 
why more normal conditions should not be restored as soon 
as the frontier is reopened to trade and commerce. 
Looking at the Vilna dispute and its present settlement 
from a purely impartial standpoint, one has, I think, to 
agree that the decision to give Vilna to Poland was the best 
that could be done in the circumstances; but at the same 
time, one is also compelled to admit that Lithuania has 
come badly out of the controversy. The Poles consider the 
matter finally closed and are now disinclined to discuss the 
status of what they regard as a part of the Republic of 
Poland. But not so the Lithuanians, who foresee changes 
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in the status quo of Eastern Europe before that region is 
finally settled, and are biding their time in the belief that 
Vilna will again change hands before the final settlement. 
When M. Valdemaras told me on the 9th August, 1928, 
that he considered the Vilna question ' to form part of a 
much larger problem—the future settlement of Eastern 
Europe ' he confirmed my impression that Vilna, like 
several other highly important questions, depends on the 
degree of permanency attached to the status quo established 
by the Treaty of Versailles. The fundamental question is 
whether this status quo is to be maintained as a res 
immutabilis, or whether it is to be regarded as subject to 
change in course of time and circumstance. The Poles 
pin their faith to the former conception of the status quo, 
and the Lithuanians to the latter, but much must happen 
before this matter is thrashed out. There is a prevailing 
opinion to-day that vital issues such as this can easily be 
settled by words or by pens, ink, and paper. It is much 
more likely that, in the long run, they will be settled by 
deeds. It is idle to forecast anything at the present time, 
but one thing is certain. The battle of the status quo has 
got to be fought out sooner or later, and on its result the 
future of Europe will depend. On the one hand, Europe 
must be shaped to fit the Treaty of Versailles ; on the other 
hand, the Treaty must be revised to fit the conditions prevail­
ing in Europe. 
I do not propose to describe in detail the tedious series 
of negotiations and political explosions that have taken place 
in the last few years, but there are one or two incidents 
which are worthy of mention. Lithuania has continued to 
consider herself at war with Poland, but has confined her 
operations to closing her frontier to traffic of any sort and 
allowing no mutual diplomatic or consular representation. 
This has caused economic injury to Poland, especially to the 
Vilna Corridor, for which the natural outlet to the sea leads 
across Lithuanian territory to the Lithuanian port of 
Memel and the Latvian port of Libau. It was particularly 
injurious to the local timber merchants, who were 
seriously handicapped by being prevented from floating 
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timber rafts down the river Niemen. The situation was 
not improved by the fact that incidents were continually 
occurring along the frontier, and became distinctly critical 
as result of the coup d'etat of the 17th December, 1926, 
which brought M. Valdemaras into power and made way 
for a Government that showed considerably less restraint 
than its predecessors in the conduct of foreign affairs. 
Unfortunately, this upheaval at Kovno came almost right 
on the top of a similar coup by Marshal Pilsudski at Warsaw. 
With a passive state of war existing all along the Polish-
Lithuanian frontier and with a semi-military Government 
in power in both capitals, a small incident might easily 
lead to a violent explosion. Various attempts were made 
to bring to an end the ' state of war ' and to reach a settle­
ment about the frontier, but the Lithuanians insisted that 
any formula should include an admission that the Vilna 
question remained open, and this condition the Poles would 
not accept. Again there was much talking both in Geneva 
and out of it, several meetings between ministers, but nothing 
done. Then in October, 1927, the Poles excelled themselves 
by celebrating the seventh anniversary of the Zeligowski 
coup with national rejoicings at Vilna ; and not only was 
this festival attended by Marshal Pilsudski and several 
Polish ministers, but actually by General Zeligowski himself. 
By this time national feeling was roused to a very high pitch 
on both sides, when another incident occurred in connection 
with the alleged internment of Polish teachers in Lithuania 
and Polish reprisals against Lithuanians in Vilna; and the 
situation was further complicated by the danger of a raid 
on Kovno by the Lithuanian emigres who had fled after 
the coup d'etat, and the fear of intervention on the part of 
Russia. M. Valdemaras accused the Poles of supporting 
the emigres against his own regime, and a crisis was precipi­
tated which became a matter of international concern, 
threatened to renew active hostility between the two 
countries, and brought M. Valdemaras face to face with 
Marshal Pilsudski in the Council Chamber at Geneva. The 
verbal encounter between the diminutive Lithuanian dictator 
and the Polish marshal had its humorous side, and closed 
10 
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with a dramatic shaking of hands, but the only result was 
the mutual acceptance of a resolution which enabled both 
dictators to return home in triumph, and so to save then-
faces without having to continue the dangerous and not 
very edifying practice of spitting fire at one another. Yet, 
while it overcame the crisis of'the moment, it did not remove 
its permanent cause, since it was explicitly stated in the 
text that it in no way affected questions on which the two 
Governments were at variance, and the parties were merely 
recommended to enter into direct negotiations as soon as 
possible in order to establish a good understanding as the 
basis of peace. Negotiations certainly have taken place in 
Berlin, Konigsberg, and elsewhere, but the frontier question 
is no nearer a solution than it was at the beginning. In 
every case the conference breaks down or is adjourned owing 
to the respective attitudes towards Vilna. The Poles will 
not discuss Vilna, while the Lithuanians insist on it being 
made quite clear that their claim remains open ; and so 
the process continues ad nauseam. 
The monotony of the quarrel was at any rate relieved 
in 1925 by the participation of the Vatican in a lamentable, 
though rather humorous, episode. Poland, one of the oldest 
and strongest allies of the Catholic Church in Europe, 
concluded an important Concordat with the Holy See, 
under which the Catholic Church of Poland received eccle­
siastical jurisdiction over all Poland, including Vilna. 
Lithuania was already on strained relations with the Vatican, 
owing to a dispute between the native clergy and those of 
Polish origin; and the news of the Polish Concordat was 
the signal for hostile demonstrations, which took rather a 
peculiar form. The residence of the Papal Nuncio in 
Kovno was subjected to a fusillade of rotten eggs, which 
was scarcely in keeping with the dignity of its august 
occupant, and the Lithuanian representative at the Vatican 
was withdrawn. History does not relate what happened to 
the Papal Nuncio, but all one can hope is that he did not 
put his head out of the window. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE NEW POLISH REPUBLIC 
ONE of the most important and complicated features of post-war Europe has been the establishment of the Polish Republic, whose composition, character, 
and geographical position are such that her internal move­
ments and external influences have their repercussions 
throughout the whole European continent. Poland is a 
country of minorities, of many tongues, and of many distinct 
races ; it is a country of divers religions, and of great 
contrasts. Although the Poles head the list of nationalities, 
nearly a third of the population belongs to other races, and 
the Russian, White Russian, German, French, Ruthenian, 
Lithuanian, Czech, and Yiddish languages are all spoken 
in the new Polish Republic,, restored from the territory of 
the former German, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian 
Empires. While part of the population lives upon the land 
and illiteracy is prevalent in certain districts, other sections 
of the people are occupied with industry and are in an 
advanced stage of civilization. Polish culture is of a very 
high order, and it has made a mark in Europe that requires 
no recommendation ; but it must not be imagined that all 
Poles are musicians, artists, or literary ' stars although 
the particular temperament that tends to produce artistic 
qualities is inherent in the Polish race. From the partitions 
up to the end of the Great War the Poles were a nation 
without a country, a fact which provided a singular oppor­
tunity for the exercise of their temperamental qualities, 
and the clash with reality has been rather a severe test for 
a new state faced with a heap of difficulties, unusual in their 
number and in their intensity. The P61es are great idealists, 
and they will go through anything in pursuit of their ideal. 
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They regard themselves as a people with a destiny, and if 
their national temperament accounts for much of their 
success it is also responsible for many of their failures. 
While some of the Polish people were born as German 
subjects, some as Russian, and others as Austrian, they have 
always been Poles in the first place ; but the fact remains 
that their domicile under foreign rule has had its effect. 
Although they may be entirely Polish in sentiment, their 
more material ideas are to some extent German, Russian, 
or Austrian, according to individual circumstances, and 
therefore the present generation cannot be regarded as truly 
representative of the new Poland. 
British visitors to Poland are attracted by the romance 
of Polish history and the charm of Polish culture, and 
are not slow to realize that the Poles are a people among 
whom it is exceedingly pleasant to live. The atmosphere 
of the Polish cities, in many cases mediaeval, is something 
quite new to those who have never explored the vast area 
of Eastern Europe; and they find themselves among 
conditions totally different from those to which they are 
accustomed. Unfortunately, few of those who visit Poland 
to-day know and understand the conditions that existed 
when the country was divided up between the Hohenzollern, 
Hapsburg, and Romanoff empires, and therefore it is 
difficult for them fully to appreciate the progress which has 
taken place since the end of the Great War. Perhaps the 
most striking feature to-day is the very strong form of 
nationalism that permeates all sections of the people, from 
the old aristocracy to the humble peasant and from the 
cabinet minister to the railway porter. Now that Poland 
has come back to her own again, the future of the country 
is the first consideration in the minds of all patriotic Poles ; 
but Polish patriotism is by no means confined to words, 
for the average Pole is doing, and is ready to do a great 
deal more, to further the interests of the nation that is 
everything in the world to him. And not only is this 
self-sacrificing spirit present among the men; it is equally 
noticeable among the women, who always have been, and 
are likely to remain, a great power in national activity. 
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Although the Pole is naturally more than pleased with the 
turn of events that restored to him his ancient heritage, 
he is at the same time subconsciously disappointed that the 
present frontiers are narrower than those of bygone days ; 
and, as his ideal has not been wholly fulfilled, he is still 
fired with ambition for the future. Nationalism and 
ambition are excellent qualities in themselves, but when 
combined with idealism they are apt to lead to trouble. 
Fortunately, this is realized by many of the Polish 
leaders, and there is now a distinct tendency in Warsaw 
to try and restrain these traits in the Polish character and 
to cultivate the qualities of caution and common sense. 
Poland to-day seems to bear a certain resemblance to 
an old English county family that has just been reinstated 
in its ancient country seat after years of adversity in different 
parts of the world. The various members of the family 
return with different ideas and strange customs, and their 
position amongst their neighbours rests entirely on the 
achievements of past generations. Naturally they magnify 
the past, from which they derive their position, and, although 
their means are slender, they feel they are entitled to 
possessions equal to those of their more wealthy neighbours. 
If the estate is smaller than in former days, they feel that 
it must be restored to its old dimensions. Anything short 
of these requirements seems for the moment humiliating. 
But these people are living in a state of unreality, and fail 
to realize that the new is not the old. They are living 
largely on memories which they cannot dismiss from their 
minds ; they are snatching at the past which has fallen 
from their grasp for ever. Consequently, things lose their 
true proportion and these people become rather trying at 
times to their neighbours, who hope that for their own sake 
they will face the world afresh and leave the past to take 
care of itself. And so it is with Poland. If the Poles could 
only forget their frontiers of the Middle Ages, they would 
find their path in the twentieth century much easier to tread. 
It is necessary to study this Polish temperament, and 
to see how it has grown owing to the circumstances in 
which the Poles have been placed since the partitions ; for 
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it is chiefly owing to the fact that the nation was for long 
without territory that the present Polish character possesses 
certain well-defined features. 
Poland is situated almost exactly in the centre of Europe. 
It forms part of the great plain which begins in France, 
extends across North Germany and Russia, and terminates 
at the Ural Mountains. It lies at the point where this plain, 
which is comparatively narrow in the west, widens out like 
a fan, owing to the southward bend of the Carpathians, to 
spread henceforth from the Baltic to the Black Sea. This 
position at the gateway from the broad plain of the east 
to the narrower one of the west has placed Poland across 
what has always been the great commercial and military 
high road between east and west, and also upon several 
important routes between north and south.1 If this position 
has had its advantages, these have been fully counter­
balanced by corresponding dangers. It has given the 
country considerable importance as a distributing centre 
and as a highway for transit trade ; but, situated at the 
meeting-place of the Germanic, Scandinavian, Slav, and 
for centuries the Asiatic worlds, Poland has been exposed 
to attacks from all sides, and has served as the great battle­
field of Eastern Europe. To-day the Poles in Europe 
number about 25 to 30 millions, and they are wedged in 
between two great nations, the Germans and the Russians, 
who outnumber them in the ratio of 2 to 1 and 3 to 1 respec­
tively. The dangers of this exposed central position are 
increased by the fact that Poland has no good natural 
frontiers, the only natural boundaries in this region being 
the Carpathians in the south and the Baltic in the north, 
neither of which has fully served its purpose in the 
ethnographic or political sense. In the south the Polish 
population extends over the mountain ridges for a consider­
able distance, which has led in part to unnatural frontiers 
as in the case of the old Polish State. In the north the old 
Poland was never able to hold a sufficient frontage on the 
1 The route from the Black Sea to the Baltic via the Vistula, 
and that from the Baltic to the Mediterranean via Krakow and 
the ' Moravian Gate '. 
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Baltic, and. the Polish population has been pushed away 
from the sea-coast, except for a small area to the west of 
Danzig. In the east and west it is difficult to find any 
serious barrier. The great European plain is broken only 
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by numerous rivers which serve rather to bring the 
peoples together. The valleys of the Oder, the Warta, 
and the Netze have brought the Germans into Poland, while 
the Niemen, the Pripet, and the Dniester have carried the 
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Poles far into Lithuania and the Ukraine. The one real 
obstacle to ethnic and political expansion that the plain 
presents is the great area of marshes and forests in the 
Pripet valley. This unattractive region never appealed 
to Polish colonists, who invaded the fertile lands on 
either side—the Grodno and Vilna regions in the north­
east, and south-east towards Lwow, Volhynia, and Podolia. 
Hence the strangely bifurcated appearance of the eastern 
limits of the Polish ethnographic area and the consequent 
difficulty of drawing a good eastern frontier for Poland. 
The Polish advanced positions at Vilna and Lwow form 
two exposed salients, separated from each other by the 
wedge-like Pripet region, the population of which may be 
White Russian or Ukrainian, but certainly not Polish. 
Whatever natural unity Poland possesses is chiefly due 
to the influence of the Vistula, which has always been 
the great artery of the country's economic life. Poland 
might, indeed, be described as the basin of the Vistula, 
together with the valleys of certain adjacent rivers which 
offer easy access to this river, are in part connected with it 
by canals, and with it practically form one system of water­
ways. This system of closely connected rivers has been 
of the greatest assistance to Polish expansion in the past, 
and should be of valuable service to the country in the 
future by providing communications with the Danube, the 
Niemen, and the Dnieper, which represent half of Eastern 
Europe. But the exploitation of these waterways must 
largely depend on political conditions at the mouth of the 
Vistula and on the extent to which the river is made 
navigable. 
Poland was originally rather a small state. The early 
Polish kingdom, as it developed between the tenth and 
twelfth centuries, included what is usually known as ' Con­
gress Poland V Western Galicia, Silesia, Posnania, West 
Prussia, and sometimes Pomerania. It was practically 
confined to the region lying between the Oder and the 
Vistula, but it extended farther to the west and possessed 
1 A small kingdom set up by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, 
and incorporated in Russia a few years later. 
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a broader frontage on the Baltic than it was destined to 
do in later times. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
the kingdom passed through a period of division, weakness, 
and confusion, owing to frequent partitions and civil wars 
among its princes; and unfortunately for Poland, this 
period coincided with one of the greatest ages of German 
expansion and colonization—the most successful period in 
the thousand years' history of the Teutonic Drang nach 
Osten. It was at this time that Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, 
Pomerania, and Silesia passed under German control and 
were flooded with German colonists; while even more 
serious was the establishment of the Teutonic Knights in 
East Prussia during the thirteenth century, when the original 
Prussians1 were absorbed or exterminated by the foundation 
of a German colony that has always remained a thorn in 
the side of Poland. In 1308 the Teutonic Knights succeeded 
in seizing West Prussia as well, thereby bridging the gap 
between East Prussia and Germany, and cutting off Poland 
from the Baltic ; and in this way began the struggle for the 
mouth of the Vistula, which even to-day is one of the greatest 
dangers to European peace. When Poland in the fourteenth 
century pulled herself together again as a united kingdom, 
it was too late to think of recovering most of the lands lost 
during the preceding period, but the Poles could never 
become permanently reconciled to the loss of West Prussia 
with all that it entailed. Indeed, the recovery of that 
province was the chief object of the Hundred Years War 
between Poland and the Teutonic Knights, which cul­
minated in the historic victory over the Germans on the 
field of Tannenberg (Grunwald) in 1410.2 
Looking for allies and additional resources for this struggle, 
Poland turned to the east and began a significant movement 
analogous to the Germanic Drang nach Osten of which it 
was the direct result. The first success in this direction 
was the conquest of Eastern Galicia, the first encroachment 
by Poland upon the domain of Ukrainian nationality and 
1 A people who were neither Germans nor Slavs, but were closely 
related to the Letts and Lithuanians. 
2 Vide Chapter V. 
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the beginning of a question that is still unsolved; and this 
was followed in less than half a century by the personal union 
of Poland and Lithuania in 1386, which became an import­
ant landmark in the history of Eastern Europe. At that 
time Lithuania was a powerful state extending from the 
Baltic to the Black Sea, and including nearly the whole of 
the White Russian and Ukrainian peoples ; and it had been 
built up within two generations by able rulers and by the 
valour of the Lithuanian nation, which formed scarcely 
one-tenth of the population of its vast empire. Hence the 
union between Poland and Lithuania created a realm which 
was for a long time the strongest Power in Eastern Europe, 
and remained until the partitions the second or third largest 
state on the whole European continent. Reinforced in this 
way, Poland was able to carry through to a successful 
conclusion the struggle with the Teutonic Knights ; and 
by the Peace of Torun in 1466 West Prussia, including 
Danzig and the mouth of the Vistula, was reunited to Poland 
with extensive rights of local self-government, while East 
Prussia was left to be held by the Knights as a fief of the 
Polish Crown.1 But an even more important result of the 
union of 1386 was the gradual fusion of Lithuania with 
Poland. In this partnership Poland, the smaller but 
culturally more advanced state, constantly predominated 
and, without even so much as serious friction, absorbed to 
a large degree her sister nation. The connection between 
the two states, which originally consisted solely in their 
possession of a common ruler, was gradually tightened until 
in 1569 it was converted into a permanent organic union. 
As I have already referred to this in a previous chapter, 
suffice it to recall that the Lithuanian nobility, and to a 
large extent the Christian population of the towns, volun­
tarily accepted the Polish language, customs, and 
1 In 1525 the King of Poland allowed the Teutonic Grand Master, 
Albert of Hohenzollern, who had become a Protestant, to secularize 
East Prussia and turn it into a duchy hereditary in his family. 
In 1618 this duchy passed to the Brandenburg branch of the 
Hohenzollerns. The Great Elector succeeded in freeing East 
Prussia from Polish suzerainty by the treaties of Wehlau (1657) 
and Oliva (1660). 
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nationality ; that Polish colonists settled in large numbers 
in Lithuania; and that Polish culture reigned supreme in 
Vilna, Minsk, Lutsk, and Kameniets. This process of 
Polonization—a process which is taking place to-day in 
Western Poland—did not, however, extend to the lower 
classes of the population. While one great obstacle was 
largely removed by the foundation of the Uniate Church 1 
in communion with Rome, the masses of the Lithuanian, 
White Russian, and Ukrainian peasantry still clung to their 
respective languages and national customs, and created an 
insuperable barrier to the solid establishment of Polish 
nationality throughout most of the eastern territories. 
It is unnecessary to refer to the many fluctuations of the 
Polish frontiers during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, or to the reasons for the stagnation and decadence 
into which Poland fell during the eighteenth century; but 
it is important to realize the position of the Polish Republic 
just before the partitions—the historic Poland to which the 
Poles so often compare the Poland of to-day. On the eve 
of the First Partition Poland ranked as the third largest 
state on the Continent, with an area of 282,000 square miles, 
while in population it stood fourth with over 11 million 
people. Its frontiers extended from the Baltic and the 
Carpathians to the Dnieper and the Dvina, and it included 
nearly the whole of that broad isthmus between the Baltic 
and the Black Sea that leads from eastern continental 
Europe to the peninsular Europe of the west. Within 
these boundaries Poland perhaps formed more of a geogra­
phical unit than the new Poland, but whatever may have 
been the physical merits of the old Poland, its population 
was far from homogeneous. The Poles cannot have formed 
more than about 50 per cent of the population, while more 
than one-third was made up of Ukrainians and White 
Russians, and the remainder consisted of Germans, Jews, 
Letts, Lithuanians, Armenians, and Tartars. Such a mix­
ture of races was not destined to last as a single European 
1 A body founded in 1596, which accepted the supremacy of the 
Pope, but was allowed to preserve the Slav liturgy and many 
special rites and practices of the Orthodox Church. 
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state, and even if it had lasted until the nineteenth century 
it would have been faced with almost overwhelming diffi­
culties from nationalist movements. Poland was also 
weakened by the fact that, while it was a republic both 
in name and in reality, political rights and privileges were 
restricted almost entirely to the nobility1; a prosperous 
middle class was sadly lacking; and the peasants were 
held in serfdom. This gave the state a very narrow founda­
tion ; it tended to make the masses indifferent to the fate 
of the Republic ; and it made Polish patriotism almost a 
monopoly of the nobility and clergy. 
Before the partitions, Poland was rather an area of Polish 
domination than one enclosed by national frontiers. While 
the landowners were Poles, the majority of the population 
were serfs and foreigners. On the other hand, what now 
constitutes the middle class was then represented by foreign 
merchants, chiefly of German and Jewish origin, who settled 
in the towns and laid the foundations of industry and 
commerce. 
Economically, the country was miserably poor and back­
ward ; the cities, apart from Warsaw and Danzig, were 
small and insignificant; commerce and industry were almost 
non-existent; and agriculture was the one healthy feature 
of economic life. Politically, the Republic had by the middle 
of the eighteenth century fallen into a sad state of impotence 
and lethargy. I do not propose to dwell on the abuses, 
defects, and peculiarities of the Polish constitutional system 
of that time, but as this depressing period of Polish history 
is rather apt to obscure the earlier and more prosperous 
periods in the minds of Western Europeans, it is as well to 
make it clear that the old Polish State at its best, in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was an adventure 
reflecting considerable credit on those who were responsible 
for its evolution. It was the largest and most ambitious 
experiment with the republican form of government that 
the world had seen since the days of the Romans : it 
was the only experiment on a large scale with a federal 
republic until the appearance of the United States. In the 
114 per cent of the total population. 
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sixteenth and seventeenth centuries this Republic was the 
most liberal state in Europe, the state in which the greatest 
measure of constitutional, civic, intellectual, and religious 
liberty existed. In an age of religious persecution and con­
tinual religious wars, Poland was remarkably free from such 
troubles ; and her territory offered almost complete tolera­
tion and asylum to those fleeing from the persecution of 
Western tyrants. And if in the eighteenth century the 
Republic had fallen on evil days, the errors and short­
comings of that period can be equalled and surpassed in 
many other European countries, and in no way prove the 
incapability of the Polish nation for independent statehood. 
At the moment when Poland had reached the lowest stage 
in her decline, the three monarchies of Russia, Austria, and 
Prussia united to deprive her of certain territories which 
they coveted. By the First Partition of 1772 Catherine II 
appropriated a part of White Russia (the later ' govern­
ments ' of Vitebsk and Mogilev) ; Frederick II took West 
Prussia (without Danzig) ; and Austria acquired most of 
what is now Galicia. This aroused the Poles from their 
lethargy and led them to inaugurate a promising movement 
for political, economic, and social reforms, but the neigh­
bouring Powers were not disposed to tolerate this revival. 
Once more they fell upon the Polish Republic and, whereas 
on the first occasion they had partitioned it on account of 
its weakness and accompanying dangers, on the next occasion 
they did so because it was growing inconveniently strong. 
By the Second Partition in 1793 Prussia annexed Danzig 
and Posnania, while Russia seized all the country as far as 
a line closely corresponding to the Russo-Polish frontier 
laid down by the recent Treaty of Riga. This humiliation 
led to the Polish rising under Kosciuszko, a last desperate 
effort to free the country, but by way of punishment the 
three Great Powers then combined to wipe Poland off the 
map of Europe by the Third Partition in 1795. Then, after 
Napoleon's half-hearted attempt to restore Poland, the 
Congress of Vienna of 1815 made a new distribution of the 
Polish territories (including the establishment of ' Congress 
Poland '), which lasted with slight changes until the outbreak 
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of the Great War. By this Fourth Partition Russia was left 
in possession of about 82 per cent of the area of the old 
Poland; 10 per cent fell to Austria; and 8 per cent to 
Prussia. But as pre-partition Poland and ethnographic 
Poland (the area within which the Poles form the majority 
of the population) do not by any means coincide, it is 
necessary to point out that under the arrangements of 1815 
about three-fifths of the Polish race were left under Russian 
rule, one-fifth under Austria, and one-fifth under Prussia.1 
The history of Poland from the time of the partitions 
to the outbreak of the Great War may be divided into two 
periods. During the first of these periods, up to 1863, the 
nation, refusing to believe that the wrong done to it could 
endure for more than a short time, made no less than nine 
efforts to regain its freedom by arms. This was a period 
of perpetual conspiracies, ever-recurring insurrections, and 
of heroic but fruitless sacrifices. It was a period when most 
of the elite of the nation lived in exile, forming the Polish 
Legions in the armies of Revolutionary France and of 
Napoleon. It was a period when Polish literature proved 
the vitality and power of the national genius, and romanticist 
poets sang the hopes and sufferings of ' the martyr nation \ 
After the failure of the insurrection of 1863, however, the 
Poles had to recognize that the methods hitherto pursued 
were utterly hopeless. As long as the three great military 
monarchies of Eastern Europe remained strong and united 
in their common purpose of keeping the country under their 
control, the restoration of a free and united Poland was 
entirely out of the question. After 1863, therefore, the Poles 
tended to renounce conspiracies, rebellions, and indeed any 
hope of fulfilling their national aspirations except in the 
very distant future. Many turned from politics in despair 
and threw themselves into the work of the economic con­
struction of the nation ; others devoted themselves to such 
modest opportunities for political work as existing conditions 
afforded. The one aim in view was to survive as a nation ; 
to keep patriotism alive, and to strengthen its influence 
1 In 1910 there were about 13 million Poles in Russia; about 
4-3 million in Austria ; and about 4 million in Prussia. 
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among the masses of the people ; to prepare the nation 
morally and materially for the great day, when by a funda­
mental change of circumstances Poland might emerge from 
captivity. 
The regime of oppression, persecution, and denationaliza­
tion to which the Poles were subjected during most of the 
nineteenth century has, like most oppressions, been the 
subject of some exaggeration ; but conditions were certainly 
severe in Russian Poland from 1863 onwards, in Austrian 
territory dining the period up to 1866; and in Prussia 
after the appearance of Bismarck in the political arena. In 
all three countries in varying degree efforts were made to 
drive the Polish language from the schools, from the courts 
of justice, and from all administrative intercourse; to 
suppress Polish institutions and organizations; and to 
suppress the external manifestation of Polish nationality. 
The Tsarist Government indulged in periodical outbreaks 
of considerable brutality, while the Prussian Government 
confined itself chiefly to colonization and expropriation of 
land. But the pressure to which the Poles were subjected 
was never uniform in all three parts of what had once been 
Poland, and there was always one part in which conditions 
were easier and it was possible to carry out some patriotic 
work. If Russian Poland served in such a role from 1815 
to 1830, during the short existence of the constitutional 
kingdom founded by Alexander I, and Prussian Poland 
formed a haven of refuge during the middle of the nineteenth 
century under the lenient rule of Frederick William IV, 
Austrian Poland was in the last fifty years the region of 
relief. Forced by her expulsion from Germany in 1866 and 
by her dualistic reorganization in 1867 to look for a new 
orientation and to bid for the loyalty of her Polish subjects, 
Austria accorded to the Poles of Galicia a wide measure of 
local autonomy and practically turned over to them the 
government of that province. Hence, Galicia was enabled 
to become a centre of every sort of Polish intellectual, 
economic, and political activity, as well as the headquarters 
of every national movement, and a school whose output of 
parliamentarians, trained administrators, and soldiers has 
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proved invaluable to the resurrected Polish State. With 
traces of the political atmosphere of Austria, this school 
was far from what was to be desired, but it afforded the chief, 
and in many respects the only, training for national self-
government that modern Poland has received. 
The variety of political and economic regimes under which 
the Poles have lived for over a century has not failed to 
produce a considerable difference, and even a certain 
estrangement between the three long-separated parts of the 
nation. Every visitor to the country to-day is struck by 
the differences in ideas, customs, and character between 
the hard-headed, practical Posnanian Poles, among whom 
illiteracy is almost unknown and who have acquired much 
of the Prussian love of order, regularity, and efficiency; 
the Galician Poles, with their passion for politics and their 
tendency to slow, easy-going Austrian ways; and the 
Russian Poles of the ' Congress Kingdom ' with their 50 per 
cent of illiteracy, their more backward economic and social 
conditions, their political inexperience and doctrinairism, 
and their greater devotion to art, literature, and music. 
While the unity of the nation has not been fundamentally 
broken, it is a difficult task to establish uniform laws and 
institutions where such diversity has hitherto existed, and 
to overcome the many and subtle effects of more than a 
century of disunion. The last hundred years have also 
produced a decided weakening of Polish influence in many 
regions that belonged to the old Republic, and in this respect 
the partitioning Powers have not laboured altogether in 
vain. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Polish 
culture and the Polish language were still predominant 
almost throughout the whole of historic Poland, at any rate 
among the educated classes, but since that time they have 
met with grave losses. The country gentry, who were the 
chief representatives of Polish culture in the more eastern 
territories, have lost a great part of their estates or influence 
through the policy of the Russian Government; and 
Nicholas I and his successors brought back to the Orthodox 
Church millions of Uniate peasants who, as long as they 
were obedient to Rome, had been sympathetic to Poland 
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rather than to Russia. Moreover, two at least of the peoples 
once united with the old Polish State have now developed 
pronounced nationalist movements of their own—the 
Lithuanians and Ukrainians—and both movements have 
assumed a strong anti-Polish tendency as result of their 
fight against the predominating influence of Polish culture. 
However incomplete these national revivals may be, they 
have in any case made it abundantly clear that the restora­
tion to Poland of her frontiers of 1772 is at present out of 
the question. 
At the same time, these losses have not been without their 
compensations elsewhere. If the Polish element has lost 
ground in areas where it was widely but sparsely disseminated, 
being chiefly represented by the educated classes, it has made 
progress in regions where it was more concentrated and 
where, in particular, there was a Polish peasantry as a 
foundation. In Eastern Galicia there has been a steady 
increase of Polish population,1 and in the region round 
Vilna it appears that the Polish language has widely extended 
its influence in the most recent decades. Indeed, as far as 
statistics prove anything in this part of the world, there is 
now a continuous belt of predominantly Polish territory 
extending from the ' Congress Kingdom ' through the Grodno 
and Vilna districts as far as the river Dvina. In the west 
the Poles have scored in a different way ; for here it has 
been a case of awakening a national movement among 
Polish-speaking people, who had long been separated from 
Poland and were apparently devoid of any Polish national 
consciousness. Such has been the work accomplished during 
the past fifty years in Upper Silesia and Teschen, regions 
that had been politically detached from Poland since the 
fourteenth century, and in East Prussia by a few enthusiasts 
among the Protestant Poles or Masurians. 
11857—20 per cent Poles; 1890—31-2 per cent; 1910—39-6 
per cent. While it is true that this gain is partly due to the fact 
that the Jews, forming 12 per cent of the total population, have 
within this period transferred themselves from the German to the 
Polish figures, there is no doubt that the Poles alone have increased 
more rapidly than the Ukrainians. 
11 
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More important, however, than these gains in the more 
or less outlying districts has been the internal transformation 
of Poland since the middle of the nineteenth century. The 
emancipation of the serfs and the agrarian reforms that 
sprang from this measure have produced a class of thrifty, 
industrious, and fairly prosperous peasant landowners which, 
owing to the influence of the educated classes and their own 
experience under foreign domination, soon flocked to support 
the national movement. In Prussian Poland, during the 
struggle for the land against the colonizing enterprises of 
the Government, the peasants were the salvation of the 
Polish cause. Meanwhile, since the middle of last century, 
Russian Poland has been passing through a period of rapid 
industrial development, which made that region one of the 
leading manufacturing centres of the Russian Empire. This 
helped to produce a numerous, active, and enterprising 
middle class, and a large class of industrial workers, both 
of which have displayed a sense of patriotism of great benefit 
to the Polish nation. 
In the last half-century a new Poland has begun to make 
its appearance, and it is stronger, richer, and more harmoni­
ously developed than the old Poland of the landowners and 
clergy. It is also better fitted for self-government. If the 
generation that had witnessed the abortive insurrection of 
1863 had almost despaired of Poland, the present generation 
that appeared at the close of the century grew up with a 
more hopeful and confident spirit. They were proud of the 
material progress that was being made ; they trusted the 
new democracy that was being created; and they were 
ready to believe that Poland's day would come in the not 
very distant future. The revolution of 1905 was the first 
indication of a general upheaval in Russia, while the Bosnian 
crisis of 1908 foreshadowed a great conflict in which the 
partitioning Powers would be ranged against each other. 
As in the case of Finland, Poland's hour was at hand. She 
prepared and she waited; and in 1914 the storm broke 
from Posnania to the Ukraine, and from the Baltic to 
the Carpathians. 
With the outbreak of war the Poles found themselves in a 
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very difficult position. It was clear that, if the Polish 
claims were to receive attention at the close of hostilities, 
Poland must play some part in the great international 
struggle ; but Poland's two great historical enemies— 
Germany and Russia—were fighting on opposite sides. 
France, which had been the mainstay of Poland's hopes for 
foreign help in the earlier decades of the nineteenth century, 
had latterly become the ally of Tsarist Russia ; and neither 
France nor Great Britain were now likely to exert their 
influence for the independence of a country of which three-
fifths belonged to their powerful Russian ally. Moreover, 
the Poles had become so used to carrying on their national 
struggle by peaceful means that military action was almost 
a forgotten idea among the people ; and, while the Prussian 
Poles were no less fascinated by the power of Imperial 
Germany than the Germans themselves, the Russian Poles 
were bound to the empire of the Tsars by ties of increasing 
industrial and commercial interests. It was only in Austrian 
Poland that the idea of military activities cropped up again 
in the national mind before the war. Refugees from Rus­
sian Poland after the suppression of the revolution of 1905 
had made '.propaganda for secret military organizations, 
which had found favour among the youth of the schools in 
Galicia ; and the Austrian Government, foreseeing a clash 
with Russia over Balkan questions, supported the military 
societies which during the years immediately preceding 
the war were formed by different Polish political parties. 
The more radical of these were determined to support 
Austria in the event of a conflict with Russia, as they 
considered the overthrow of Russia the most important 
step towards the deliverance of Poland. But they did not 
fully realize to what extent Austria had become subject 
to Germany, and how little Poland had to expect from 
that quarter. 
Obviously it is impossible here to go into the details 
of the war in Poland, which together with the Russian 
Revolution made Polish independence possible, but it is 
necessary to bear in mind a few essential points in the general 
movement of events. August, 1914, found the Poles of 
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Germany, Austria, and Russia estranged to one another, with 
their sympathies divided and no united national policy. 
Pilsudski crossed the frontier from Galicia with a few 
thousands of his men and opened hostilities with Russia, 
but the German and Austrian Governments refused to 
sanction an independent Polish army under his command, 
and the so-called ' Polish Legions ' were placed under the 
command of the Central Powers. But the Polish National 
Committee, formed in Krakow, aimed at uniting Galicia 
and ' Congress Poland' as a third party in the Dual Mon­
archy, and required the Polish Legion to take the oath to 
the Emperor Francis Joseph. In Warsaw another Polish 
Committee under Dmowski denied the right of the Krakow 
Committee to speak in the name of the Polish nation; 
declared its loyalty to the Tsar Nicholas ; and attempted 
to form a Polish Legion on the side of Russia. Meanwhile 
the Grand Duke Nicholas issued a proclamation promising 
to unite the three parts of Poland in an autonomous state 
with the Russian Empire and, when the Russian army 
occupied a great part of Galicia, supporters of the Russian 
policy openly adhered to this plan, and the Austrian proposal 
fell rather flat. In the summer of 1915, however, the 
Central Powers overran Congress Poland, and after the fall 
of Warsaw governments were set up on behalf of Germany 
at Warsaw, and Austria-Hungary at Lublin, it being now 
the turn of the Russian solution to dissolve into thin air. 
Thus Poland was divided into several camps, and not only 
did Poles in the different regiments of opposite armies fight 
each other under compulsion, but Polish volunteers stood 
on opposite sides of the front, and disputes between sup­
porters of Russia on the one hand, of the Central Powers 
on the other, became the dominant feature of Polish life 
during the first two years of the war. While one side hoped 
for reunion of all Polish lands under Russia and the grant 
of liberal self-government under pressure of the Western 
Allies, the other side supported the conception of a united 
Poland federated with Austria on the same terms as 
Hungary. To neither of them did an entirely free state 
seem within the sphere of possibility, while the Prussian 
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Poles contented themselves With an attitude of passive 
resistance. 
As the war proceeded, the Polish nation became more 
divided than ever owing to the passing of territory from 
one military command to another, and many national leaders 
migrated to Russia and to Western Europe. It was not 
until November, 1916, that the Central Powers, realizing 
that something must be done to allay dissatisfaction and 
obtain recruits in the occupied Polish territories, issued a 
manifesto creating some show of an independent Poland, 
which certainly had the advantage of raising the question 
as an international issue. But little was done by Germany 
and Austria to give effect to their declaration, and it was 
only due to the pressure of the military position that the 
Poles obtained some more concessions, such as the creation 
in 1917 of a Regency Council and a Provisional Council of 
State. By this time dissatisfaction was growing in the ranks 
of the Polish Legions, and their refusal to swear fidelity to 
the Central Powers led to their disbandment and the im­
prisonment of Pilsudski in the fortress of Magdeburg. It 
was necessary to await greater events before the dawn of 
the new Poland would break. The Russian Revolution 
had a more determining influence on the fate of Poland 
than any other happening of these eventful years, and it 
was the collapse of the Russian Empire that was the saving 
of the nation. Thereafter, the Allies were no longer tied 
by regard for Russia in the settlement of the Polish question ; 
for President Wilson included a ' reunited and free Poland, 
with access to the sea ' among his ' fourteen points ', formu­
lated in January, 1918 ; and six months later the Prime 
Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy pledged them­
selves at Versailles to this solution of the Polish problem. 
But the defeat of Germany was still necessary in order to 
establish this conception as a reality, and it was not until 
the autumn of 1918 that Polish independence was pro­
claimed and established in Western Galicia and by the 
Regency Council in Warsaw. At Lublin, which had been 
the centre of the Austrian occupation, a special Government 
of a radical complexion was formed, but both this and the 
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Regency Council placed dictatorial powers in the hands of 
Pilsudski as soon as he returned from his German prison. 
In November, 1918, the Germans left Russian Poland with­
out much resistance, and in the following month they were 
expelled from Prussian Poland. 
Meanwhile, Paderewski, who had been working hard in 
America in the interests of Polish independence, arrived in 
Warsaw 1 and was entrusted with the formation of a Coali­
tion Cabinet; and it was under his guidance that the 
Constituent Assembly re-elected Pilsudski as temporary 
head of the state, and gave the new Republic a provisional 
constitution. The task of the new rulers of Poland was 
one of exceptional difficulty, and it is most remarkable to 
see to-day what has been done in the last decade. A political 
and economic whole had to be created out of three provinces 
which had been separated for over a century, and had 
become accustomed to different social conditions, legal 
systems, and administrative practices, as well as to different 
markets, trade routes, and communications by rail and 
water. The three parts of Poland had drifted far apart, 
and real unity will only be restored when the rising genera­
tion has reached maturity. In the early days it was rather 
a question of shaking things together provisionally and 
hoping for the best. Two-thirds of the country had actually 
been the scene of war ; Congress Poland and Galicia had 
been devastated. Most of the factories were closed for want 
of raw material, if they had not been dismantled altogether. 
The fields of the peasants had been laid waste, their live­
stock slaughtered, and their farms burnt. Many districts 
were famine-stricken, while others were swept by epidemics. 
Communications were completely disorganized, and rolling 
stock was in a deplorable state. Marks, roubles and kronen 
circulated freely, but their value was low and precarious, 
and public and private finances were in a chaotic state. 
Moreover, Russia was seething with trouble, and the ideas 
prevalent there unsettled the peasants, who demanded a 
redistribution of land from the large estates, and also the 
workers, who were suffering from unemployment. Yet in 
11st January, 1919. 
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spite of all the difficulties that confronted the new state, 
it was not long before the Poles put their back into the 
colossal task of reconstruction. 
In Poland to-day we see the result of their labours. It 
took several years before the former provincial governments 
could be replaced by the outline of one general system, but 
now the country has been divided into small provinces or 
voyvodcies, as they were called in the old Poland, which are 
governed by councils partly elected and partly composed 
of officials, and presided over by an administrative governor. 
There are also urban and rural district councils. But the 
Poles have been faced with the difficulty of reconciling the 
necessity of establishing uniform administration throughout 
the country with the expediency of allowing for widely 
different provincial conditions, and of stimulating local 
effort by the largest possible measure of local autonomy. 
Consequently, uniformity has not yet been reached, and the 
systems in force at present vary in different parts of the 
country. Similar difficulties arose in the matter of 
education, and a uniform system had to be introduced. 
While compulsory education was necessary to overcome the 
ignorance of the people which had been rather encouraged 
by one partitioning Power, minority schools had also to 
be organized in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. Before the war each part of Poland had its 
own individual system of teaching, and the work of codifying 
these systems into one uniform method required great efforts 
on the part of the authorities and co-operation on the part 
of the teaching staff. It was only in Austrian Poland that 
a complete body of Polish educational institutions really 
existed, and this had to help with personnel and advice 
those other parts of the country which, under Russia and 
Prussia, had been deprived of- public education in the 
national language. However, after several years of untiring 
labours the Poles have established complete uniformity of 
educational methods. The greatest efforts have been 
directed towards the reduction of illiteracy, which in the 
former Russian provinces had reached alarming proportions. 
In the Congress Kingdom there were actually fewer schools 
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in 1904 than in 1840, and in 1900 36 per cent of the army 
recruits could neither read nor write, while in the eastern 
provinces nearly half the recruits were illiterate. In order 
to realize the significance of the educational campaign in 
Poland, it is only necessary to mention that the number 
of children attending elementary schools in the former 
Congress Kingdom in 1923-4 was 1,345,586, whereas the 
corresponding number in 1910-11 was only 370,576—an 
increase of 263 per cent—and that the number of schools 
in Galicia has been increased by 1,000 since the establish­
ment of the Polish administration. 
Other difficulties have been the drawing up of a uniform 
code of law to replace the three vastly different systems of 
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia ; the establishment 
of the currency on a sound foundation ; and the creation 
of a united Polish army out of officers and soldiers of the 
three armies of the partitioning Powers and voluntary 
organizations formed during the Great War. The question 
of the currency presented a problem of unusual magnitude, 
and it was chiefly due to the energy and courage of M. 
Grabski, who may be regarded as one of the greatest financial 
statesmen since the war, that Poland was pulled out of her 
financial mess. The first five years of Poland's independence 
were marked by a continuous decline of the Polish mark, 
introduced by the Germans as the legal currency of the 
country during the war. Attempts at stabilization prior 
to 1923-4 could not be expected to be successful. During 
the first two years the administrative machine was in a stage 
of construction, and a war with Soviet Russia was raging 
on the eastern frontiers of Poland, which not only dealt a 
severe blow to the reviving country but necessitated the 
maintenance of a large army, thereby making the balancing 
of the budget impossible even during the years 1921-2. 
The unsettled questions of Upper Silesia and of Poland's 
eastern frontiers further impeded the work of financial 
reform, as, until these questions were settled, Poland could 
not expect a foreign loan of any importance. Efforts were 
made in 1922 to stabilize the currency on the basis of a 
balanced budget, but the scheme of financial reform, 
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elaborated by M. Michalski and based on a capital levy, 
was doomed to failure. The drop in the mark was rapidly 
increasing, reducing the gold value of notes in circulation 
as well as the state revenue from taxation. The dollar 
exchange, which was 9-8 Polish marks per dollar in January, 
1919, rose to 141-9 marks in 1920, to 770 in 1921, to 3,416 
in 1922, to 32,778 in 1923, until in January, 1924, the dollar 
was quoted at 9,350,000 Polish marks. During the second 
half of 1923 the depreciation became particularly heavy, and 
the value of currency in circulation was falling in proportion. 
M. Grabski's policy may be described as : no foreign control, 
no parliamentary interference, the immediate ' pegging ' of 
the exchange, the introduction of a new currency on a gold 
exchange standard, the balancing of the budget concurrently 
if possible, and the obtaining of certain resources abroad 
on the credit of the reforms carried out.1 From the outset 
M. Grabski concentrated his attention on the exchange 
question, and within three weeks of receiving his full powers 
from the Seym he had completely arrested the fall of the 
mark. This he achieved by stopping the issue of further 
paper currency and declaring his readiness to sell exchange 
freely, thereby risking the whole gold reserve of the Treasury 
which only amounted to $2,500,000; and this respite 
allowed progress to be made with the setting up of the Bank 
of Poland, and especially with the national budget. Eventu­
ally the cessation of further issues of Polish mark notes, 
together with the establishment of a balanced budget, 
enabled, the Government to carry out the proposed currency 
reform ; and the public was called upon to find 100 million 
zlotys for the capital of the Bank of Poland at a time when 
increased taxation was absorbing the greater part of their 
capital available for investment. The zloty was fixed at 
1,800,000 Polish marks, or equal to the value of the gold 
franc. During this critical time in the financial affairs 
of Poland the severest economies were exercised, including 
the abolition of two Ministries and the reduction by 20,000 
of the Civil Service staff. 
1 The weakness which has since then overtaken the zloty should not 
obscure the great importance and high quality of M. Grabski's reforms. 
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The Poles take a great pride in their army, formed on a 
conscription basis and raised to a high standard of efficiency 
with the help of a French military mission, but the impression 
prevalent in some quarters that the Poles are militaristic is 
not an accurate estimate of the case. While it is true that 
a considerable sum is annually devoted to the upkeep of 
the army and the maintenance of its fighting efficiency, and 
that this department of the state receives great attention, 
it is only necessary to glance at the map to realize the 
necessity for these measures. It must also be borne in 
mind that the military uniform is one of the most popular 
outward and visible signs of the statehood of the Polish 
nation, and therefore it is the pride of those who have 
worked so hard for the realization of their hopes. In these 
post-war days there is an inclination to accuse others of 
militarism, and often the accusations are made by those 
who do not know the meaning of the term. At present the 
Poles are strong as a military Power ; but it is from necessity 
more than from choice. 
. Even the Peace Conference did not bring peace to Poland. 
Indeed, it created difficulties which involved the new state 
in conflict with her neighbours. A struggle with Czecho­
slovakia for the possession of the former Austro-Silesian 
Duchy of Teschen, with its valuable coal-mines, began early 
in 1919 ; Lwow,1 the capital of Eastern Galicia, was a scene 
of conflict between the Poles and the Ukrainians, whom the 
Austrians had left in power before their departure; war 
with Soviet Russia raged along the eastern frontier through­
out 1919, and the very existence of Poland was threatened 
by a strong Soviet force which advanced far enough to 
hammer on the gates of Warsaw. Before the new Polish 
State was many months old, it was called upon to face a 
war of unusual severity; and it needed a mighty effort to 
hurl back across their own frontiers the hordes of demoralized 
savages that threatened to overrun Europe. If Finland 
closed the European door to Bolshevism in the north, it 
should be recognized that Poland saved Europe in the east. 
To pass from war to domestic affairs is to move from 
1 Otherwise Lemberg, 
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one kind of turmoil to another, for the domestic history of 
the new Polish State has been scarcely less stormy than 
the record of its foreign relations. Ministers have been 
coming and going at a great rate ; party strife has been 
raging fiercely in the Seym and out of it; and even when 
the Constituent Assembly had been succeeded by a duly 
elected two-chamber Parliament on a basis of universal 
suffrage, the first President of the Republic was assassinated 
by a political fanatic shortly after his election. Polish 
cabinets have never been able to rely on a solid parliamentary 
majority, and many favoured the idea that the dictatorial 
powers, temporarily granted to the Government for purposes 
of financial reform, should not only be prolonged but extended 
also to political matters. The Polish Constitution in its 
present state of uncertainty is rather bewildering to the 
foreigner, but when one realizes the complicated mixture 
of conditions which led up to the independence of the 
country, and the diversity of the requirements of the new 
Polish State, one begins to wonder why it is not still more 
bewildering. The constitutional impasse is undoubtedly a 
serious obstacle to smooth running of the internal political 
machine, and decisions of far-reaching importance will have 
to be taken sooner or later. Is Poland going to be governed 
by a dictator, or is she going to settle down to representative 
government on Western lines ? At present the Poles have 
in Marshal Pilsudski a leader of ability, patriotism, and 
personality, who has earned the respect and devotion of a 
great mass of the people ; but it is doubtful whether the 
Seym will ever fulfil its constitutional function as long as 
the services of the Marshal are available for the benefit of 
the state. In the settlement of this question the Poles realize 
the value of time, and they are wisely allowing the political 
situation gradually to clarify itself before attempting to 
come to a definite decision. Many things decide themselves, 
and this may be one of them ; but a strong decision at an 
opportune moment seems more likely to become necessary. 
Marshal Pilsudski is a most remarkable man, who carries 
organization even as far as the cells of his own brain. By 
consulting his mental time-table he can tell you exactly 
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what he will be thinking about at a certain hour this day 
next week, and he so allocates his thoughts that he knows 
precisely when he will reach a decision on any given question. 
His personality is a great power in Poland to-day, but his 
health is such that his influence is rather lacking in con­
sistency. His life has been one long fight for Poland, and 
the hardships of which he has had to endure in prison and 
out of it have told severely on his advancing years. As he 
is -essentially a soldier, his position in the state perhaps 
adds to the impression of militarism to which I have already 
referred, but in a nation of idealists it is often to the army 
that the state has to turn when looking for a man of action 
in times of national crisis. . 
In the administration enthusiasm is to be seen in every 
department of work, and the zeal of government officials 
is remarkable. Old bureaucratic methods have to be re­
placed by more practical ones, and the means employed by 
higher officials to train their subordinates are sound and 
likely to lead to good results. One provincial governor, 
realizing that Poles are naturally inclined to disregard the 
value of time, arranges appointments at odd minutes past 
or before the hour, as, by fixing the time of a conference 
at II.3 or 14.7 he hopes to impress the value of minutes on 
those who work under him. A small thing in itself, this 
example shows the trouble taken in Poland to-day to bring 
things into line with the most modern and progressive 
systems of Western Europe. Indeed, one of the most 
important features of Polish political life is the realization 
of national defects and a determination to remedy them as 
far as possible. Poland has still a long way to go before 
the state is fully consolidated, and it will take some effort 
to restrain the tendencies that might at any time overrule 
wisdom and sound judgment. This effort is undoubtedly 
being made, but it will have to be sustained in times of 
stress, and possibly in times of national excitement, if it 
is going to succeed. To the average Englishman the Pole 
appears to be excitable and rather impulsive, romantic and 
impatient; he appears to be sensitive even to the most 
friendly criticism. For this reason there is a tendency to 
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refrain from saying things that might offend, and the Polish 
characteristic of resenting the criticism even of those who 
wish them well deprives them often of valuable assistance. 
There are two sides to every question, and a sympathetic 
understanding of the other side's point of view often brings 
material help to those who are blessed with that quality 
of human understanding. 
Poland's political problems may be divided under the 
headings of national and social questions. Of the former 
the most important is the minority question and of the latter 
that of agrarian reform. While there are over 3 million 
Poles living abroad, in neighbouring countries, the Republic 
has many districts of mixed nationality, one-third of the 
population being non-Polish in race and speech. 
While the rights of racial and national minorities are safe­
guarded by the special treaty signed by Poland at Versailles, 
the German, Ukrainian, and Jewish minority questions cause 
a good deal of internal unrest and lead to much misunder­
standing, almost unavoidable at the present stage of post­
war conditions in Eastern Europe. As yet only one province 
of mixed nationality, Silesia, with a large percentage of 
Germans, has its own provincial Seym. With regard to the 
3 million Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, Poland is under 
international obligation to give them self-government and 
a university, and the Government are taking steps to ease 
this difficult question, which arose out of the growth of 
Ukrainian nationalism encouraged by Austria to counter­
balance Polish power in the Dual Monarchy. It was under 
the Austrian regime that a Ukrainian educated class rose 
from among the peasants, and the Ukrainian priesthood 
made the Uniate Church a bulwark of nationalist pro­
paganda. While the Poles, who form 27 per cent of the 
population of Eastern Galicia, are Roman Catholics, the 
Ukrainians, who form about 60 per cent, are partly Greek 
Catholics (Uniate) and partly Greek Orthodox, and are 
nearly three times more illiterate in numbers. Moreover, 
the Poles form the chief population of the towns, and entirely 
monopolize the landowning class, so that racial differences 
are further accentuated by class antagonisms, although the 
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new policy of agrarian reform tends to diminish strife 
between the two peasant groups. On the other hand, there 
are differences between the Ukrainians in Poland and those 
under Russian rule, the former being mostly Uniate in 
religion and the latter Greek Orthodox ; and one section of 
the Polish Ukrainians undoubtedly wants union with Russia. 
Under Galician autonomy the Ukrainian language enjoyed 
equal rights with Polish in the public and official life of 
Eastern Galicia, and Ukrainian societies and newspapers had 
the same liberty as those of Polish origin ; but Polish land­
lords exercised a selfish influence in Ukrainian matters, and 
the old social gulf between the Polish landlord and the 
Ukrainian peasant added fuel to the fire of nationalism 
among the young Ukrainian intelligentsia. The history of 
the Galician Provincial Diet is an unbroken record of 
quarrels between Poles and Ukrainians, and at the beginning 
of this century the conflict began to assume violent forms. 
An attempt at reconciliation was made on the eve of the 
Great War, but it naturally led to nothing and, unfortunately, 
many of the germs of conflict then existing are still present 
in the Polish-Ukrainian dispute of to-day, which constitutes 
a very serious question for the Poles to solve. 
The large number of Jews in Poland is due partly to the 
fact that the old Poland had given them shelter and allowed 
them to acquire almost a monopoly of commerce, although 
they had always maintained their own language, dress, and 
customs, and partly because the Tsar's Government forbade 
Jews to live in certain Russian districts, and compelled them 
to move in great masses to the former Polish provinces of 
the Russian Empire. Under Austrian rule the Jews were 
at first merely tolerated, but they eventually received full 
equality of rights which was in great contrast with their 
treatment under Russia and more favourable than their 
position under Prussia. Consequently, there were more 
Jews in Galicia than elsewhere in Poland, and they became 
assimilated to the Polish educated class. At the 1910 
census more than 90 per cent of the Galician Jews registered 
themselves as Poles. Yet the modern separatist movement 
of Zionism has developed more fully in Galicia than else­
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where, and Lwow has been an important emigration centre 
for Palestine.1 Economically, owing to the commercial and 
industrial backwardness of Galicia, the Jews largely main­
tained their monopoly of trade, and enjoyed great prosperity, 
with the result that they began to acquire land and to enter 
the professions in large numbers. This led to counter-
economic measures on the part of the Poles, while attempts 
to protect the peasants from exploitation led to violent anti-
Semitism, especially when this became a definite feature of 
Austrian politics. Anti-Jewish riots occurred in Western 
Galicia in 1894, and just before the war there was an effective 
boycott of Jewish trade in Russian Poland, owing to the fact 
that persecution in Russia had driven masses of Russian 
Jews into Poland and had made the position still more 
difficult. In 1912 there were so many Jews in Warsaw tha t 
they were enabled to send a representative to the Russian 
Duma, while to-day there are many more in the Polish 
capital than in the whole of Palestine. Moreover, the 
increase of Jewish wealth during the war has not helped to 
solve the question. Their chief claim is that their language 
should be used in the state schools, which is no less absurd 
than a demand of Whitechapel Jews for the replacement of 
English by Yiddish in some of the schools of the London 
County Council. Although self-government would in this 
case be quite impracticable, there is a recognized Jewish 
party in the Polish Seym which, in 1925, reached a modus 
vivendi with the Government by which they agreed to dis­
continue their hostile attitude in exchange for administrative 
and educational concessions. While there is no doubt that 
in Poland the Jews are heartily disliked, they have the same 
rights as other Polish citizens. 
In previous chapters I have mentioned the agrarian reform 
movement in other countries, and Poland is no exception in 
this respect. The process of disintegration of the larger 
estates, and the development of medium-sized farms, has 
been going on in Poland ever since the emancipation of the 
peasants from serfdom ; but under the new agrarian legisla-
1 For details on the Zionist movement, vide The Middle East, 
by the same author, Chaps. IV and 
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tion private estates are limited to 60 hectares in industrial 
and urban districts, 400 hectares in the eastern provinces, 
and 180 hectares elsewhere. The remainder is allotted to 
peasants with little or no land at a price fixed by the state, 
but owing to the party opposition of those who contend 
that a great slump in production will follow the sudden 
splitting up of all large estates, and the difficulty of financing 
the new holdings, the reform has so far only been carried 
out to a limited extent. As in all countries of Eastern 
Europe, landlords are suffering severe hardship in many 
cases, but the general development of the peasant class is 
a question that has to be faced in all agricultural countries 
of Europe. 
Warsaw is a difficult city to describe, and from my own 
experience I should be inclined to say that snow was its 
chief characteristic, but I had the misfortune to visit the 
Polish capital in the coldest part of the coldest winter for 
many decades. I arrived in a blinding snow-storm at the 
Alexandrowo station of Russian memory and, after hunting 
for a taxi in the neighbouring streets, was rattled at a terrific 
pace over the most uneven thoroughfares to the Hotel 
Europejski, opposite the great open space where the Russian 
cathedral once stood. On the far side is the imposing 
colonnade forming the front of what was once the palace 
of August II of the Saxon dynasty of Polish kings, and is 
now used as the headquarters of the Polish Army. Warsaw 
is full of palaces, some in use as such, others converted into 
government offices. The Briihl Palace is now used as the 
Foreign Ministry, while the Palace of the Potockis is a typical 
home of the old Polish nobility. Like all European capitals, 
there is the usual cosmopolitan atmosphere, but it is chiefly 
confined to the ' Europejski', where people sit and eat, and 
sometimes sleep, waiters run about with dishes, bands play, 
and porters hold out their hands for tips. But that is not 
Warsaw. To see the capital you must wander through the 
old town or Stare Miasto and its quaint byways, watch the 
strange mixture of races that throngs the cobbled streets ; 
you must poke your nose into the houses of the ancient 
market-place, with their picturesque painted exteriors ; and 
12 
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you must ' do ' the Castle of the Kings, which overlooks the 
Vistula and contains some of the most beautiful furniture 
and tapestries in Europe. But this is not all. You must 
visit the French Embassy and see what France does to 
impress the Poles with her prestige ; you should not fail to 
admire the beauties of the Lazienki Park with the elegant 
little palace of King Stanislas August; and you should 
spend an afternoon in the fascinating gardens of Wilanow. 
A good look at the statue of Sigismund III standing on the 
top of his column, with sword and cross in hand, will give 
you ideas ; a look at one or two churches will convince you 
that the Church Catholic is the same as it is in London or 
Lisbon ; and an evening spent at the opera in the Teatr 
Wielki will supply impressions of another kind. When a 
short study of this sort has been carefully carried out, you 
should have much material for thought, and a certain insight 
into what constitutes modern Poland and her capital. But 
there are some ' don'ts ' to bear in mind in Warsaw. It is 
useless to try and talk to policemen or taxi-drivers, who 
only speak Polish ; it is wiser to write addresses on slips of 
paper and present them as required. Don't expect an 
English newspaper, unless you are willing to a pay a shilling 
for it; don't try to find addresses by yourself; and don't 
imagine French is generally understood, because it is only 
spoken among the upper classes. If Warsaw is not a 
typically Polish city, such as Krakow or Vilna, it is an 
exceedingly interesting place where much can be learnt of 
a more general European nature, but it is one of these places 
that is apt to produce rather a confused mind until the victim 
has time to orient his ideas. 
When the industries of the world were experiencing an 
unusual boom after the Great War, Polish industries were 
in a state of utter ruin and disorganization ; and it was not 
until 1924 that things took a turn for the better, although 
the financial reforms of that year produced a severe industrial 
crisis. After agriculture, coal is the most important item 
in Polish economic life, and in actual production Poland 
occupies the third place in Europe. It is, indeed, the coal 
export that has enabled the country to attain a com­
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paratively good trade balance in spite of the adverse con­
ditions in which economic restoration took place. While 
the home consumption of coal in 1926 was a little over 21 
million tons, the export figure was 15 million tons, or about 
26 per cent of the total exports; and if in that particular 
year the Polish coal exports were abnormally increased 
owing to the coal strike in England, the increase was largely 
counterbalanced by the customs war with Germany. Coal 
export from Upper Silesia is now an important feature of 
Polish policy, from a political as well as from an economic 
standpoint. Poland is also fortunate to possess considerable 
oilfields, which rank next to those of the Caucasus and 
Roumania, and the whole industry is practically concen­
trated in a belt of oil-containing layers about 250 miles long 
on the northern slopes of the Carpathians.1 Although only 
about 7 per cent of the oil deposits have yet been worked, 
it is estimated that the districts will yield up to 300 million 
tons of petroleum. But perhaps the oldest Polish industry 
of importance is the manufacture of textiles, and the ancient 
traditions of the textile trade are represented by the Drapers' 
Hall built at the time of Casimir the Great on the market­
place of Krakow. Owing to protective measures and to the 
customs union with the former Russian Empire, the growth 
of the textile industries round Lodz was very rapid, but after 
four years' stoppage during the German occupation it needed 
great efforts to set the industry on its feet again. Not only 
had the mills suffered severely from military operations, 
but requisitions and confiscations of raw materials and 
semi-manufactured goods were accompanied by a wholesale 
removal of machinery. Since then the greatest progress has 
been in the cotton industry, and spinning production has 
even surpassed pre-war figures, while the jute industry has 
now reached the level of pre-war production. Roumania 
is Poland's best market for textiles, which are also exported 
to Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, the Baltic States, and 
Scandinavia, while in 1926 a beginning was made with 
exports to China and Africa. After textiles, the metal 
industry employs the greatest number of hands, and before 
1 The centre of the oil industry is the district of Boryslaw. 
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the war mechanical construction was well developed in 
Russian Poland and Upper Silesia. In the former region 
the factories suffered greatly during the war, but they have 
already recovered to a great extent, and in the production 
of textile machinery, steam and oil engines, electro-motors 
and machine tools, the Polish mechanical industry is com­
peting successfully in world markets. Although Germany 
still occupies the leading position in Poland's foreign trade, 
there has recently been a marked decline in favour of the 
Scandinavian and Baltic countries, which, in 1926, absorbed 
16 per cent of the value of the whole foreign trade of Poland. 
Serious difficulties of a technical nature, however, have 
hampered Polish trade, and the establishment of good rail 
communications has been no easy matter. The Polish 
railways were built in the interests of the three partitioning 
Powers, and strategical considerations usually overruled 
Polish economic needs. While the Austrian lineage was only 
half that of the German provinces, the railways of the densely 
populated Congress Kingdom, with its centres of industry, 
were in the lowest stage of development. As early as 1919 
steps were taken to develop the railway services, especially 
in the Russian provinces and in Galicia, and the proposed 
lines were begun according to their importance in the 
economic life of the country. The requirements of the coal 
districts received first consideration, as it was essential that 
the railway service from the Dabrowa basin in former 
Russian Poland should be brought into line with the excellent 
system in Upper Silesia and the adequate service in the 
Krakow basin. From the railway standpoint it was neces­
sary that the coal districts should be treated as a whole, 
and the need of better transport facilities for the timber 
and oil resources called for early attention. From her own 
resources, Poland could do little by way of equipping the 
railways, as the repair shops in the Russian provinces were 
almost completely destroyed; but fortunately her great 
deficiency in rolling stock was largely made good by consider­
able allocations from Germany and Austria. Yet a large 
quantity of material had to be purchased abroad ; repair 
shops had to be constructed ; locomotive and carriage work 
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had to be created ; the broad Russian gauge in the former 
Russian provinces had to be converted to the Central 
European gauge ; immense damage in the eastern districts 
had to be repaired; and a vast amount of other construc­
tional work had to be carried out. The speed with which 
the railways have been put into working order reflects great 
credit on the energy and resource of the Poles, although 
they received valuable assistance from the American railway 
mission, and had at their disposal a large number of ex-
employees of the Russian railways who had recently returned 
to Poland. Only those who have travelled in Poland in 
1918 or 1919 over the devastated areas can fully realize the 
state of affairs at that time. Station buildings were replaced 
by wooden sheds, railway officials had to live in coaches 
and wagons, the trains were seldom heated, and the over­
crowding was terrible. By 1923 the technical condition 
of the railways compared favourably with that of almost 
any European system; and to-day travelling in Poland 
is more comfortable than in many European states; 
a regular service of fast trains is maintained on all the 
more important routes ; and the standard of punctuality 
is high. But the greatest technical problem which the Poles 
have had to face is the adaptation of the railway system to 
the new direction of trade. The strategic and other lines 
leading to Petrograd, Vienna, and German centres had to 
give way to communications with Danzig, Gdynia, and 
Upper Silesia in order to suit the general direction of trade 
from south to north instead of from east to west. Un­
fortunately the railways have scored at the expense of 
the long and numerous waterways that are the natural 
means of transport for much of the Polish traffic. Much 
work is needed on the Vistula and other waterways, but 
owing to want of capital and organization little has been 
done to develop this important form of communication. 
Although the space at my disposal is quite inadequate 
for dealing with the internal affairs of the new Poland, which 
is one of the most interesting developments of modern 
times, I hope I have given my readers sufficient material 
for an objective appreciation of the Polish attitude to 
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European affairs with its merits and shortcomings. Poland 
has a future of great possibilities. The material is present 
and there is no lack of motive power; but everything 
depends on the direction of her slow and steady progress, 
on her readiness to profit from the example and advice of 
others, and on her adoption of a policy of ' Safety First 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE POLISH CORRIDOR AND DANZIG 
I NOW come to what may be regarded as the culminating point of this narrative—the relations between Poland and her neighbours—which not only have a direct bearing 
on the future of the Polish State, but also have a profound 
influence on the future destinies of Europe. If the setting 
up of the Polish Republic is a significant fact in itself, 
of much greater significance are the reactions thereby pro­
duced in the respective policies of the Great Powers. As 
this book is essentially a study of the Baltic area, I have 
excluded such questions as do not wholly fall within this 
province, except where some reference to them is necessary 
for a better understanding of the case in point. For this 
reason I have omitted to deal with Poland's eastern frontiers 
and Upper Silesia, and have left to others the consideration 
of Poland's relations with Czechoslovakia and Roumania. 
With the Lithuanian question already stated, I will now 
deal with the all-important matter of the Polish Corridor 
and its effect on Germany and Russia. 
The most fundamental need of Poland is peace ; and by 
' peace ' I mean not mere absence of war, but an atmosphere 
of political tranquillity in foreign and internal affairs, 
which will enable the state to consolidate its position in 
Europe and within the frontiers of Poland. This involves 
friendly relations with her neighbours, satisfactory con­
ditions for foreign minorities, industrial co-operation, and 
an absence of political upheavals. It may not be possible 
to arrive at this desirable state of affairs all at once, but the 
mere effort of trying to attain this end cannot but further 
the interests of consolidation. To the outside observer 
Poland's position in Europe appears to be a difficult one. 
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With Germany in the west and Russia in the east, she is 
situated between two neighbours with neither of whom 
is she on the most friendly terms ; and there is even a 
danger of these two Powers working in co-operation. It 
is chiefly a question of frontiers, and such a state of affairs 
creates an atmosphere of political uncertainty which is 
scarcely in the interests of Poland at the present stage of 
her development. The situation that exists is natural after 
a war of colossal magnitude, and ten years is a short time 
in reorganization of affairs in a part of the world where 
things move slowly; but, before this state of political 
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tension and general uncertainty can give place to conditions 
suitable for progressive development, important changes 
of policy must take place. Indeed, it is difficult for an 
impartial observer to see how Poland can remain indifferent 
to the friendship of Germany and Russia. 
The ' thirteenth point' of President Wilson's declaration 
at the Washington Congress of 1918 reads as follows : 
' An independent Polish State should be erected which 
should include the territories inhabited by indisputable 
Polish populations, in which should be assured a free and 
secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic 
independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed 
by international covenant.' This formed the basis of the 
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settlement that brought the Polish Corridor into existence 
and fixed the German-Polish frontiers as they are to-day. 
It was provided that there should be a plebiscite in Upper 
Silesia, which resulted in a decision by which the southern 
half of the area, containing valuable mines, passed to Poland, 
while the northern half returned to Germany, Two other 
plebiscites were provided for in East Prussia, in the Allen-
stein and Marienwerder districts respectively, both of which 
went in favour of Germany. The boundaries were then 
so fixed that a large part of the Posen and Bromberg1 area 
went to Poland, and the Polish Corridor was run to the sea 
between East Prussia and Brandenburg, ending in the 
territory of the Free City of Danzig, which was to be admin­
istered by the League of Nations, although its foreign 
relations were to be under Polish control. By this means 
East Prussia was severed altogether from the main body 
of the German Reich, while in Posen 2 and West Prussia 
over a million Germans were assigned to Poland. The 
main principle underlying this settlement at the Peace 
Conference was one of nationality, although in certain 
cases it was found necessary to modify or even to overrule 
this consideration owing to economic and other factors. 
Modifications on strategic grounds received little support, 
except where they were involved in economic factors inti­
mately bound up with geographical issues. Religion was 
only taken into account in so far as it threw doubt on the 
national sympathies of people who clearly belonged to a 
particular nation by race and language, but were of a differ­
ent religion ; while history could not be altogether ignored. 
Differences of opinion among the delegates were solely 
concerned with the extent to which these other factors 
might justly be allowed to overrule considerations of simple 
nationality, and it was not unusual to find the positions 
assumed by the representatives of the Great Powers entirely 
reversed in dealing with different individual problems. The 
necessity of taking into account factors other than nationality 
became obvious as soon as any attempt was made to deal 
with concrete questions, as it was clearly impossible to have 
1 Bydgoszcz in Polish. 2 Poznan in Polish. 
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islands of one country in the territory of another, and there 
were geographical facts that put out of count the idea of a 
territorial jig-saw puzzle. In all such cases it was found 
necessary to decide contrary to the wishes of one or other 
of the two claimants, and to do so on grounds of general 
justice, taking into account matters of history and religion 
and the economic interests of the territories immediately 
concerned and of the nations that claimed these territories. 
Apart altogether from East Prussia, there had long been a 
German overflow into Poland, originally in the nature of 
peaceful penetration, but reinforced after the partitions 
by the policy of the Prussian Government; and consequently 
there were large minorities of German race and language, 
possessing an influence out of all proportion to their numbers, 
claiming to belong to a higher civilization and culture, 
controlling most of the means of production, and constituting 
in general the middle or upper classes. While a proportion of 
the German influence in Posnania and West Prussia, assigned 
to Poland, was latterly due to Prussian colonization, its 
origin must be traced to the urban settlements, going as far 
back as the thirteenth century, which were in these early 
days promoted and furthered by the Polish princes. 
A great stream of German immigration flowed into 
Poland during the thirteenth century, consisting for the 
most part of peasants and merchants who followed the 
summons of the Polish princes and founded towns and settle­
ments in the Polish State ; and part of these immigrants 
became Polonized. In the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries the process was repeated partly as a result of 
religious disorders and the Thirty Years War, when the 
low-lying plains of the Netze and the Vistula were intensively 
settled by Germans, who also immigrated in large numbers 
from the south into the province of Posen. Hence the 
area, which now constitutes the western districts of Poland, 
contained already a large proportion of German population 
when it came into the possession of Prussia—Upper Silesia 
in 1742, West Prussia and the Netze districts in 1772 on 
the occasion of the First Partition of Poland, and the greater 
part of the province of Posen in 1793 on the occasion of 
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the Second Partition. In the towns this German element 
had tended to become an actual majority, and even in the 
country districts there were probably considerable islands 
where the Polish element was in a definite minority. In 
these cases the Peace Conference had to decide whether the 
will of the ill-educated majority should overrule that of the 
well-educated minority, and whether the fate of the more 
compact and wealthy islands should be determined by the 
will of the larger and more sparsely inhabited country 
districts which surrounded them. In other words, was 
quality or quantity to be the determining factor ? One 
method which suggested itself was to make a clean cut by 
majorities on both sides, and to invite the minority in each 
case to co-operate with the state in which they found them­
selves ; and this was the method definitely adopted to the 
detriment of the Germans. 
The application of the principle of nationality sounds 
the essence of simplicity, but when national divisions are 
as uncertain as they are in this ' corridor ' region it becomes 
a most complicated affair. In some parts it is almost impos­
sible to discover whether a man is a German or a Pole, 
and in some cases he does not care whether he is one or 
the other. Often Germans have Polish names, and vice 
versa, while the respective languages have been adopted 
to suit circumstances. Indeed, these peculiarities of nation­
ality have been twisted and turned to suit the interests 
of both sides, and relatively insignificant details have been 
given prominence at the expense of the essential questions 
at stake. 
The report of the Polish Commission of the Peace Con­
ference formed the actual basis of the subsequent settle­
ment, but certain modifications were introduced by the 
Supreme Council-in regard to Danzig and the neighbouring 
regions, and still further changes were made in the German-
Polish frontier after the receipt of the German observations 
on the Draft Treaty. The original proposal of the Com­
mission was that in Posnania and West Prussia the western 
limit of Polish ethnographical majorities should, with 
certain modifications, be made the frontier between Poland 
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and Germany; and this proposal was supported by the 
representatives of all the Great Powers. It, however, took 
into account factors other than ethnographical to an extent 
which was afterwards thought, especially by the British 
representatives, to be excessive ; and, while much could 
be said in defence of its solutions in regard to any particular 
problem, the result as a whole, owing to the general tendency 
to give the benefit of the doubt to Poland, was unduly 
unfavourable to the German claims. There were three 
areas in particular where Germany had been treated with 
extreme severity. All three could show a large majority 
of Germans, but they had been assigned to Poland on 
various grounds. They were, however, given to Germany 
in the final version of the treaty. From a purely ethno­
graphical point of view, it must be admitted that the 
resulting frontier line still shows a balance in favour of Poland. 
Almost every Polish excrescence has been included in 
Poland, while no such effort was made to include all German 
excrescences in Germany. 
The British delegation was the only one that found 
itself in the position of opposing or trying to limit the 
Polish claims in all the main questions where there were 
substantial differences of opinion, and only time and history 
can prove or disprove the wisdom of the British attitude 
which was certainly not due to any unfriendliness towards 
Poland. Indeed, it was chiefly due to a deep-rooted 
belief that if Poland was to be strong both internally and 
externally it was necessary that self-determination should 
be the guiding principle of the settlement. Mr. Lloyd 
George expressed himself as follows 1: 'I am therefore, 
strongly averse to transferring more Germans from German 
rule to the rule of some other state than can possibly be 
helped. . . . The proposal of the Polish Commission that 
we should place 2,100,000 Germans under the control of 
a people which is of a different religion and which has never 
proved its capacity for stable self-government throughout 
its history, must, in my judgment, lead sooner or later to 
a new war in the east of Europe.' 
1 Memo. 25th March, 1919 (Cmd. 1614, 1922). 
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Whatever may be the merits and defects of the local 
frontier settlement, the larger conception of giving Poland 
an access to the sea through this territory involved cutting 
off East Prussia from the rest of Germany ; and it is the 
clash of these two principles that have produced the 
' Corridor Question ' with all its ramifications and reper­
cussions. It was most desirable that Poland should have 
free access to the sea, and at the same time it was most 
undesirable that the German State should be severed in 
the process. A proposal that commended itself at the 
time was that the Polish-Lithuanian union should be 
revived, and that the Polish access to the Baltic should be 
through Memel, but this proposal was dropped owing to 
Polish and Lithuanian opposition ; and an opportunity 
was lost of obtaining a settlement that might well have 
been satisfactory after the early stages of political estrange­
ment had subsided, and might have solved the Vilna question 
at the same time. Indeed, this solution still finds favour 
in certain high quarters, although it is difficult to see how 
the opportunity of applying it can possibly return. The 
fact, however, remains that the Corridor exists to-day as 
a problem of the first magnitude in European politics, and 
that efforts have been made to balance things up for the 
Germans as far as possible, although not to their satisfaction. 
In order to guarantee to East Prussia free communication 
with the rest of Germany, the Treaty of Versailles obliged 
Poland to grant free transit across the territories which had 
been allotted to her. Germany and Poland were to come 
to an agreement by which Germany was to obtain free 
transit across the Corridor, while Poland was to receive 
similar privileges across German territory on the right 
bank of the Vistula, for communication between Poland 
and the Free City of Danzig. An agreement on these lines 
was reached at Paris on the 21st April, 1921, and the Con­
vention provided for railway, telephone and telegraph 
communications, while Poland was to regulate postal com­
munications, navigation in territorial waters and internal 
waterways, and road traffic in general. On the strength of 
the Polish-Danzig Convention of 1920, Poland extended 
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her obligation to grant transit over the territory of the Free 
City of Danzig. In these matters the Poles showed a con­
siderable degree of generosity, and did all they could to 
facilitate German communications in rather a difficult 
situation, even to the length of granting free transit to 
military convoys, although they were not obliged to do so 
by the Peace Treaty. In order to guarantee the normal 
functioning of these communications, the Poles proposed 
that all differences should be regulated, not through diplo­
matic channels, but by a special tribunal which was after­
wards set up at Danzig. Up to the end of January, 1925, 
no differences of opinion were recorded, and the German 
Government did not submit one case to the Danzig Tribunal, 
but troubles have since arisen over the railway arrangements, 
especially the goods traffic, and there are administrative 
questions in which reform is rather urgently needed. Rail­
way communication falls into two classes—' Privileged' and 
' Ordinary ' transit, the former being confined to definitely 
stipulated lines,1 free of passport and customs formalities. 
Travellers are not allowed to alight from the transit trains, 
and they are not allowed to pass or receive anything through 
windows. Goods traffic is also exempt from customs if 
carried in special transit trains. Ordinary transit, on the other 
hand, takes place on all the lines of the western provinces 
of Poland, and in these trains German citizens must have 
passports and a Polish visa. Goods traffic does not come 
under any tariffs, but is subject to customs formalities 
such as the sealing of wagons. I have travelled in one of 
the transit trains with sleeping and restaurant cars from 
Marienburg to Berlin, and during a long night journey 
there was no indication whatever that this German train 
was passing through foreign territory, and the train reached 
the Friedrichstrasse station within a few minutes of scheduled 
time. Perhaps the most interesting centre of the traffic 
between the Reich and East Prussia and Danzig is Tczew, 
1 The principal lines allotted to privileged transit are—Lauen-
burg—Danzig—Tczew—Marienburg; Choj nice — Tczew—Marien­
burg ; and Schneidemuhl—Bydgoszcz—Torun—Deutsch-Eylau. 
2 Dirschau in German. 
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a Polish river port on the Vistula situated on the Polish-
Danzig frontier. Here there is a general convergence of 
railways, and screens of wire netting separate the trains 
from one another to prevent abuse of the transit regulations. 
The Germans are entitled to one troop train weekly and to 
one train carrying war material, but arms must be deposited 
in a special carriage under the supervision of a Polish 
guard. Although this last provision does not seem alto­
gether unreasonable in principle, it leads to some rather 
unfortunate incidents in actual fact; and one could not 
but sympathize with the German general who had to hand 
over his sword to a Polish railway guard on his way to 
manoeuvres in East Prussia. The German mails are 
carried in German wagons, but these carriages, together 
with the German post office staff, are put under the charge 
of a Polish official; certain telegraph and telephone lines 
have been allotted to German use on payment; and motor 
traffic is limited on certain roads indicated by the Poles. 
It is impossible to go into all the details of this complicated 
system of communications in the Corridor, but suffice it 
to say that the arrangement works tolerably well in spite 
of certain conditions that must be exceedingly irritating 
to the Germans. 
A recent journey through the Polish province of Pomorze 
(the Polish province constituting the Corridor) revealed 
some very interesting facts bearing on the present situation 
in that territory. In Torun, Bydgoszcz, and Grudziadz 1 
I had long conversations with Polish and German officials, 
as well as with representatives of the local inhabitants, 
and I believe that my impressions are somewhere near the 
truth. On the German side I heard chiefly complaints 
to which the Poles replied in justification of the policy 
which they are carrying out. In Torun, where about 
5 per cent of the population is German and the German 
language is still spoken, even by many Poles, the chief 
sources of complaint were : (i) the expropriation of estates ; 
(2) want of adequate facilities for secondary education in 
German ; (3) censorship of the press ; and (4) a system of 
1 Thorn, Bromberg, and Graudenz in German. 
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taxation by which the Poles are often exempt but the Germans 
are always obliged to pay. 
With regard to the expropriation of land, the German 
minority seem to think that the Polish Agrarian Reform 
Act is specially directed against German landowners, and 
that in many cases Poles are allowed to retain their property, 
a privilege that is always denied to Germans. The fact 
of the matter is that the policy of land expropriation and 
the splitting up of the large estates into small holdings is 
now fairly general in many countries of Eastern Europe. In 
such circumstances the large landowners are necessarily 
the greatest sufferers, and it so happens that in the province 
of Pomorze the majority of these landowners is German. 
The fact that the Germans previously bought up so much 
land in this territory, and obtained loans for this purpose, has 
caused them to be faced not only with the prospect of expro­
priation but also with the likelihood of their loans being called 
up. Undoubtedly the situation for these German landlords 
is very difficult, but expropriation has become a necessity. 
Many Polish farms have become very small owing to the 
land having been split up amongst large families, and 
without some measure of this kind it would be impossible 
for these poor peasants to acquire more land. While 
there are cases where the Poles have shown favouritism 
to their own people, and certain officials have been over-
zealous to have ' Poland for the Poles ', my impression 
is that on the whole the Polish Government are trying to 
treat the German landowners in a just and equitable 
manner. To expect perfection at this stage in the settle­
ment of the frontier districts is to expect too much, and it 
is surprising to me that there is not more friction. 
In the matter of secondary education, the Polish author­
ities informed me that the Government maintain the 
German gymnasium at Torun as it was before the war, 
with German teaching, German teachers and German 
text-books ; that the two gymnasia at Grudziadz have 
parallel German classes ; and that there are three private 
schools staffed with German teachers, some of whom even 
to-day do not speak Polish. Taking into consideration 
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the percentage of Germans in this region, it seems that 
on paper the. number of secondary schools is adequate, 
but I doubt whether there is yet adequate provision of 
German teachers or sufficient educational facilities for a 
community whose educational needs are exceptionally great. 
I do not think that the Polish authorities quite realize the 
needs of the German minority in this particular direction, 
but I feel that in the course of time this matter will receive 
their sympathetic consideration. The censorship of the 
press I have seen with my own eyes, but I have not seen the 
matter excluded, so it is difficult to express an opinion. Yet 
it seems more than probable that both sides are to some 
extent at fault, the Germans in printing matter distasteful 
to the Poles, and the Poles in being perhaps rather severe 
in the suppression of articles. I have before me a copy 
of the Pommereller Tageblatt, published at Tczew, in which 
an article on Polish schools in Prussia and German schools 
in Poland is completely deleted by the censor. 
In Bydgoszcz, formerly a very German town but now 
with a Polish majority, I inquired into the striking change 
of nationality that had taken place and found it to be due 
to the following causes : the departure of German officials 
and their replacement by Poles ; the fact that many Poles 
had previously accepted German nationality for con­
venience' sake ; the Polish policy of introducing as many 
Poles as possible into the province of Pomorze; and the 
general trend of German migrations westward to the large 
industrial centres of Germany. The Poles have made 
remarkable progress in this province in accordance with 
their general policy of consolidation, especially in the setting 
up of hospitals, welfare centres, and other social institutions, 
which are open to all irrespective of nationality; and it seems 
to me that Poles and Germans work tolerably well together, 
except where nationalist tendencies assume an aggressive 
form. Unfortunately, German nationalism is rather prom­
inent in Bydgoszcz, which probably accounts for certain 
difficulties experienced by the whole minority there. The 
Poles are trying to extend their influence, and the Germans 
are trying to defend their minority rights, in a frontier 
13 
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district where friction is only to be expected, as both 
attitudes are the result of well-thought-out policies, framed 
with a view to determining the future of the Corridor. 
Another very natural cause of ill-feeling in Bydgoszcz is 
the opinion, freely expressed by Poles, that East Prussia 
will gradually be absorbed by Poland at the wish of the 
inhabitants themselves. When in Grudziadz, the most 
German town in the Pomorze, I visited the industries of 
agricultural machinery, hardware, and rubber goods, and 
found Poles working well under German foremen. There 
were no cases of Germans working under Polish foremen, 
but there was no friction among the workers. It seems to 
me that the bourgeoisie element gives rise to most of the 
bad feeling between the two peoples. In former times 
there was no middle class in Poland, and this gap had to 
be filled by foreigners, so that now the German and Jewish 
elements of the population clash to some extent with the 
new Polish middle class, which is rapidly developing. The 
arrangements for German railway transit across the province 
are better than I expected to find, and, although there are 
certain complaints about the restrictions on goods traffic, 
there is a general consensus of opinion that the passenger 
arrangements are satisfactory. Considering the difficulties 
in operating a traffic of this nature, my own impression 
is that, if the present system is not entirely satisfactory, 
it is through no want of effort on the part of the Polish 
railway authorities. 
Let us now turn to the crucial question of Danzig, the 
port which controls the mouth of the Vistula and was to 
establish Poland's actual outlet to the Baltic. Although 
Danzig is almost entirely German in race and language, 
the Peace Conference took the view that this was an excep­
tion to the general principle of following the wishes of the 
majority of the inhabitants in regard to nationality, on 
the grounds that the national aspirations of a small body 
of Germans clashed with the vital necessities of a much 
larger body of Poles ; and they contended that the interests 
of the smaller body must give way to those of the larger. 
They did not, however, view Polish interests with regard 
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to the general welfare of Europe in this light. The 
question of constructing another harbour on the Polish 
coast seemed out of the question at that time, so the Con­
ference set themselves to consider the needs of a nation 
of nearly 30 million inhabitants, occupying the whole basin 
of the Vistula with certain ramifications and extensions, 
particularly to the west. It was contended that the natural 
outlet for this country was by the mouth of the river 
around which and upon which the whole fabric of Polish 
society had been built. Suggested outlets to the Black 
Sea and the Adriatic were ruled out of the count, and 
it was taken for granted that the greater, part of Polish 
trade must pass by way of the Vistula and the port of 
Danzig. 
In the early days German merchants settled in Danzig 
with the object of opening up Eastern Europe to navigation, 
and the town assumed quite a German character, while 
in the fourteenth century it came under the dominion of 
the Order of Teutonic Knights. In 1376 Danzig joined 
the Hanseatic League and took part in the extensive trade 
of that organization with the Scandinavian cities, with 
England, Holland, France, and Spain ; but the struggles 
between the Teutonic Knights and Poland continually 
imperilled its independence, and Danzig came under the pro­
tection of the king of Poland, still as a free city, after the 
defeat of the Knights at Tannenberg in 1410. The fifteenth 
century was a period of commercial prosperity for Danzig, 
as the Hanseatic League was then at the zenith of its power, 
but within the next hundred years there appeared the first 
signs of the League's decay, and in 1669 it ceased to exist 
altogether. Meanwhile, Danzig's geographical position had 
brought it into close commercial relations with Russia and 
Poland, and the city received from the latter timber, pitch, 
potash, and a certain quantity of grain in exchange for salt 
and cloth. Shipbuilding has always occupied a prominent 
place in the activities of the Free City, and in the days 
of wooden ships Danzig's position was almost unrivalled 
owing to the proximity of the great oak forests of Poland 
and Russia. In fact, this industry developed to such large 
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proportions, when Danzig supplied ships to Spain and Italy, 
and even to England and Holland, that the members of 
the Hanseatic League were eventually forbidden to supply 
ships to foreign Powers. Danzig's most flourishing period 
was about the sixteenth century, when the Polish Republic 
was at the height of its development, and the Danzig 
merchants were the most important commercial medium 
between the lands of the Vistula and the grain and timber 
merchants of Western Europe. The well-preserved charters 
of the city show that under the Polish kings Danzig prospered 
and acquired such extensive autonomous rights that it 
had its own army and fleet, concluded treaties with foreign 
sovereigns, and even declared its neutrality in Poland's 
wars with other countries. In the archives letters exist 
from Henry VIII of England, Queen Elizabeth, Oliver 
Cromwell, Henry IV of France, Louis XIV, Philip of Spain, 
Gustavus Adolphus, Tsar Alexis of Russia, and many other 
sovereigns and princes, in which the magistrates of the city 
are treated as the chiefs of an independent state. Indeed, 
the city was at that time known as the ' Granary of Europe '. 
The grain exports reached 115,000 shiploads per annum, 
and the population 75,000, a figure which Hamburg did 
not reach till a century later. The most important fact, 
however, is that Danzig's natural hinterland throughout 
all these years was the basin of the Vistula, from which 
the city was cut off by the partitions of Poland. Between 
the First and Second Partitions, when the territory of the 
present Corridor was under Prussia and separated from 
Danzig, the city was almost ruined, but when in 1792, 
shortly before the Second Partition, Prussia annexed the 
whole of Western Poland up to the Vistula and including 
Danzig, the city's trade instantly began to revive. It was, 
therefore, in consideration of Danzig's economic depen­
dence on the Vistula that the Polish Commission recom­
mended the inclusion of Danzig in the Polish State. But 
such a settlement would have been to ignore the wishes 
of the population, 96 per cent of which was German, and 
the British delegates at the Conference stood out against 
this injustice. 
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The German Delegation protested against the whole 
settlement, and insisted that the sea-coast, Danzig and the 
mouth of the Vistula should remain in German hands ; 
but their protest was rejected by M. Clemenceau in the 
following terms : 
' Poland will be given certain economic rights in Danzig, and the 
city itself has been severed from Germany, because in no other way 
was it possible to provide for that " free and secure access to the 
sea" which Germany has promised to concede. The German 
counter-proposals . . . deny secure access to the sea to a nation 
of over 20 million people, whose nationals are in the majority 
all the way to the coast, in order to maintain territorial connection 
between East and West Prussia, whose trade has always been 
mainly sea-borne. They cannot, therefore, be accepted by the 
Allied and Associated Powers.' 
EAST PRUSSIA.—' . . . for Poland to have immediate and un­
broken communication with Danzig and the remainder of the coast 
by railways which are entirely under the control of the Polish State 
is essential. The inconvenience caused to East Prussia by the new 
frontiers is negligible compared to that which would be caused to 
Poland by any other arrangement.' 
DANZIG.—' The economic interests of Danzig and Poland are 
identical. For Danzig as the great port of the valley of the Vistula 
the most intimate connection with Poland is essential. The an­
nexation of West Prussia, including Danzig, to Germany deprived 
Poland of that direct access to the sea which was hers by right. 
The Allied and Associated Powers propose that this direct access 
shall be restored. It is not enough that Poland should be allowed 
the use of German ports : the coast, short as it is, which is Polish, 
must be restored to her. Poland claims, and justly claims, that 
the control and development of the port, which is her sole opening 
to the sea, shall be in her hands, and that the communications 
between it and Poland shall not be subjected to any foreign control, 
so that in this, one of the most important aspects of national 
life, Poland should be put on an equality with the other states of 
Europe.' 
PORTS, WATERWAYS, AND RAILWAYS.—' Similarly, it is noted 
that, with regard to the question of Danzig, Germany declares 
herself ready to accord, to assure Poland free access to the sea, 
facilities and advantages similar to those which are asked from 
her at Hamburg and Stettin on behalf of the Czechoslovak State ; 
but without raising any objection of principle she claims to make 
the matter in both cases the subject of and a counter in special 
negotiation with the interested parties only, without any inter­
national guarantee.' 
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The final decision reached in the matter of Danzig was 
a compromise between the Polish demand for the cession 
to the new Polish State of the most convenient outlet and 
inlet for Polish commerce, and the reluctance to place a 
city 96 per cent German under a foreign sovereignty. 
Over thirty alternative solutions had been rejected. The 
legal and political status of the Free City is that of an 
entirely separate state and dependent member of the 
community of nations under the protection of the League 
of Nations, represented on the spot by a High Commissioner, 
who decides in the first instance all differences between 
Danzig and Poland. Poland's rights are exclusively 
economic and ensure her free access to the sea. The legis­
lative body is the Volkstag, consisting of 120 members 
elected on the system of proportional representation; 
while the highest executive authority is vested in the 
Senate consisting of a President, Vice-President, and twenty 
Senators. The President and seven Senators are elected 
for four years, and the Vice-President and thirteen Senators 
acting in a secondary capacity are elected for an indefinite 
period, the Volkstag having the right to cause their resig­
nation. The Senate directs the policy of the Government 
and is responsible to the Volkstag, so it must not be confused 
with Senates elsewhere which form the Upper Houses of 
the legislature. The administration of the harbour and 
waterways is carried out by a Harbour Board, consisting 
of five representatives of the Free City and Poland respec­
tively, with a Swiss President appointed by the League of 
Nations. The Harbour Board has energetically taken up 
the matter of improving the port, which can now accom­
modate even the largest vessels; many new warehouses 
and granaries have been erected; and loading operations 
have been greatly facilitated by the setting up of new electric 
cranes and the laying down of more railway lines. The 
management of the railways, in so far as they do not serve 
purely local requirements, has been entrusted to Poland, 
and is conducted by a special administration of the Polish 
State Railways in Danzig, to which a Danzig delegate is 
appointed to represent the city's interests. There have 
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been endless difficulties over this railway administration 
on the grounds that it was not confined to Danzig traffic, 
and it was decided several years ago by the High Com­
missioner that the offices should be removed from Danzig, 
but it is typical of conditions in the Free City that they 
still remain as before. The conduct of foreign relations 
is in the hands of the Polish Government, which is entrusted 
with the protection of Danzigers abroad, and in foreign 
centres where Poland is represented by a consulate and 
where Danzig has important commercial interests, Danzig 
officials are attached to the consulate. Further, owing to 
the numerous relations existing between Danzig and Poland, 
the Poles have a diplomatic representative in the Free City, 
while most of the other Powers are represented by Consuls-
General or Consuls. 
In some international conferences Danzig participates as 
an independent entity. The postal and telegraph services 
are administered by the post office of the Free City, but 
the Poles have been allowed to have their own postal 
arrangements in the harbour for the purpose of maintaining 
direct communication between Danzig and Poland, as well 
as between Poland and overseas countries. The area of 
the harbour, however, has recently been extended to in­
clude most of the city. The Polish post-boxes have in past 
years been a source of perpetual friction between Poles and 
Danzigers, and have led to incidents of an exceedingly 
childish nature, but fortunately both sides are now rather 
past the infantile stage of bickering, and are showing more 
sense in a difficult section of a delicate settlement. Accord­
ing to the Treaty of Versailles the Free City is in customs 
union with Poland, but the organization of the customs 
is under the government of Danzig. The Danzig Board 
of Customs levies duties according to the Polish tariff, 
but these are collected by the local custom-house officers; 
and arrangements have been made whereby the Free City 
receives a percentage of the Polish customs revenue. 
Although Danzig's prosperity is essentially dependent on 
her trade, there are some remarkable industrial enterprises 
in the city. The International Shipbuilding and Engineer­
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ing Company, formerly the Imperial Dockyard and one 
of the largest engineering -undertakings in the Baltic, 
employs 3,000 workmen and 400 officials and is supported 
by British, French, Danzig, and Polish capital. One of 
the private shipyards has built vessels up to 36,000 tons; 
and the present building output could be largely increased. 
There are several floating docks to accommodate ships up 
to 6,000 tons, and there is every facility for the repair 
and maintenance of ships. Danzig has her own mercantile 
marine of about eighty vessels which fly the flag of the 
Free City—a red ground with a gold crown surmounting 
two white crosses—and ply chiefly between Danzig and 
the North Sea and Baltic ports. There is also a 
special currency, the gulden, based on the gold franc (25 
gulden = £1), but German weights and measures are 
universally employed. 
Danzig I found more German than Germany itself. 
German culture is firmly stamped on nearly every building, 
the population is almost entirely German, and German 
nationalism is strong, partly owing to the large number 
of retired civil servants who reside there, and partly 
because nationalists are free in Danzig to express them­
selves in a way that is scarcely possible in republican 
Germany. 
The Danzigers resent Polish influence in the Free City, 
especially the Polish post office, customs, participation in 
the harbour control, and the railway administration. Owing 
to the customs barriers most foreign goods are expensive, 
the customs rates being fixed by the Poles to suit the interests 
of Poland generally ; and these rates scarcely coincide with 
the interests of the Danzigers, although the latter have 
some say in the fixing of the customs tariffs. While Polish 
goods, which are little in demand, are cheap, German goods, 
which are in great demand, are expensive. This is the 
natural result of there being no commercial treaty between 
Germany and Poland, and it is more noticeable in the 
small State of Danzig than. almost anywhere else. The 
United States, on the other hand, having a commercial 
treaty with Poland, are able to import their goods on favour­
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able terms, and consequently American motor-cars are 
common in the streets of Danzig. The Danzigers seem at 
present to be rather divided in their attitude towards 
Poland, some following the line of uncompromising hostility, 
while others believe in co-operation and hope for changed 
conditions in the future. Although the latter are increasing 
in numbers and there has recently been an improvement 
in Polish-Danzig relations, very few Danzigers believe that 
present conditions are permanent. The visit of the Polish 
Ministers in February, 1929, seemed to create a favourable 
impression, and it took place at a time when an overture 
of this sort was capable of producing beneficial results ; 
but the status of Danzig is so much involved in larger issues 
that it is a mistake to expect any very marked change in 
mutual relations so soon after the general upheaval in these 
frontier districts. 
What the future has in store for Danzig it is difficult to 
say, but there is little doubt that economic considerations 
will play an increasing part in the destinies of the Free City. 
Statistics show that the trade of the port has risen with 
leaps and bounds since the war, and that it has become the 
chief outlet for the Polish hinterland pending the completion 
of the new Polish port of Gdynia. But it must be remem­
bered that most of the transit trade from Poland through 
Danzig consists of coal and other heavy bulk material 
from Polish Upper Silesia, which brings little benefit to 
the Danzig merchants, and that the forthcoming competition 
of Gdynia may prove to be very detrimental to Danzig's 
interests. 
The new Danzig currency is also proving to be a serious 
drawback to the people, as most goods come from Poland 
and the purchasing value of the Danzig gulden is practically 
reduced to that of the Polish zloty. Similarly, agriculture 
is at a disadvantage, as it is cheaper to buy Polish produce 
than to rely on that of the local producer. Although 
Danzig is essentially German, it is a city with well-defined 
character of its own, and there are signs of foundations 
for a Danziger nationality. Tradition can do a good deal 
in this direction, especially in a city well endowed with 
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historical buildings representative of a period of former 
glory and prestige, but it is questionable whether this factor 
can make sufficient headway in an age when economic 
considerations play so important a part in national 
policies. 
It seems that the most important question for Danzig, 
under present conditions, is the future relationship of the 
port to the new port of Gdynia. I visited Gdynia in the 
most severe winter that Europe has experienced for a very 
great number of years, and I saw the port under quite 
abnormal conditions. Both the Outer and Inner Basins 
were frozen, work was almost at a standstill, and sea com­
munications were suspended ; but the Poles may derive 
some consolation from the fact that every other port in 
the Baltic was in the same position at that time. 
Gdynia is a vast undertaking, which receives the unstinted 
praise even of the Germans and Danzigers. Whatever may 
be the political motives behind this remarkable achieve­
ment, and whatever may be the future prospects of this 
monument to Polish enterprise and endeavour, the Poles 
have shown that no effort has been spared on their part to 
turn to the best account the newly acquired territory 
giving them access to the sea. A further proof of this 
is to be found in the construction of the new railway from 
Upper Silesia through Bydgoszcz to the new port, which 
will bring the coalfields within comparatively easy reach 
of sea communication. But the pure materialist will not 
see Gdynia in the light that the Pole sees it. To him this 
new port on the shores of the Baltic is not a mere construction 
of ironwork and masonry ; it represents the ideal of Poland 
as a sea Power, and it is this ideal that makes Gdynia the 
most cherished possession of Poland to-day. 
But the question arises whether Poland's export trade 
will develop to a sufficient extent to maintain prosperity 
both in Danzig and Gdynia. If this trade does increase 
in accordance with Polish expectations, it may then be 
anticipated that the one port will become the complement 
of the other. But, if on the other hand, there is not sufficient 
trade for both ports, it may reasonably be concluded that 
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Danzig will be the one to suffer. It is only natural that 
the Poles should concentrate their efforts on the trade of 
Gdynia rather than that of Danzig, but it is a mistake 
to lose sight of the fact that a serious diminution in Danzig's 
trade returns would not only bind Danzig closer than ever 
to Germany, but would give the Free City further reason 
to complain of her present status. 
In Poland I was much impressed with the great optimism 
regarding the future outcome of the economic policy adopted 
for the exploitation of the new districts acquired under 
the Treaty of Versailles ; but the Poles would be wise to 
satisfy themselves that the methods pursued are sound 
on economic grounds, apart altogether from political con­
siderations. Economic idealism is a dangerous thing, and 
when blended with political idealism it needs a strong 
restraining influence. 
The Poles maintain that the harbour of Danzig is unable 
to meet the demands of their increasing export trade, and 
that in order to adapt it to the increased volume of traffic 
it would be necessary to build a new harbour in the Free 
City. The question, therefore, arose whether it would be 
better to build a new harbour at Danzig jointly with the 
Free City, or only to participate in the modernization of 
the existing port, and to spend the balance on the construc­
tion of a purely Polish harbour at Gdynia. Although 
Danzig is situated at the mouth of the Vistula with direct 
communication with Poland and her waterways, and already 
possessed the necessary buildings and institutions, the Poles 
decided in favour of the Gdynia project with all the new 
construction work that it entailed. While it is impossible 
to say that this decision was influenced solely by economic 
considerations, the Poles have formed a comprehensive 
port scheme on the contention that Poland's future lies on 
the security of her outlets to the sea, which must be estab­
lished on a firm economic basis by the development of the 
port system Danzig-Gdynia-Tczew. When the time comes 
for the development of the Polish waterways, the Poles 
intend to face the problem of Tczew and a canal to the sea ; 
for only when a third outlet through Tczew has been secured 
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will it be possible to take full advantage of the Vistula as 
a means of communication. 
I now propose to give some account of the actual Corridor 
controversy, stating the case put forward by the Poles 
in defence of the present settlement and the arguments 
of the Germans in favour of a revision of their frontiers 
with Poland. Both cases are stated with vehemence, and 
much importance is attached to unessential points and 
insignificant details, but in my endeavour to be scrupulously 
fair to both sides I will omit such contentions as have no 
direct bearing on the fundamental issue. The case may be 
divided into two headings, that of principle and that of 
detail. While the former deals with Poland's access to 
the sea and the consequent severance of East Prussia from 
the mainland of the Reich, the latter takes into consideration 
the respective claims on historic, ethnographic, and economic 
grounds. 
The Poles, who are supported by those elements that 
maintain that the Versailles status quo must stand, contend 
that there is no ' Corridor Question ' ; but that the province 
of Pomorze (the Corridor less Danzig) is an integral part 
of Poland historically and ethnographically, with a Polish 
majority all the way to the coast. They argue that an 
outlet to the sea is vital for Poland ; and that the vital 
needs of a nation of nearly 30 million people cannot be 
sacrificed for the convenience of 2 million East Prussians, 
who are thereby separated from the rest of Germany. 
East Prussia, they say, has preserved a certain specific 
character which clearly distinguishes her from the rest 
of Germany, and makes her practically a German colony. 
Moreover, the Poles claim that it is not possible to revise 
the Treaty of Versailles without causing new difficulties, 
perhaps greater than those already existing, and shaking 
the foundations of the status quo in Europe generally. 
Apart altogether from their claims to the Corridor, they 
fear that any alteration of the status quo in one locality 
would invite similar claims in other regions and, therefore, 
they consistently refuse to consider any such proposal on 
principle. It is also maintained that the Peace Treaties 
are not subject to revision in matters of territorial settle-
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merits, as Article XIX of the Covenant only provides for 
revision in cases where the provisions of a treaty cannot be 
executed,1 and that in this case the provisions have been 
executed in actual fact. 
In reply to the claim that this part of West Prussia 
should be restored to Germany, the Poles contend that 
the Corridor would still exist only in another form ; it 
would merely be turned round so as to run from east to 
west instead of from north to south, and this would cut off 
Poland from the sea, making Polish commerce entirely 
dependent on German goodwill. They further reject any 
suggestion that they should negotiate with Germany for 
a revision of their frontiers in exchange for German friend­
ship as an insult to their prestige. While the Polish Cor­
ridor separating East Prussia from the rest of the Reich 
leaves German maritime communications free, the Poles urge 
that a German Corridor would cut off Poland from free 
communication with the world. In other words, they see 
two alternatives, viz., a Polish Corridor across the com­
munications of a province which retains free access to the 
sea ; or a German Corridor, which stands across the only 
outlet of a nation to the world's maritime routes. In 
Polish eyes, there is no question of which of the two countries 
has the stronger claim, but the whole world is not with 
them. 
On turning to the more detailed aspect of the case, one 
is almost overwhelmed by a mass of literature, from which 
certain important facts stand out clearly, especially the 
historic, ethnographic, and economic contentions. 
Historically, the Poles claim that Pomorze, or Polish 
Pomerania, has always been a Slav country, which was 
incorporated in the kingdom of the Polish King Boleslav I 
at the beginning of the eleventh century; and that 
thereafter, for several centuries, it was either an integral 
part of Poland or was ruled by its own sovereign princes 
resident at Danzig. In 1308 the Teutonic Order took 
possession of Pomorze and ruled there for 146 years until 
1 Article XIX reads as follows : ' The Assembly may from time 
to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of 
treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of 
international conditions whose continuance might endanger the 
peace of the world.' 
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1454, when the province once more became a part of Poland. 
This state of affairs lasted without interruption until the 
First Partition of 1772, which means that for 318 years 
Poland had her own sea-coast until Frederick II took 
possession of Pomorze and united it with Prussia in 1772. 
It was then not until 1920 that, by the Treaty of Versailles, 
the province was given back to Poland ; and the Poles 
complain that they received it in part only, as the territory 
allotted to them did not represent more than two-thirds 
of the ancient Polish Pomerania. The Poles, therefore, 
claim that Pomorze was a part of Poland for more than 
six centuries (from the beginning of the eleventh century 
till 1772, except for the interval between 1308 and 1454), 
while Prussian rule only lasted 146 years. 
Ethnographically, the Polish claim is based on the 
grounds that Pomorze is basically Polish in population ; 
that the Kashubs, who inhabit the northern districts of 
the province, are also of Polish origin and of the same 
religion ; and that, in spite of the Prussian policy of Ger­
manizing Pomerania, the population has preserved its 
Polish character intact. It is claimed that out of a popu­
lation of 800,000 only 12 per cent represent the German 
element, while 88 per cent are Poles. Moreover, the Poles 
state that from 1871 to 1918—the duration of the German 
Empire—five of the eighteen districts of Pomerania (now 
the Corridor) were continually and only represented in the 
Reichstag by Polish deputies ; and that in the elections 
for the Polish Seym in 1922 only 15 per cent of the total 
votes recorded were entered on the German list. 
Economically, Poland maintains that the Corridor, 
together with Danzig, does not only occupy her only sea-
coast, but also the mouth of her only big river. The Vistula 
is the backbone of Poland ; her old capital, Krakow, her 
new capital, Warsaw, and her only port, Danzig (Gdynia 
is still under construction), are all situated on the banks 
of the Vistula. She argues that, if she were to be deprived 
of Danzig and her 76 kilometres of sea-coast, it would be 
the equivalent to taking away from Germany the whole 
1,488 kilometres of coast from Emden to Konigsberg, with 
two of the most important ports in the world, Bremen and 
Hamburg, her ports of secondary importance, such as 
Stettin and Konigsberg, and about sixty smaller ports. 
The Poles even claim that the loss of Danzig alone would 
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mean as much as to cut off England from access to the 
sea, while they scorn the German suggestion that their 
communications with the overseas world could be well 
maintained by special facilities through the German ports, 
as is the case with other European countries like Czecho­
slovakia. 
With regard to East Prussia, the Poles contend that 
in the thirteenth century the Teutonic Order began conquest 
and colonization of what was then Prussia (the present 
East Prussia), which in 1525 became a secular duchy and 
a fief of the Polish Crown ; and that in 1657 ^ acquired 
sovereign rights, although a part of it was for over 300 
years an integral part of Poland. This territory, they say, 
never belonged to the ancient German Empire which 
ceased to exist in 1806, but remained outside as a colony, 
and owing to its colonial character was excluded from the 
' Deutscher Bund ' which existed from 1815 to 1866. It 
was only in 1867 that East Prussia was incorporated in 
the ' Nord-Deutscher Bund', and in 1871 that it became 
an integral part of the German Reich. On these grounds 
the Poles argue that East Prussia's colonial character was 
inherited, and was not imposed upon her by Poland's 
access to the sea, and that it is not the first time that she 
has been separated from Brandenburg Prussia by the 
territory of Poland. East Prussia's decline in prosperity 
in recent years is attributed to the German customs barrier 
cutting off Konigsberg from its natural hinterland of Poland, 
and the idea that the Corridor settlement has anything 
to do with it is regarded in Poland as quite ridiculous. 
In the matter of communications between the Reich and 
East Prussia, the Poles maintain that before the war the 
greater part of the traffic was sea-borne, but that transit 
across the Corridor has been so much facilitated that 
certain goods, which formerly used to be transported by 
sea, are now being sent by the Polish railways owing to 
the favourable tariffs. 
In order to support their claim to an access to the sea, 
the Poles quote England as having 100 per cent of sea 
frontier, Spain about 66 per cent, France and Italy 50 
per cent, Germany about 25 per cent, and Poland not even 
2 per cent. England, France, and Spain border on the 
ocean, the latter two countries bordering on the Mediter­
ranean as well; Germany has access to the ocean by the 
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North Sea, is the strongest country on the Baltic, and 
possesses Stettin, the largest port on that sea. A small 
country such as Finland, having a long coastline with twenty-
three ports on the gulfs of the Baltic, obtained by the 
Peace Treaty of Tartu the Petsamo Corridor with access 
to another sea, the Arctic Ocean. Even Lithuania has 
70 kilometres of coastline and 115 kilometres of the Gulf 
of Courland. Taking these facts into consideration, the 
Poles cannot understand anyone seriously denying them 
their own free access to the sea, especially when a country 
like Bulgaria possesses two ports. 
The Germans, on the other hand, who have the backing 
of those elements who claim to regard the position from a 
practical and more materialistic point of view, maintain that 
the Corridor tears the German State asunder and isolates 
East Prussia, and that it is not even necessary to secure 
Poland's access to the sea. Access to the sea, they say, 
is an economic requirement, while the Corridor is a chapter 
in the history of Polish political imperialism. They claim 
that a Polish German understanding could provide Poland 
with much more comprehensive and advantageous access 
to the sea than that of the narrow and non-centrally situated 
Corridor. Such ports as Stettin, Danzig, and Konigsberg 
could be placed at the disposal of Poland, who could receive 
privileges in these ports and guarantees of communications 
with them, and would thus be economically better off than 
under present conditions. Moreover, the Germans contest 
the claim of the importance of the Vistula to Poland, 
because four-fifths of its course are practically unnavigable, 
and the remaining fifth, which was regulated by Prussia 
and rendered navigable for ships up to 400 tons, has been 
so neglected since it came under Polish ownership that it 
is again choked with sandbanks. But even if the Vistula 
does possess the importance assigned to it by Poland, 
there are other European countries that are ethnographically 
landlocked. Czechoslovakia, with more highly developed 
industries and export markets far more vital to the country 
than those of Poland, sends her exports through Germany 
down the Elbe. The same principle applies to Austria, 
Hungary and Switzerland; and although Poland may 
exceed these countries in population, she certainly does 
not do so in industrial output. 
Germany claims that East Prussia belonged to the Prussian 
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State, not as a colony, but as an integral member, and 
had been governed from Berlin since 1656 in common with 
Brandenburg and Pomerania. As far as the question of 
treaty revision is concerned, the Germans read Article XIX 
of the Covenant very differently from the Poles, and lay 
great stress on the phrase ' international conditions whose 
continuance might endanger the peace of the world \ In 
this contention they have considerable support in England 
and America, but not in France or those Northern countries 
whose interests are more or less bound up in the strength 
of Poland. What the Poles'call a German Corridor the 
Germans view as their territorial unity being left intact, 
while they draw attention to the fact that, if Polish traffic 
were accorded privileged rights of transit to the coast, 
Poland would suffer no territorial injury as her geographical 
unity would remain unimpaired. Whereas the Poles claim 
that the Transit Convention meets Germany's needs as 
regards communications between East Prussia and the rest 
of Germany, the Germans naturally reply that even the 
most ideal agreement on this question can never compen­
sate for the severe damage arising out of the separation 
by foreign territory of East Prussia from the rest of the 
country. 
Historically, the Germans state that the Polish contentions 
are not in accordance with fact. They contend that the 
Corridor was originally inhabited by Germanic tribes, who, 
in the course of the general migrations, were replaced by 
Slavs. These Slavs, however, were not Poles, but Pomer­
anians, who are now represented by the race known as 
Kashubs. From the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, 
native princes ruled in the territories of the Pomeranians, 
who frequently waged war among themselves and with 
the neighbouring Poles, always anxious to extend their 
dominion over Pomeranian territory, and the mouth of the 
Vistula in particular. There was never any question of 
the annexation, or even vassalage, of Pomorze 1 to the king­
dom of Poland. Indeed, it was not until the twelfth 
century that a tributary relation with Poland was acknow­
ledged, and this only lasted till it was cast aside by Duke 
Swantopolk of Pomerellia in 1220. On the death of the 
last Pomerellian duke, a war of succession broke out between 
1 Known also as Pomerellia. 
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the various relations of the extinct dynasty, among whom 
were the Germanized dukes of West Pomerania, the German 
Margraves of Brandenburg, and Przemislaus of Poland. 
On the death of Przemislaus in 1296, the Polish throne was 
seized by Ladislaus Lokietek, who, being dethroned shortly 
afterwards, could not make good his claim to Pomerellia 
against the Brandenburgers, but he instructed his vice-
regent in Danzig to appeal for help to the Teutonic Order. 
The Knights defeated the Brandenburgers, but, as Ladislaus 
did not refund the expenses of the campaign as promised, 
Danzig and the whole of Pomerellia were handed over to 
the Order in 1308. The Germans, therefore, claim that 
till 1308 Pomerellia was never a Polish possession, but 
an independent country governed by its own non-Polish 
rulers. 
But it is not only to the Polish claim to Pomerellia from 
1000 to 1308 that the Germans take great exception, but 
also to their claim for the later period from 1454 to 1569. 
They say that West Prussia and the contiguous part of 
Pomerellia (the Corridor of to-day) were not incorporated 
with Poland in 1454, but only associated with it in a personal 
union under the Polish kings, otherwise maintaining their 
political independence. They had their own Parliament 
and laws ; German, not Polish, was the official language ; 
and Poles, as foreigners, were not eligible for ecclesiastical 
or temporal offices. This independence was acknowledged 
by the kings of Poland in the Charter of Union of 1454. 
Although the Peace of Thorn in 1466 put an end to the resist­
ance of the Teutonic Order, it also consummated the personal 
union of Pomerellia to the Polish Crown, which was main­
tained until 1569. It was only then that West Prussia 
and Pomerellia were reduced to the status of a Polish 
province. The Germans, therefore, claim that Pomerellia 
was Polish only for 200 years (from 1569 to 1772), while 
it was under German sovereignty for 305 years (from 1308 
to 1466 and from 1772 to 1919). The Polish claim that 
Pomerellia was a part of Poland for over six centuries is 
dismissed as fantastic. 
The Germans also support their historical facts by 
the contention that Pomerellia greatly benefited materially 
under the German rule, and became extensively Germanized, 
while at the First Partition it was inhabited by a mixed 
population, the majority of which was probably German, 
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but certainly not Polish, as the Slavs of the district are 
mainly Kashubian.1 
Ethnographically, the Germans contend that, if the 
population of Pomerellia is taken as a whole, it is essential 
to include the Free City of Danzig ; for, as the capital 
of West Prussia, Danzig was formerly the chief town of 
the Corridor territory. According to the German census 
of 1910, there were in the seventeen ' circles ' (which have 
now become Polish), including the Free City, 651,855 Ger­
mans, 445,235 Poles, and 91,019 Kashubs—or 206,620 more 
Germans than Poles, 560,836 more Germans than Kashubs, 
and 115,601 more Germans than Poles and Kashubs together. 
These figures do not support a strong Polish majority, but 
the reverse ; and the balance against Poland is much heavier 
if the separate identity of the Poles and Kashubs, which 
has been established both historically and ethnographically, 
is taken into account. Although speaking a language akin 
to Polish and sharing the same Catholic faith, the Kashubs 
are the remains of a particular Slav tribe inhabiting the 
northern part of the Corridor, and the Germans claim that 
Polish settlement has never reached the sea. In the 
German view, therefore, the result was a strong German 
majority for the whole Corridor before the transfer, and 
that it was only in the district of Posen that a large Polish 
majority existed. Since the Peace settlement, of course, 
the number of Germans has dwindled and that of the Poles 
increased, but that is immaterial to a fair judgment of 
the case. 
Economically, the Germans accuse the Poles of ignoring 
the effects upon a great country by cutting it in two— 
effects which are most keenly felt by East Prussia. The 
loss of districts in Eastern Germany was a severe blow to 
the economy of the Reich, as these districts had a surplus 
agricultural output, but the loss to East Prussia is much 
more serious. Prior to the war, the trade between East 
Prussia and what is now the Corridor came to nearly 
200,000 head of cattle a year, while in 1924 the figure 
was reduced to 870. This has reacted very seriously on 
agriculture, causing a migration of the rural population. 
Moreover, the entire trade of East Prussia with the ceded 
territories has suffered as well as her trade relations with 
1 This contention is supported by Professeur A. Meillet in Les 
Langues de I'Europe Nouvelle. Paris, 1928. 
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the east of Europe. In fact conditions in East Prussia, which 
is also almost cut off from the Vistula, are so bad that the 
Berlin Government has often been obliged to render assist­
ance ; and it is difficult for East Prussia to obtain private 
loans, on account of the constantly recurring Polish demands 
for annexation. Konigsberg is almost a dead city, and it 
was here that the Prussian kings were crowned. Hence, 
as the cradle of German culture, East Prussia makes a 
strong sentimental appeal to all Germans. 
In the foregoing statements of the two respective cases 
I have endeavoured to give fair statements, entirely free 
from prejudice, but space does not permit me to go much 
into details. Readers, I know, like authors to provide 
them with conclusions, but in this case I think it is better 
that each reader should form his own opinion for himself. 
In doing so, however, it would be as well to bear in mind one 
or two rather important considerations, and to regard the 
whole subject from the European standpoint as well as 
from the local point of view. 
In recent years Poland has been carrying out an intensive 
policy of ' Polonization ' in all the districts of the Corridor 
where there was previously a considerable German population, 
and every year the Polish majority is being increased by 
the departure of dissatisfied Germans and the arrival of 
more Poles, chiefly from Galicia. On the economic side 
Polish policy has found expression in the building of the 
new port ot Gdynia and the construction of a new railway 
system connecting it with the Upper Silesian coalfields ; and 
by this means the Poles hope greatly to increase their export 
of coal at very low prices, especially to the Baltic countries. 
With an export price of 27 zloty, as compared with the home 
price of 54 zloty, Poland is pursuing a dumping policy 
which must seriously affect the British coal industry. 
Undoubtedly the Polish coal industry incurs great loss 
from this non-paying export, which cannot be balanced 
by high prices at home, but the Polish Government provides 
compensation. Apart from favourable lease agreements with 
the Upper Silesian coal concerns, which further the interests 
of the port of Gdynia, the special railway rates for coal 
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are so low as to be equivalent to an export bounty. The 
special rate per ton from the pithead to Gdynia is a little 
over a third of the inland rate for the same distance, while 
the coal concerns in German Upper Silesia have to pay 
nearly two-thirds more freight charges from Gleiwitz to 
Stettin than those charged by the Poles from Polish Upper 
Silesia to Danzig or Gdynia. Although this policy is partly 
due to an effort to improve the economic position of the 
Polish State by helping the coal industry, which cannot 
live on home consumption, there is behind it the same 
political motive that inspires most Polish efforts in this 
area, e.g. the consolidation of the Corridor, and its justi­
fication in the eyes of the world as a political and economic 
necessity to Poland. Indeed, the outstanding feature of 
the present situation is that every year the Corridor is 
becoming more Polish owing to the determined efforts of 
the Poles to make it so. 
The Germans, on the other hand, concentrate their 
attention on the position of their minority and their rights 
under the Minority Treaty ; and they do everything in 
their power to resist the attempt of the Poles to strengthen 
their position by ' Polonizing' the population of these 
districts. It is estimated that about 800,000 Germans 
have left the country since the foundation of the Polish 
Republic, and that the German minority in Poland alto­
gether amounts to between 1,100,000 and 1,200,000 people. 
But the chief aim of German policy is directed to the future, 
when the German Government finds an opportune moment 
to raise the whole question of the Corridor as an international 
issue. While the Poles are doing everything to avoid any 
discussion of the matter or to postpone it as long as possible, 
the Germans wish to hurry it on owing to the energetic 
efforts of the Poles to improve their ethnographic and 
economic position. During my recent visit to Germany 
and Poland I gained the definite impression that the late 
Herr Stresemann intended to raise this question as soon 
after the evacuation of the Rhineland as was practicable, 
which no doubt accounts largely for the Polish reluctance 
to see the Allied troops leave the Rhine. 
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Meanwhile, the Polish Corridor has produced a marked 
degree of mutual antagonism between Germany and Poland. 
The Germans are absolutely determined that their country 
must cease to be cut in two by a strip of Polish territory, 
isolating East Prussia. The Poles are equally determined 
that the status quo of the Treaty of Versailles must stand. 
While in Germany meetings are held all over the country 
protesting in the most vehement terms against the injustice 
of the Corridor settlement, in Poland there is the most 
violent opposition to any suggestion that the Peace Treaty 
should be revised. The Poles openly declare that they will 
fight rather than be deprived of what they regard to be 
an integral part of Poland, and even old men state their 
intention of joining the colours in the event of any threat 
to the province of Pomorze. I cannot stress too strongly 
the seriousness of the present position in this part of Eastern 
Europe, where racial feeling runs high, where nationalism 
is very strong, and calm contemplation is not regarded 
as a virtue. At present compromise is quite out of the 
question. Neither side will consider anything stopping 
short of its full claims. It has been suggested that an 
alternative solution might be found, but the Poles will 
not listen to any proposals, and the Germans stand by their 
suggestion at Versailles that the Poles could receive port 
facilities at the German ports of Danzig, Stettin, and Konigs­
berg. In no European situation is the deadlock more 
complete. 
Among neutral observers, who have no material interests 
at stake and can view the question impartially, there are 
two schools of thought, those who regard the Treaty of 
Versailles as a res immutabilis and believe that Poland's 
claims should be upheld at all costs, and those who are 
of the opinion that the present situation can only lead to 
war. In a Memorandum submitted to President Wilson 
at the end of 1918 and to the Peace Conference in Paris in 
1919, Roman Dmowski, the leader of the Polish National 
Committee, stated: ' If East Prussia is to remain an 
integral part of German territory then . . . West Prussia 
must also remain in Germany's possession. If East Prussia 
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remains in German hands as an isolated Prussian possession, 
cut off from the main body of the country by the . . . dis­
tricts lying in between, it will be a source of unending strife 
between Poland and Germany.' But it is obvious that 
Dmowski drew from this the conclusion that East Prussia 
should also be allotted to Poland, and this view is still 
prevalent in Poland to-day. After all, there are two sides 
to every question. 
There is, however, a sinister side of all this wrangling 
over territory on the banks of the Vistula, and if the local 
situation between Germany and Poland is serious in itself, 
much more serious is the indisputable fact that the Corridor 
has joined the hands of Germany and Russia, and placed 
Poland between two strong and unfriendly states. Whether 
one supports the German claims or the Polish arguments, 
and whether one cares to admit it or not, no one to-day 
can shut his eyes to the German policy of drawing nearer 
to Russia, which is the direct outcome of the settlement 
of Versailles in Eastern Europe. This is a question which 
Europe will neglect at her peril, and in which the future 
peace of the nations depends. Already there has taken 
place over this very question that grouping of the Powers 
which preceded the Great War, and the symptoms of the 
political disease in that part of Europe are such as to give 
rise to grave apprehension. France, Belgium, Denmark, 
and the Baltic countries support Poland as a defence 
against Russia or Germany, while opinion in England is 
very divided at present. Italy is an unknown quantity, 
but it must never be forgotten that there will surely come 
a time in the programme of Mussolini when the surplus 
population of Italy must find room for itself in the world. 
As in the case of the Vilna question, the status quo is involved, 
and this issue cannot but make Europe divided contrary to 
her own interests. Although the outlook at present is dark, 
feelings on both sides may be very different ten years hence, 
and it is possible that economic realities1 will eventually 
overcome the political and psychological factors which now 
1 An important German-Polish Financial Agreement was signed 
in October, 1929. 
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predominate, but meanwhile we must regard the Corridor 
question in a European sense, as a matter that affects 
European relationships generally, and on which the tran­
quillity of Eastern, if not the whole of, Europe depends. 
The possibility of a Russo-German combination makes 
the Corridor the greatest danger spot of Europe to-day, 
and it is interesting to know that the late Marshal Foch, 
shortly before his death, forecast that this area would be 
the scene of the next war. I have it on the best authority 
that the Marshal was sitting at his desk with a map of 
Europe spread out before him. He was discussing various 
questions with one whose statements are unquestionable ; 
and, when the subject of the next war cropped up, Foch 
at once took his pipe out of his mouth and pointed to the 
narrow strip of territory giving Poland access to the Baltic : 
' There ', he said, ' lies the root of the next war.' 
CHAPTER IX 
POWERS AND POLICIES 
HAVING described the new or restored states which have a direct interest in the Baltic, it is now necessary to turn to the policies adopted by these 
countries as protection against the possible aggression of 
their former dominating Powers, Germany and Russia. 
General Baltic policy in view of a possible Russo-German 
combination must also be considered. 
Sweden, a wealthy country which has long enjoyed the 
blessings and profits of peace, deprecates any policy that 
might conceivably involve her in difficulties with Russia, 
while she would be very reluctant to impair her good relations 
of long standing with Germany. Although the Swedes 
still maintain their excellent military qualities and possess 
some of the best gun factories in the world, Swedish 
neutrality is almost a time-honoured axiom of Swedish 
policy, and the fact that political elements, largely Socialist, 
usually outweigh the military influence in the country tends 
to confirm the evidence of recent history, that Sweden 
prefers a prosperous neutrality to the cost and hazards of 
war. Norway, protected by Sweden, takes little part in 
international questions, and wisely prefers to follow a policy 
of independent detachment. Denmark, on the other hand, 
forms the ' Gate of the Baltic ', so to speak, and would be 
at the mercy of any form of aggression resulting from a 
Russo-German combination, unless she could fall back on 
the support of one of the greater Powers. The natural 
inclination of the Danes is to lean towards Great Britain, 
and in the event of trouble it is more than likely that they 
would place themselves unconditionally under British control 
and protection. Moreover, the geographical position of 
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Denmark is such that she favours a strong Poland on the 
eastern frontier of Germany; so that the Danes cannot 
but regard a combined policy of Germany and Russia with 
the strongest disapproval, although they prefer to keep 
outside the sphere of political entanglements. 
In the Baltic States there is still strong support for a 
' Baltic League ', based on the existing treaty between 
Estonia and Latvia, and it is hoped by Baltic politicians, 
especially in Estonia, to draw Finland into this alliance. 
Some favour a more comprehensive union including Poland 
and other countries having a common frontier with Russia, 
while others go so far as to advocate the inclusion of 
Roumania in order to form a continuous defensive bloc 
stretching from the Arctic Ocean in the north to the Black 
Sea in the south. Although such a policy undoubtedly has 
its advantages for the actual Baltic States themselves, there 
are difficulties and disadvantages, if not indeed dangers, 
in the realization of such a project. As such an alliance 
would be directed against Russia, there is little doubt that 
Russia would exploit such a grouping to her own advantage ; 
and, as there would be so many weak links in the chain 
of defence that the stronger states would suffer for the 
shortcomings of the weaker, it seems that any policy likely 
to be provocative should be avoided. At present Russian 
aggression in this quarter is rather out of the question, and 
this being so, it seems better to leave well alone. Moreover, 
the present relationships between Poland and Lithuania 
prevent co-operation in that quarter. While neither 
Estonia nor Latvia, nor any Baltic country for that matter, 
could ally herself to Lithuania without incurring the hostility 
of Poland, the exclusion of Lithuania would render that 
country an easy prey to the first grabber, with the serious 
consequences that would undoubtedly follow. But as it 
is not in the interests of the Scandinavian nations or Finland 
to fall in with such a policy, the net result is that at present 
the Baltic League is not likely to extend beyond the 
Estonian-Latvian Treaty. Yet it must be admitted that 
these Baltic countries, although enjoying the good-will of 
the Great Powers and membership of the League of Nations, 
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are in a state of the utmost uncertainty as to what support, 
if any, they could expect in the event of aggression. 
That a Russo-German entente would seriously affect 
British policy in the Baltic, which more or less harmonizes 
with that of the Baltic countries, is a foregone conclusion, 
and it is obvious that Great Britain could not tolerate the 
formation of a policy which would transform the Baltic 
from a mare apertum to a mare clausum. Nor could Great 
Britain possibly stand aside and watch the evolution of a 
policy destined to threaten the very existence of the Baltic 
States and to control at will the great timber trade of Fin­
land. As it is a matter of the utmost importance that these 
new states should not be reduced to forming a mere connect­
ing link between Germany and Russia, it is strongly advisable 
that such support as has been suggested should be given 
by one of the Great Powers which supported their inde­
pendence and made that independence possible. British 
support is indicated, partly because it would be more 
acceptable on account of the power and prestige of the 
British fleet, and partly because Great Britain has greater 
interests in the Baltic than any of the said Powers. But, 
if the British Government should hold out some encourage­
ment, and try to build up British interests in these countries, 
it is essential that the Baltic Governments should meet them 
half-way. While British interests in the Baltic are for the 
most part commercial, the strategic position of the Baltic 
States vis-d-vis Russia is a matter of importance in Anglo-
Russian strategy generally. It may be true that British 
interests with regard to Russia are concentrated rather in 
the south and east than in the north, but it may be taken 
for granted that the maintenance of the Baltic as a mare 
apertum is among Britain's more important interests, which 
is capable of being strengthened by economic and other ties. 
For this reason the Baltic Governments should lose no 
opportunity of so directing their foreign policy so as to 
encompass considerations that might make their national 
independence indispensable to Great Britain. 
Although the same principle applies to Finland, the 
situation of that country geographically gives her politically 
220 BRITAIN AND THE BALTIC 
a very independent position. There are two definite lines 
of policy open to Finland—a Scandinavian or a Baltic policy 
—but she prefers to compromise. It is of the utmost 
importance to Finland that Estonia and Latvia should 
maintain their independence, yet the Finns want a free hand 
for the future, and their best interests He in a policy of 
detachment, in keeping on friendly terms with all their 
neighbours, Russia included, and in leaning towards Scandi­
navia with a prospect of continued peace. Finland is already 
able to stand firmly on her own feet for reasons which have 
been given earlier in this narrative, and the timber trade is 
an important commercial tie between her and Great Britain, 
but there is much room for improvement in the British 
export trade to Finland, and the Finnish Government would 
be well advised to attract British capital for the internal 
development of the country. There is a marked similarity 
between the British and Finnish dislikes of external commit­
ments, and therefore a certain sympathy in policy between 
the two countries, but too much importance cannot be 
attached to the improvement of economic relations on 
which so much in the future depends. There is no doubt 
that England enjoys Finnish commercial good-will and 
financial friendship, and that there does exist in Finland 
a demand for high-class goods and a readiness to spend; 
but British firms do not exert themselves to provide for 
Finnish wants, and they do not send to the country suitable 
or sufficient representatives. In some cases they appoint 
sub-agents under Stockholm, which offends Finnish suscepti­
bilities, while in other cases men are chosen owing to their 
knowledge of the Russian language and Russian methods 
for work in a country which has just thrown off the yoke of 
Russian domination. Neither course is likely to lead to 
good results. Finnish merchants complain that British 
manufacturers expect to be approached from the Finnish 
side, and make no effort on their part to obtain a footing 
in the market. For every British commercial traveller in 
Finland there are at least ten Germans, who push their goods 
with vigour and are successful. Yet the Finns want to 
trade with us and prefer dealing with us, but are compelled 
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to buy from Germany and America in order to obtain the 
goods they want, although they would willingly pay up to 
10 per cent more to have British goods. It is the same story 
as elsewhere. The superior attitude of British firms is 
depriving them of a ready market, and they have largely 
themselves to blame for the loss of what must be added 
to the long list of lost opportunities which have characterized 
British foreign trade since the end of the Great War. But 
the fault is not entirely on our side, and it is clearly in the 
future interests of Finland to do everything in her power 
to strengthen the economic bonds between the two countries, 
and thereby to increase British interest in the security of 
her territory. 
Since the war, the Finns have come to realize that the 
English language is of great importance to them commerci­
ally, as most of their export trade is now with Great Britain 
and the United States ; and there is a strong movement on 
foot to make English the second language of the country, 
compulsory in all the schools, and to make Swedish only 
optional for all Finnish-speaking people. While this 
measure would undoubtedly be in the commercial interests 
of Finland, it would also help considerably to promote 
British export trade to the Finnish market. The adoption 
of English as the second language would itself encourage 
English people to visit a country of great natural charm 
and attraction, and tourists are the forerunners of trade; 
existing trade would be made easier on both sides; and a 
natural sympathy would exist between this country and 
another land where the English tongue was spoken. The 
Geographical Society of Finland has done a great service 
to both countries by producing an atlas, with an explanatory 
volume in English, which I believe to be unique of its kind ; 
and even a casual study of this remarkable work is sufficient 
to provide much valuable and absorbing information about 
Finland, which is so painfully lacking in this country. 
Many people will study an atlas who will not read serious 
books about a country that is little known to them, and by 
this means they absorb knowledge without any apparent 
effort. While this publication is calculated to arouse British 
222 BRITAIN AND THE BALTIC 
interest in Finland, the Finns are trying to inaugurate a 
scheme by which they can obtain scholarships for study at 
British universities. 
The Baltic peoples are realizing—what is undoubtedly 
true—that English is becoming more and more the language 
of international intercourse, and that it is taking the place 
of German in commerce just as it is supplanting French in 
social life. They are, therefore, prepared to do all they 
can with the modest means at their disposal to acquire and 
cultivate a language that can be of immense value to them 
culturally, commercially, and perhaps politically as well. 
But, in order thoroughly to establish English as a second 
language in any one of these countries, it is necessary that 
prospective teachers should have every facility to study in 
England, and to do so under the most favourable conditions. 
It is also essential that as many students as possible should 
receive such assistance as to enable them to attend courses 
at British universities. The countries in question cannot 
at present afford to subsidize this branch of education to 
any great extent, but they can contribute a certain pro­
portion of the cost; and it is surely not too much to expect 
the British Government also to contribute to a move­
ment that is clearly in the interests of British trade in 
the Baltic. Other European Powers, such as France, Ger­
many, and Italy, have spent, and are spending, considerable 
sums on the propagation of their cultures in foreign lands, 
and their efforts in this direction have met with no small 
success. Hitherto the British Government has left this 
work almost entirely in the hands of private enterprise, 
but they cannot afford to continue this policy indefinitely. 
These Baltic countries, especially Finland and Estonia, 
want to draw closer to Great Britain, and they now prefer 
the English language to any other foreign tongue. But it 
is necessary that the British Government should meet them 
half way; give them every reasonable concession and 
facility ; and remove such unnecessary restrictions as are 
keeping out of England many honest and well-intentioned 
people from the North, who wish to study England and the 
English language. If we wish to seize this opportunity of 
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drawing closer to us a country that supplies us with a large 
proportion of our timber, and another that may help us to 
re-establish our connections with the Russian market, we 
should meet their linguistic proposals with a ready response. 
If we fail to do so, other European Powers will be only too 
ready to grant the necessary concessions and facilities in 
order to increase their cultural influence. 
It may be argued that we have already too many foreign 
commitments—an argument which is usually put forward 
when any new feature of foreign policy is proposed. But 
are we, as a great world-empire with world interests and 
with our important prestige in the Baltic, prepared to for­
sake our principles of helping small nations to whose 
independence we have largely contributed, even when it is 
clearly to our own advantage to do so ? It cannot be said 
that there is any part of the world which is not our concern, 
and we would not have it otherwise. We have good friends 
in the Baltic, who may be valuable friends in years to come ; 
and it is a moral obligation as well as in our material interests 
to support them, letting it be clearly understood that they 
can rely on some degree of British assistance in accordance 
with their needs. There is no question of any definite 
commitments in the Baltic at present, but it should be made 
known that Britain's position there is such that she cannot 
view with indifference any policy likely to threaten the 
independence of any of these Baltic countries. 
With Poland the British position is somewhat different, 
and, although to some extent the political road from London 
to Warsaw runs through Paris, the more direct relations 
between Great Britain and Poland are of increasing' interest 
at the present time. On the Polish side, my impression 
is that there is a general feeling that the British public 
regard Poland as a distant state of Eastern Europe, with 
which there is little intercourse and little community of 
interest. There also seems to be a feeling that Britain 
shows little enthusiasm about a country which she helped 
to restore in the Peace Treaty. To some extent this is 
true, but it must be remembered that the great majority 
of English people take little or no interest in countries 
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outside the British Empire, and that foreign affairs only-
touch a very small section of the community, chiefly those 
who have commercial interests to consider. This state of 
affairs is certainly to be deplored, but it explains an im­
portant feature in the British attitude towards many foreign 
countries besides Poland. 
Unfortunately, Polish history and culture are little known 
in Great Britain. In Paris and Rome there are considerable 
Polish communities with a deep and wide cultural influence, 
but in London most of the Poles are of quite a different 
class, being chiefly employed on work in and around the 
docks. The result is that the British people are more or 
less deprived of acquiring valuable knowledge about a 
country with which they might have a considerable degree 
of sympathy. Furthermore, comparatively few Englishmen 
make the journey to Poland except for official or business 
purposes, and those who do so have to contend with the 
language difficulty. All this forms a serious obstacle to a 
sympathetic understanding of Poland's interests and aspira­
tions. At the same time, I have never met anyone who has 
visited Poland, and has not been impressed by what he has 
seen. The progress made in the last ten years, the work 
that has been carried out at Gdynia and the strong appeal 
of Poland's ancient cities, have always made a marked 
impression on British visitors. 
In present circumstances, it is natural that Poland should 
wish to have British political and financial support, and I 
will endeavour to make the British position clear in both 
these directions. Great Britain occupies a special position 
of her own in regard to European affairs and her interests 
are world-wide. She follows a policy of very general 
formulae—security of the British Isles from attack ; protec­
tion of imperial communications; and the promotion of 
peace. The British Government, in their endeavour to 
contribute to the maintenance of peace in Europe, have 
accepted certain obligations under the Locarno Pact and 
in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations ; 
but, by so doing, they have gone to the utmost limit in the 
matter of actual European commitments. There are many 
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states in Europe which would give a good deal to know the 
likely attitude of Great Britain in the event of their becoming 
the victims of aggression ; but I do not believe that there 
is any statesman or politician in England to-day who could 
give an answer to any one of these states, even if he were 
in a free position to do so. The fact is that the British 
Government are not prepared to anticipate events. They 
view the future with an open mind, and their attitude in 
any future crisis will be dictated solely by the circumstances 
of the case. 
The British people refuse to be involved in European 
quarrels in which they have no direct interest, and British 
commitments in Eastern Europe would not receive the 
support of the electorate. The British people will not incur 
obligations which they may in the future be unable to fulfil. 
It may, therefore, be concluded that Poland cannot expect 
political support from Great Britain, except in so far as 
both countries are bound by the League Covenant. As 
far as Great Britain is concerned, an Eastern Locarno is out 
of the question. Yet it must not be imagined that for this 
reason Poland is deprived of British sympathy and moral 
support. The Polish Legation in London has been raised 
to the status of an Embassy, with a corresponding change 
in Warsaw. Englishmen watch with the greatest interest the 
consolidation and development of the resurrected Polish 
State, and those who know the circumstances in which the 
Poles have striven to regain their former position in Europe 
show a sympathetic appreciation of a remarkable example 
of national endeavour. But, unfortunately, those possessing 
the necessary information form a very small minority of the 
British public, although this ignorance of Polish affairs is 
through no want of effort on the part of the Polish Govern­
ment. 
From the financial point of view, there is a certain reluct­
ance to invest British capital in areas where there is an 
atmosphere of discord, and there is no doubt that the 
situation with regard to Poland's frontiers forms a serious 
obstacle to investment. If Poland's future was associated 
with conditions of political tranquillity, in which only capital 
15 
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was needed to assure steady commercial and industrial 
progress, the London market would not be slow to offer 
its co-operation. But, as things are, there is still a feeling 
of uncertainty, which can only be dispelled by material 
results. 
The confidence of the London market is difficult to obtain 
and British financiers will not take the chances that are 
lightly shouldered by American financial houses ; but British 
interests are usually closely allied with British capital, and 
finance plays, perhaps, an unusually prominent part in 
British foreign policy. As far as Great Britain is concerned, 
much will depend on Poland's attitude towards her neigh­
bours. While an uncompromising attitude on the part of 
the Poles will not find favour in Great Britain, a spirit of 
' give and take ' should inspire confidence as well as interest 
in. political and financial circles. 
Polish relations with France are on quite another footing. 
In a speech delivered in Paris on the 28th January, 1926, 
M. Jules Laroche, the then newly appointed French Am­
bassador to Warsaw, stated: 
' Des que les Etats commencerent a s'evader de la con­
ception feodale et a s'orienter vers une politique europeene, 
la France et la Pologne commencerent a meler leurs destinees. 
Et quand la grande bataille diplomatique du XVIIIieme 
siecle amor9a les bouleversements qui devaient s'ensuivre, 
la diplomatie fran^aise eut vite fait de decouvrir que la 
Pologne etait un des pili&rs de l'equilibre europeen, et par 
la meme un element essentiel de la paix. 
' La Pologne, elle ne devait que tot ressentir quelles 
consequences desastreuses peut entrainer pour la liberte des 
peuples un affaiblissement de la France. C'est a la faveur 
de cet affaiblissement que peut etre commis le grand crime 
qui devait martyriser, en l'asservissant et en la depe£ant, 
une nation tout entiere.' 
In other words, France and Poland are bound together 
by necessity as well as by tradition. The French regard 
the Polish State, the stronger the better, as indispensable 
to their security, while the Poles look to France for support 
in the event of trouble. M. Gaston Doumergue, President 
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of the Republic, formulated the first principle of France's 
Polish policy as follows : ' C'est dans la pratique toujours 
plus intime de l'alliance fondee sur le respect des traites 
que la France et la Pologne trouveront les plus sures garanties 
de paix'; while M. Poincare has said, ' Nous savons que 
nous pouvons compter sur la Pologne ; la Pologne peut 
etre sure qu'elle a le droit de compter sur nous '; and M. 
Clemenceau declared, ' Nous voulons une Pologne vraiment 
forte.' On the 19th February, 1921, a treaty was signed in 
Paris which constituted a political and military alliance 
between France and Poland, and although the terms of the 
latter are not known, there is no doubt that there is a very 
close understanding between the two countries. Hence 
France plays an important role in the affairs of Eastern 
Europe, if not of the Baltic, and introduces a far-reaching 
complication with regard to Germany's orientation. Ger­
many refuses to accept the Polish Corridor, and Russia 
would welcome a weaker Poland, while France is bound by 
her policy and interests to take the opposite course. This 
is a great obstacle to a Western orientation of Germany, which 
is most desirable for the most obvious reasons. The Poles 
maintain that Germany is doing everything she can to 
loosen the bonds that bind France and Poland together, 
and, although I am not in a position to say whether this is 
the case or not, it is clear that Poland's future position 
greatly depends on France. 
The policy of France and Poland is a rigid adherence to 
the status quo established by the Treaty of Versailles, while 
Germany and Russia take the opposite view. It is on this 
vital question of the status quo—to be or not to be—that the 
whole settlement of Eastern Europe depends ; and this 
principle may well decide the issue of peace or war. Both 
Germany and Russia want the Vilna question kept open, 
as it offers opportunities to both with a view to future 
political bargainings ; and Lithuania hopes to make use of 
these bargainings to obtain what she wants. In fact, Vilna 
is wrapped up in the Corridor question, on which depends 
the settlement of Eastern Europe, which in turn is intimately 
bound up with the principle of the status quo. Hence, 
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Europe must face the question of treaty revision before 
things can settle down in Eastern Europe. As yet there 
has been no attempt to face this question on which the peace 
of Europe depends, and it is only necessary to pay a brief 
visit to Eastern Europe to realize that things cannot go on 
as they are going at present. Political situations do not 
often remain stationary. Either they improve or they get 
worse, and the situation in Eastern Europe is certainly not 
improving. I am neither a war-monger nor a pacifist, but 
I see some very ugly symptoms on the banks of the Vistula 
which Europe will ignore at her peril. Between Germany 
and Poland there is the making of a first-class crisis, which 
may come at a time when another Power in the south is 
looking about for trouble. Some months ago an influential 
European statesman told me that it was quite possible 
that the League of Nations would open the question without 
the initiative of the Powers directly concerned, but it is 
difficult to visualize this actually taking place. The ten­
dency in some neutral countries seems to be to argue that, 
as the 1920 settlement has now worked for ten years, it is 
better to leave it alone. It is the old refrain of ' wait and 
see ', sometimes quite a useful policy where tranquillity is 
assured, but distinctly dangerous where inflammable material 
is concerned. If the present Polish Government have no 
policy of aggrandizement and the Germans have no intention 
other than to seek a settlement by peaceful means, this 
does not remove the very hard ' nut that has to be cracked ' 
before these two peoples can live and work together on 
friendly terms. Moreover, it is essential that they should 
co-operate in their own interests and in those of all Europe. 
Economically, they could help each other, and, politically, 
they could work together for the consolidation and improve­
ment of Europe ; but, as things are, it is impossible to think 
of them doing either the one or the other. With Poland 
allied to France, and Great Britain little interested in what 
happens in Eastern Europe, Germany has been forced to 
seek the friendship of Russia. I do not believe for one 
moment that Germany's Russian policy is that of her own 
choosing. It has been forced upon her by the manner 
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in which Britain and France have practically left her out 
of the Locarno policy, and by her present position in Eastern 
Europe. Indeed, there are many circumstances which point 
to the fact that Germany is at present in doubt whether to 
throw in her hand with Russia or to go with the Western 
Powers. She would naturally prefer the latter, but is doubt­
ful whether she can obtain British friendship, which is the 
great determining factor. The British Government has it 
in their power to draw Germany away from Russia by offer­
ing her something more attractive, and this could be done 
by introducing some reality into our Locarno policy with 
regard to Germany, and by trying to bring Anglo-German" 
relations as much as possible into line with Anglo-French 
relations. Britain can also do much to improve the position 
between Germany and France. 
The first step towards the consummation of Locarno is 
the evacuation of the Rhineland, and Mr. MacDonald's 
Government have been wise to take the lead in this matter. 
With British and Belgian troops cleared out of the Rhine-
land, it would indeed be difficult for France to remain without 
prejudicing herself in the eyes of all those who are really 
working for a peaceful settlement. The military occupation 
has been the greatest obstacle to the progress of Western 
Europe on peaceful lines, and the gateway of Locarno is 
to be found at the bridge-heads of the Rhine. Indeed, it 
cannot be said that the war period has really come to an 
end until the last Allied soldier has left German soil. Then, 
and only then, will Europe be able to return to normal 
conditions of peace, and will it be possible to establish 
normal friendly relations between Germany and her late 
enemies. As long as the Rhineland occupation continued, 
Locarno remained a farce. Germany could not be expected 
to have any confidence in Britain's military obligations under 
the Locarno Treaty, as long as British troops remained on 
German territory in partnership with those of France, her 
possible aggressor. 
Although an Anglo-German rapprochement is by no means 
capable of early attainment, a policy directed towards this 
end would do much to improve things all round. It would 
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improve the prospect of reaching a position in which London 
had the same ties of friendship with Berlin as with Paris ; 
it would tend to bring together the three Great Powers, 
Great Britain, France, and Germany, as a solid nucleus of 
European stability founded on mutual interests ; and it 
would introduce British influence as a beneficial factor in 
the settlement of Eastern Europe. If the Locarno policy 
is going to succeed, it is essential that Anglo-German relations 
should eventually become as good as Anglo-French relations, 
even if the latter were to suffer a little in the process ; but 
it must be remembered that France's full participation in 
the final settlement of Europe is a fundamental necessity. 
Franco-German relations, which would complete the Locarno 
triangle, are a difficult proposition owing to the close 
proximity of these two military Powers, and because of the 
fundamental differences in their national characters. Yet, 
there is good reason to hope that economic interests will 
gradually bring them closer and closer together, and that 
British policy may prove a determining factor in the process. 
Of all the attempts that have been made since 1918 to 
ensure a peaceful Europe, Locarno is the only measure which 
provides any tangible guarantees for the future. The 
Locarno Treaties are based on reality and provide definite 
military commitments on the part of the guarantor Powers. 
In the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee 1 between Germany, 
Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, otherwise known 
as the Rhineland Pact, the contracting parties collectively 
and severally guaranteed the inviolability of Germany's 
existing western frontiers and the observance of the 
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles regarding the demili­
tarized zone. Germany and Belgium, and Germany and 
France, mutually undertook that they would ' in no case 
attack or invade each other or resort to war against each 
other ' except in the case of legitimate defence against 
violations of the above undertaking, ' flagrant breach ' of 
the provisions regarding the demilitarized zone, action under 
Article XVI of the Covenant, or under Article XV, para. 7, 
if directed against the state which was the first to attack. 
1 Vide Appendix. 
POWERS AND POLICIES 231 
They agreed to settle all disputes by arbitration or concilia­
tion, as provided in the separate treaties for that purpose. 
In case of ' flagrant violations' of these undertakings, the 
contracting parties would ' immediately come to the assist­
ance ' of the party injured ; in doubtful cases, the Council 
of the League should decide whether the violation had been 
committed; and the Council should also give a decision 
even in ' flagrant' cases. Great Britain and Italy 
guaranteed these stipulations, their guarantee becoming 
effective if one party refused to submit a dispute to peaceful 
settlement, or to accept an arbitral award, and attacked 
the other party, or violated the demilitarized zone ; in the 
absence of such aggravation, the Council of the League 
should decide on the appropriate action. 
While other attempts to eliminate the possibilities of war 
in Europe rest chiefly on sentiment and public opinion of 
the moment, Locarno has behind it the material power of 
modern armies. It is, therefore, a solid foundation on which 
to build. But, if the full value of this Pact is to be realized, 
its policy must not be confined to times of emergency. It 
should also animate the peaceful relations of the signatory 
Powers towards one another. Locarno must become an 
integral part of European political life, and the achievement 
of this end lies largely with Great Britain. British initiative, 
as shown in the evacuation of the Rhineland, must lead the 
way towards a real Locarno. 
In these comparatively early post-war days, Europe is 
living in an atmosphere of political artificiality and false 
values, in which Locarno stands out as the only solid and 
statesmanlike guarantee of peace. There are important 
elements working for peace in a practical and far-sighted 
manner, but they are almost overwhelmed by a voluminous 
mass of international nonsense, arising out of the preachings 
of doctrinaire professors and the uninterrupted gabblings 
of irresponsible peace societies. The number of these latter 
bodies is legion, but the result of their endeavours is merely 
to hamper, if not to destroy, the sincere efforts of experts 
who know the subject with which they are dealing. All 
voice their notions in a multitude of conferences which lead 
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to nothing; even sensible men and women pin their faith 
to ideals inconsistent with human nature ; and there exists 
a form of ' sloppy' internationalism, blind to the material 
interests of nations which are the only possible founda­
tions of a lasting peace. Indeed, there is a form of 
internationalism which professes to further the interests of 
peace, but is in reality playing into the hands of Moscow. 
Communism, and all that is rotten in politics to-day, 
seeks the abolition of all national sentiments, and there is 
no more favourable condition for the dissemination of 
political evil than amongst people who cling loosely to their 
nationality. But there is an aspect which is even more 
detrimental still to the interests of peace. Many of the 
so-called pacifist societies are definitely working under the 
orders of Moscow, and are exploiting genuine international 
peace effort in order to spread Communism under the 
camouflage of international friendship. In these days it is 
very necessary to distinguish between the true and the false, 
and to remember that there are few forms of internationalism 
in Europe which can really stand the light of day. Nor is 
it desirable that the peoples of Europe should lose their 
national characters and become merged into one mass 
population. It is the individuality of the nations that has 
made Europe what she is to-day, and nationalism is one of 
the most cherished possessions of the human race. Any 
attempt to destroy this would be to invite a serious calamity 
to western civilization. Many of the pacifist societies do 
all they can to stamp out national patriotism, and by so 
doing prove that a common-sense peace is not their ambition. 
Only loyal Englishmen, patriotic Frenchmen, true Germans, 
and Italians who love their country, can produce a Europe 
that is held together by the mutual interests of them all. It is 
easy to say quite sincerely' I will never do it again but con­
ditions change and the crime is repeated ; but, if the certain 
consequences of ' doing it again ' continually stare one in the 
face, repetition is much less likely. Hence, all those who 
are really working for peace must see to it that Locarno is 
developed to the fullest extent of reality. Peace can only 
be reached through strictly practical channels, and when it 
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has become the greatest material interest of all nations, 
collectively as well as individually. All must therefore work 
for the harmonizing of individual interests, so that nations 
may prosper to the benefit, and not at the expense, of their 
neighbours. When the time comes that the prosperity of 
each nation is welcomed by all Europe, peace may be 
regarded as in sight, but not before. 
Much has been said in recent years about the new Europe, 
the new diplomacy, and the new order of things ; but what 
is the essence of all this novelty that is supposed to have 
invaded the world since the war ? A great catastrophe 
undoubtedly makes its impression on nations and people, 
but it does not change their whole nature. The war has 
brought about a change in methods, but the principles of 
diplomacy and politics remain the same. Europe has 
changed her shape, but she is still the same Europe and may 
quite possibly regain her old shape again. It is utter 
nonsense to imagine that the natural post-war desire for 
peace will override differences of material interest between 
the nations. The old order of things still remains with us, 
with the only difference that it is enshrouded in an artificial 
casing of idealistic dreams which will remain dreams until 
they vanish into thin air. Although for some this may be 
an unpalatable mouthful to swallow, it is a fact, and it is 
only facts that provide useful and profitable guides in 
efforts to bring about European consolidation. Of these 
facts perhaps the most striking is that Russia is one of the 
greatest obstacles to . peace to-day, and that Germany is 
being forced to throw in her lot with her. Now, Germany 
was before the war the most powerful Continental nation, 
and there is every reason to anticipate that she will regain 
that position in the not very distant future. Are we going 
to stand aside and watch the formation of a Russo-German 
combination, combining the energy, organization, and enter­
prise of the Teuton with the revolutionary ideas of the 
Soviet ? To permit such a possibility would be an unforgiv­
able crime not only against Germany, but against the whole 
world. It is unthinkable, but it is there staring us in the 
face. Germany belongs to the West, and it is the bounden 
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duty of every civilized nation of Europe to see that she is 
not deprived of her western birthright. The way is clear. 
France is not in a position to make the first move towards 
bringing Germany within the order of Locarno ; it, there­
fore, rests with Britain, and if Mr. MacDonald's Government 
can ' set the ball rolling ' in this direction, they will earn 
the respect of all parties in this country, the gratitude of 
the greater proportion of the German people, and the 
profound thanks of all the Baltic countries. If, on the other 
hand, things are allowed to drift until it is too late, we may 
rest assured that sooner or later there will be another war, 
more devastating and more far-reaching in its evil effects 
than that which we have recently experienced. 
CHAPTER X 
GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY 
rpHE first thing to bear in mind in studying Ger-
U many's position as a factor in post-war Europe is 
JL that, although she is at present going through a 
period of difficulty and uncertainty, she has a great past 
and will probably have an even greater future. As a nation 
the German people are destined to play a highly important 
part in world affairs, and this must be accepted as an un­
deniable fact. The second point to remember is that the 
Germans are a hard-working and progressive race ; and 
that these high-spirited people will not submit to such 
efforts as may be made to check their enterprising ambitions. 
This being so, Europe will be wise to adopt such an attitude 
towards Germany as will make the best use of her strength 
and able qualities for the building up of a strong and closely 
knit combination of Western Powers, whose material 
interests lie in peaceful conditions in which to progress. 
The influence of such an entente on the smaller Powers 
would have a steadying effect, and would tend to localize' 
such periodic explosions as take place in the Balkans and 
elsewhere. 
Since the war Germany has undergone a transformation 
as remarkable as it is complete. The imperial order of things 
has vanished, leaving only a few traces here and there, and 
has been replaced by an entirely different atmosphere show­
ing a very different side of the German character. A bust 
of the former Kaiser in one hotel, a picture of him with 
his military commanders in another, and a collection of old 
Prussian Army Lists in a third, are amongst the few reminders 
of pre-war Germany that meet the eye of the casual stranger 
in Berlin. That the sweeping changes of the past decade 
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are for the better there can be no possible doubt, and no 
one realizes this more than the great body of the German 
people, who are now free from the bondage of military and 
official despotism, and are in a position to work out their 
destiny to their own advantage instead of for the benefit 
of those who exploited the nation for their own personal 
glorification. 
Formerly Berlin was a great military Kaserne, of which 
the Kaiser was Commandant, and most departments of life 
were conducted as part of this vast military organization. 
Visitors to the capital could not help being impressed by 
the glittering splendour of the Prussian Guards, the soldierly 
bearing and smart turn-out of the officers in the Unter den 
Linden, and the outward signs of imperial power that almost 
dazzled the eyes of the foreigner. The military spirit of 
Imperial Germany permeated into every corner of Berlin, 
and the visitor had it firmly impressed upon him that the 
German officer was lord of all, and belonged to a sphere a 
great deal higher than that of his fellow-men. The officer 
was received almost royally wherever he went; he had the 
best seats in the theatres and the best tables in the restaur­
ants ; and every civilian, German and foreigner alike, 
was made to feel that these exponents of the art of war 
were fundamentally of much greater importance than those 
who practised the professions and occupations of peace. 
Germany of these days had, indeed, the appearance of a 
mighty Power destined to achieve great things in the world, 
and her army system was in itself the object of world-wide 
admiration ; but the German people were deprived of their 
individual personality in order to play their part in this vast 
organization that tended to cripple individual endeavour. 
At that time I had many friends both in the army and 
in the diplomatic service, and I was received with the 
greatest kindness on all occasions, but the profession of 
arms seemed completely to eclipse all other departments of 
state activity. The conditions of peace were regarded as 
secondary to those of war. At a luncheon which I attended, 
given by one of the heads of departments at the Auswartiges 
Amt in honour of the German Delegation to The Hague Peace 
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Conference of 1907, the officers present were regarded as 
more important guests than the delegates for whom the 
luncheon was given, and I could quote numerous other 
instances showing how Germany was at that time com­
pletely hypnotized by the glamour of military prowess. 
But it was not only the immense prestige of the army that 
impressed the foreigner. The same system existed in a 
minor degree in all departments of the Imperial Government 
service. Any -uniformed Government official, whether he 
was a railway guard, a policeman or postman, demanded a 
considerable amount of respect, and he saw that he always 
got it. The question was how long the German people were 
doomed to submit to this form of despotism, which was 
preventing them from giving expression to their true national 
characteristics and their beneficial influence in the world. 
Through adversity, in which the Germans have the full 
sympathy of the British people, the old regime has gone 
and has given place to what we believe to be the true 
Germany. Although their difficulties are great and their 
future is at the moment perhaps a little obscure, the German 
people have now a greater chance than they ever had 
before; and, thanks to their national energy, remarkable 
industry and business capacity, they need have no misgivings 
as to their future position in Europe. To-day the foreign 
visitor to Berlin finds conditions which he never knew 
before. Courtesy is characteristic of every German official 
from the highest to the lowest; the German officer accepts 
his position as an ordinary member of the community ; and 
policemen, railway guards and customs officials are more 
polite and helpful to the traveller than almost any other 
similar officials in Europe. The whole spirit of Berlin has 
changed to the benefit of the Berliners and in the interests 
of trade and commerce with other countries. The foreign 
business man no longer has obstacles put in his way by a 
host of officials whose exercise of authority was their most 
cherished possession. The officials of to-day go about their 
business in a quiet and unobtrusive manner, and they are 
none the less efficient. There is a sense of equality now 
and every one is well received, whether he be an ex-ally 
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or an ex-enemy. During my recent visit to Berlin in the 
winter of 1928-9 I had discussions with officials of the 
Auswartiges Ami, and with prominent members of most of 
the political parties in the Reichstag on subjects that might 
easily have been the cause of bad feeling, but on all occasions 
these conversations were conducted with the greatest frank­
ness and in the most friendly spirit. 
Among the outstanding features of Germany to-day is a 
state of political uncertainty, arising out of the difficulty 
of reconciling party differences and the delicate position in 
which Germany finds herself in forming her lines of foreign 
policy. Both these burdens have until recently fallen to 
a great extent on the shoulders of Herr Stresemann, who, 
in spite of his very indifferent health, courageously worked 
to hold things together right up to the day of his death. 
So difficult, indeed, is the political position that a large 
number of Germans, especially in the country districts, 
are becoming opposed to the parliamentary system—a 
serious state of affairs when viewed side by side with 
Germany's economic obligations. Moreover, Reichstag 
members of the Right and Centre have nothing substantial 
to offer their electors, which creates an excellent opportunity 
for the Socialists to preach their doctrines to ready listeners. 
In foreign affairs Locarno has been a deep disappointment 
to all parties, who contend that, although the Pact looks 
well on paper, Germany has in reality been left out. In 
this contention they are undoubtedly right. Similar un­
certainty prevails on the economic side. With the 
Reparations question still in the balance,1 and the people 
still more or less in the dark as to the amount of the debt 
which they will be called upon to pay, uneasiness and 
reluctance to embark on new undertakings is noticeable 
in most departments of commercial activity. 
Both politically and economically there seems at present 
to be a great want of hope in Germany, and the people seem 
to be imbued with the idea that they have nothing to look 
forward to. The heavy burden of taxation is always a 
1The adoption of the Young Plan should bring about marked 
changes in this direction. 
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spectre before their eyes, and they cannot see the day 
when German enterprise will be free to develop to their 
own advantage. It has been said that Germany is recover­
ing with great rapidity, that industry is forging ahead, 
and that Berlin reflects a considerable degree of national 
wealth. That there is some measure of truth in this state­
ment there is little doubt. It is difficult to say at the 
present stage exactly how far this can be regarded as 
accurate, but I think I am right in saying that such signs 
of luxury and spending as may be noticeable in the German 
capital do not represent the true financial state of the 
country. The average German is undoubtedly counting 
his pfennigs, and personal economies, which are less notice­
able than personal luxuries, are obvious to any foreigner 
who takes the trouble to look. In estimating the financial 
condition of Germany most foreign observers are inclined 
to think that the country is recovering by leaps and bounds, 
and therefore that her capacity to pay Reparations is 
greater than it is in actual fact, or they contend that the 
progress of the last few years is purely artificial, that every­
thing is based on false values, and that the country is really 
on the verge of a serious crisis. While there are elements 
of truth in both these views, it seems to me that Germany, 
thanks to the capacity for work of her people, and their 
desire to participate to the fullest extent in what post-war 
Europe has to offer, has succeeded in recovering quicker than 
most countries would have done in similar circumstances ; 
but that the state of German finance, industry and agricul­
ture, combined with the uncertainty of the political situation, 
has given rise to a state of affairs that cannot stand any 
serious shocks. But, although this may be the case,, it is 
clearly in the interests of Germany to face her war debts 
with a genuine determination to meet her obligations, 
thereby inspiring political confidence abroad and making 
her own path less difficult in years to come. It is only 
natural that the German people should feel a certain want 
of enthusiasm at the present stage of their recovery, but 
there are no reasons to suppose that they will be slow in 
regaining that position which was theirs before the war. 
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Germany has come through an unsuccessful war and a 
revolution which, although almost bloodless, was none the 
less drastic in its effects, and there are certain remarkable 
features in the new regime that throw important sidelights 
on the character of the people. Perhaps one of the most 
noticeable is the manner in which the Republic has been 
accepted by those who were formerly the strongest supporters 
of German imperialism. Former high officials of the Kaiser 
are now equally high servants of the Republic, which tends 
to show that in Germany there is a very strong love of 
country, stronger indeed than any bonds that bind subjects 
to crowned heads or ruling dynasties ; and nowhere is this 
more apparent than in the case of the Reichsprasident 
himself. ' Germany 1 is far more to the average German 
than any other idea of allegiance, and the word Vaterland 
means to him much more than is imagined by the average 
foreigner. It was this Vaterland spirit that drove the 
German legions time after time against the shattering fire 
of the fortress of Verdun ; it was this idea that sent rank 
after rank of Prussian students, little more than boys, to 
certain death in Flanders, singing as they went; and it was 
this that inspired Hindenburg to remain at his post and to 
lead the broken army back to Germany. This same spirit 
will be an important factor in helping Germany to advance 
to that position in Europe to which she naturally aspires. 
With all their tribulations and misgivings as to the future, 
the Germans are fortunate to possess that characteristic mass 
patriotism which gives them strength to overcome difficulties 
as long as they are united, and the Republic has certainly 
strengthened the unity of the German nation. It is difficult 
to take German pessimism at its face value. The Ausstellung 
is popular in Germany just now, most sections of national 
energy having exhibitions of some kind, and it looks as if 
this idea is infecting the manner in which national conditions 
are presented to those who come from other countries. 
But the Germans are too methodical to excel at this art, 
and their pessimism does not deceive the careful observer. 
One day when I was in Berlin, I hailed a taxi and told 
the man to drive to the Palace of the former Kaiser. ' You 
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mean the Palace Museum ? ' he replied. Then I realized 
that I had made a faux pas. The German of the Republic 
is determined that the Hohenzollerns and everything to do 
with them shall be firmly planted in the past, and he looks 
upon the former Kaiser's Palace as if it were a building of 
hoary antiquity. Yet, within these severe forbidding-
looking walls is one of the most interesting rooms in Europe 
—the Kaiser's library, just as it was before he gave up 
the crown and fled to Holland. Although anyone can enter 
and see it at the cost of a shilling, I have only met one 
Englishman who ever knew it existed. There is much in 
the state apartments to surprise the British visitor. The 
first thing to attract his notice on entering the courtyard is 
a statue of St. George killing the dragon. In the ante­
chambers and corridors hang portraits of the Georges, Kings 
of England, and the Royal arms of England are displayed 
with those of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha. But the most 
interesting room of all is the library. A collection of British 
Navy Lists occupies a good deal of space, and on every hand 
are accounts of British expeditions on land and sea. A 
blue-bound volume on The British Naval Officer looks as if 
it had been read and re-read. British sports also seem to 
have occupied the Kaiser's attention, for an English book 
on polo fills a position next to Rider Haggard's She and 
some popular novels of about twenty years ago. But when 
the visitor turns round to examine the writing-table he 
finds something genuinely astonishing. There is the actual 
table on which the Kaiser signed in July, 1914, the orders 
mobilizing the German army and navy, and it is made of 
the wood of Nelson's Victory—a present to the Kaiser from 
Queen Victoria. On this table, where it must have faced 
the Kaiser as he signed his name ' Wilhelm' at the end of 
the fateful documents, is a large oak paper-stand of the same 
wood. At the top of it is inset a silver medallion of Nelson, 
while below are the coloured flags of Nelson's famous signal— 
' England expects that every man will do his duty.' It 
was with this message before him that William II called 
the German nation to arms. 
To-day there are few regrets at the passing of the old 
16 
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regime, as most sections of the community realize the benefits 
of the Republic. The ex-Kaiser's seventieth birthday 
passed almost unnoticed. The ex-Crown Prince, who has 
a house in the outer suburbs of Berlin, is a familiar figure 
on the golf links when his time is not otherwise occupied 
with indoor sports. The ex-princes of the smaller German 
States live quietly on their properties as private individuals, 
and the ex-king of Saxony, when recently cheered at the 
railway station, told the people that they were ' nice re­
publicans '. The Foreign Ministry and the diplomatic 
service have probably undergone less change than any 
other department of state, the old aristocracy still being 
well represented, and this is often a subject of comment in 
foreign circles. But when it is realized that the personnel 
of the Auswartiges Amt was before the war inwardly inclined 
to disapprove of many of the policies emanating from the 
Kaiserliche Schloss, that their loyalty to Germany is such 
as I have described, and that it is in the personal interests 
of this particular class to retain its position in the state, 
it is not surprising that its members should serve the 
Republic in the meantime, hoping for a changed order of 
things in years to come. In spite of all the changes, real 
and apparent, that have taken place in Germany, the 
fundamental driving forces of the nation remain the same, 
although their activities are at present subordinated to the 
changed outlook of the bourgeoisie and workers who form 
the republican majority. 
President von Hindenburg will soon celebrate the fifth 
anniversary of his accession to the Presidency of the German 
Reich, and it is impossible to look back on these last five 
years, and the events that preceded them, without realizing 
that this veteran soldier-statesman has been quietly guiding 
Germany through a most difficult period of her political 
life, and by so doing has been making an invaluable con­
tribution to the general stabilization of Europe. Although 
at heart a monarchist and a soldier brought up in the most 
conservative of military regimes, he has shown wisdom in 
accepting changed conditions, and he is now doing every­
thing in his power to help his country, often under conditions 
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that must inwardly be most distasteful to him. In doing 
so he has never failed to consider the dynasty of his former 
allegiance, yet everything he does is in the interests of the 
Germany he loves ; and he works, as far as his advanced 
years will permit, to keep his country steady in a period of 
uncertainty and perplexity. Hindenburg's personality and 
prestige form a pillar of strength in Germany to-day, and 
his calm, unassuming control of affairs, together with a 
certain continuity of authority, inspires that confidence 
which is so necessary to a nation in times of disappointment 
and despondency. It is too soon to attempt to put a value 
on the achievements of the Reichsftrasident, but there is little 
doubt that, with posterity as judge, his high character and 
outstanding qualities will be fully appreciated as an example 
for future generations. The difficulties which he has had 
to face, and the conditions, personal and otherwise, in which 
he has had to overcome them, are for the most part still 
to be disclosed; but there is every reason to believe that 
his influence on the new German Republic, and his self-
sacrificing devotion to duty, have saved the country from 
many dangerous situations, and that Germany of the future 
will owe a heavy debt of gratitude to this old soldier of the 
Prussian army and new President of the German Reich. 
Hindenburg's record is a remarkable one, and there are 
few indeed who have spent such a life of turmoil and con­
trast, of success and disappointment, and remain, at the 
advanced age of eighty-three, capable of discharging with 
wisdom and judgment the duties of chef d'etat of a first-class 
Power. The President's memory carries him back to the 
field of Konigratz, to the assault of the Guards at St. Privat, 
and to the French debacle at Sedan. He took part in the 
siege of Paris : he witnessed the proclamation of Emperor 
William I in the ' Hall of Mirrors ' at Versailles. He played 
a prominent part in the work of the German General Staff 
during the period of preparation that preceded the catas­
trophe of 1914, although the call to arms found him living 
in retirement at Hanover. Back in uniform once more, 
Hindenburg proceeded to make history on the eastern 
front, where his victories of Tannenberg and the Masurian 
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Lakes raised him to the position of a national hero ; and 
later, as Chief of the General Staff, he became the great 
figure-head of Germany's fighting forces and the idol of 
the German people. In the west Hindenburg tried every 
device to ' shoot his boltand when he had failed he still 
hoped by a strategic defensive to secure a peace compatible 
with the dignity of his country. Germany was beaten, but 
not so the spirit of Hindenburg. He saw the German 
Empire crumble before his very eyes ; he saw his Kaiser 
pack up and leave the country; and he realized that 
Bolshevism was an imminent danger to Germany, if not, 
indeed, to the whole of Europe. Seeing the inward struggle 
with which his officers and men were faced, he performed 
the invidious task of leading back to Germany the defeated 
remnants of that mighty military machine which had been 
the pride of Prussia and of the whole German Empire. By 
this action alone Hindenburg performed a most important 
service to Europe, and it may almost be said that he saved 
Europe from Bolshevism. As a soldier his work was done, 
but there was still before him a formidable task which he 
has undertaken out of sheer sense of duty. After obtaining 
release from his vows of allegiance to his former Kaiser, he 
placed his services at the disposal of his fellow-countrymen 
in their time of crisis, and by his masterly handling of the 
situation has already gained for himself an almost unique 
position in the annals of national politics. 
Germany to-day is a strange mixture of political and 
economic forces working in an atmosphere of uncertainty. 
She is like a weather-beaten ship in a heavy sea under the 
command of an aged but experienced captain. The crew, 
tired out by their struggle, have come to have little faith 
in the ship, but they inwardly believe that their captain 
will see them through. And so it is with Hindenburg, who 
from his arm-chair far in the background uses his strong 
and moderating influence to keep the political scales 
balanced. On the one side, the right wing of the Nationalist 
Party and the Stahlhelm organization have to be guided in 
the way they should go. To them Hindenburg is still the 
military commander, and as President of the Stahlhelm he 
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is in a strong position. On the other side, the left-wing 
Socialists and Communists have to be restrained. To them 
his personality as head of a democratic state has the effect 
of steadying their wilder schemes and activities. The 
President seldom shows his authority, and for several reasons 
prefers to avoid the limelight. His advanced age does not 
permit of his undertaking anything approaching arduous 
duties, and he is only allowed by his medical advisers to 
devote a certain number of hours in the day to work. For 
this reason he only sees the highest state officials, and them 
only when there is the most urgent business to be considered. 
Further, there is nothing more distasteful to Hindenburg 
than any idea of pushing himself forward. He occupies his 
position as President as a duty to his country, and he shrinks 
from anything that might conceivably create the impression 
that he wishes to occupy the position of his former master. 
In his old age he needs care and a good deal of rest, but from 
his modest palace in the Wilhelmstrasse he wields a power 
which is none the less effective. The President lives in the 
simplest possible way. A policeman at the gate, two 
sentries in the small courtyard, and the Republican flag at 
the masthead are the only outward signs that distinguish 
the palace from any other building in the street. Little or 
no ceremony attends his coming or his going. 
Fortunate are those who have been admitted to the 
presence of this grey-haired soldier and statesman. None 
have been disappointed. The popular conception of a fire-
eating Prussian general with a stern countenance and a 
domineering demeanour fade away in the company of this 
charming and benevolent old gentleman, who shows a keen 
interest in everybody and everything. With his intellect 
as quick as ever it was, Hindenburg has been known to follow 
closely on the map every move in an explorer's journey, 
and to ask questions showing that the President himself 
understood the difficulties almost as well as the explorer 
who was describing his adventures. While his kindly dis­
position is sympathetic to the human side of life, he has 
a strong sense of humour and loves a good joke. He will 
sit listening to something that amuses him for a consider­
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able time without giving any indication of his emotions ; 
then gradually his face will light up and his eyes will twinkle 
with merriment. But when he hears a really good joke 
that tickles his fancy, he literally rocks from side to side 
with laughter. The name of von Hindenburg will go down 
to history as one of the greatest men of our time. He 
embodies to the fullest extent that spirit of German 
patriotism to which I have already referred. Loyal to the 
Empire and then to the Republic, he is serving the true 
interests of Germany by sinking all personal feelings and 
by placing the Vaterland before all other considerations. 
When his term of office expires, the question of a successor 
will be one of the most serious problems that the German 
Republic has yet had to face. 
During a recent visit to Berlin, when I made a special 
study of Anglo-German relations in conversations with 
prominent members of all parties in the Reichstag, I obtained 
a fairly good idea of what was going on in German minds 
with regard to Great Britain, and I reached the conclusion 
that there was much to justify certain German contentions. 
One of my chief objects was to collect complaints, and in 
this my task was not difficult, although I was told that, if 
I were a Frenchman, it would be easier to comply with my 
request. Chief among the complaints brought forward were 
the Rhineland occupation and the execution of the Locarno 
Treaty. With regard to the former, it was stated that 
the Germans were disappointed that Great Britain had 
not used sufficient influence with France to bring about 
the evacuation of the Rhineland, and that the position 
of the German population in the occupied territory had 
for ten years been most humiliating. At the same time, 
most Germans agreed that nothing less than a general 
evacuation would be of any help to Germany. They 
argued that, were the British troops to be withdrawn 
separately, the position would be worse than before as far 
as Germany was concerned; for France would at once 
occupy the unoccupied regions. There has since, however, 
been a change in the German view, which came round to 
favour a British withdrawal to the grounds that France's 
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position as the only occupying Power would be difficult in 
the face of general world opinion. Numerous and varied 
were the complaints regarding the occupied territory, and 
many of them were of rather a trivial nature, but it must 
be remembered that in a situation where the civil population 
is very susceptible to offence small incidents and indiscretions 
on the part of individuals are apt to be magnified beyond 
their true proportions. It is the occupation itself, not its 
conditions, that is of primary importance in the relations 
between the two countries. The Locarno policy was also 
the subject of much discussion, it being urged in many 
quarters that Germany had made a mistake.in accepting 
that policy from the benefits of which she was practically 
excluded. There was also a fear, arising partly out of the 
Anglo-French Compromise, that the military guarantees of 
Locarno were altogether one-sided. Superficially this is 
quite understandable, and it needs a very deep knowledge 
of the British character to realize that it is scarcely the 
case. It was contended that, while it would clearly be in 
the interests of Great Britain to help France in the event 
of German aggression, the British people would find it very 
difficult to come to Germany's aid in the case of attack by 
France. The reply to this is, in my opinion, as follows. As 
it is reasonable to assume that peace is assured for the next 
ten years at least, it is only necessary to consider Great 
Britain's probable attitude ten years hence ; and there is 
in my mind no possible doubt that, in the event of a crisis 
at that date, the British Government would readily fulfil 
their Locarno obligations to the fullest extent with the 
whole British people behind them, provided that both were 
satisfied that a clear case of aggression had been proved. 
If—what is most unlikely—a crisis were to arise in the near 
future, and it was proved that there was a genuine case of 
aggression on the part of France, it is probable that a very 
grave political upheaval would take place in this country; 
but I do believe that, possibly after some delay and pro­
longed discussions in Parliament, the British Government 
would decide in favour of supporting Germany. At present, 
such a situation would be one of very great difficulty, but, 
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knowing my country as I do, I have every reason to believe 
that even in present circumstances right would prevail over 
the inclinations of the moment. 
At the time of writing, however, events are taking place 
at The Hague which hold out every hope that a new era 
is at hand in the position of Germany vis-a-vis her late 
enemies. The evacuation of the Rhineland is now definitely 
fixed, the Young Plan is taking practical shape, and the 
way will soon be clear for a real Locarno. Germany will 
soon regain her sovereignty over the Rhineland, and she 
knows the extent and conditions of her financial obligations. 
Much of this is due to the efforts of the British Government, 
with the result that the moment is opportune for the opening 
of a policy of Anglo-German friendship. The attitude of the 
British Delegation to The Hague Conference has clearly 
shown that Britain will henceforth pursue a definite peace 
policy in Europe, and will no longer be at the beck and call 
of our good friends across the Channel. But to imagine, 
as some French politicians seem to do, that for this reason 
the Entente Cordiale is dead, is a profound mistake. The 
Entente Cordiale is as real to-day as it was in the days of 
King Edward or in the strenuous days of the Great War, 
but like all true friendships it is unaffected by other ties 
of opinion. Great Britain and France must work together. 
It is in the vital interests of both Powers to do so. We are 
not only neighbours in the Channel, but in the Mediterranean, 
in the Red Sea, in the Mandated Territories east of the 
Mediterranean, in Africa, and in India. The world interests 
of Great Britain and France are intimately bound up in the 
close European relations of the two countries. But there 
is no reason why British friendship with Germany should 
impair that friendship with France, unless we hold to the 
principle that all national friendships are directed against 
a third party, and that nations can only prosper at the 
expense of others. Under modern conditions Europe 
must come to be regarded as an economic whole, in which 
the interests of one nation are dependent to a great extent 
on the prosperity of its neighbours and the co-operation of 
Europe's component parts. Although it may be difficult 
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at the moment for the French to see where their true interests 
lie in this matter, it is beyond question that in the long run 
Anglo-German friendship would be beneficial to France. 
As soon as France feels herself secure and is able to breathe 
more freely, she will gradually drop her national sense of 
fear, and she will realize that a combination of Great Britain, 
France and Germany, working together in the interests of 
the whole and of each in turn, would be an untold blessing 
to the politics and economics of all concerned. 
The feelings of the British and German people towards 
one another form a subject of great interest, which should 
be carefully studied by all who wish to see co-operation to 
the mutual advantage of both countries. Although super­
ficially the Germans have not disliked us in the same way 
as they have disliked the French, they have subconsciously 
disliked us more. They have been jealous of our achieve­
ments. Germans admire French intellectual activity and 
organized French effort in various directions, and can 
understand and appreciate French successes ; but it deeply 
offends them sometimes to see their own carefully planned 
schemes, which they consider to be of the highest order, 
surpassed by the work of people who seemingly are apathetic 
and only put forward their best efforts as occasion demands. 
They find it difficult to appreciate the quality of ' common 
sense '—I use this for want of a better term—inherent in 
the British nation, which is often more valuable than the 
results of pure organization. I believe this to be responsible 
for a good deal of the anti-British feeling in Germany, but 
it will not last. The Germans will realize that it is contrary 
to reason and against their own interests. On the other side, 
Englishmen are not yet quite sure that the German Republic 
has come to stay, and are still a little doubtful of Germany's 
future intentions, yet in England there is much genuine 
admiration of German enterprise and capacity for hard work. 
A further sense of jealousy also exists, but it is confined to the 
commercial side. The German is jealous of the Englishman's 
mysterious ' common sense ', while the Englishman envies 
the business capacity of the German. But there is another 
consideration which has made an unfavourable impression 
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on the average English mind—the volume of complaints 
that have met the demands of the Allied Powers in the matter 
of Reparations. If Germany had silently accepted the 
consequences of the war and had shown a determination to 
make the best of the unpleasant conditions imposed upon 
her, I believe that there would have been a general desire 
in England to reduce these demands to the lowest possible 
extent, and that British sympathy for Germany's difficulties 
would have been greatly increased. 
One of the most hopeful signs for the future of Anglo-
German relations lies in the return to Oxford of the German 
Rhodes scholars. My own recollections of the German 
Rhodes scholars before the war forms one of the most 
cherished memories of an impressionable age. Some of them 
were among my best friends at Oxford, and some are still 
among my best friends to-day. Too many, alas, have laid 
down their lives in the Great War, and their names are 
commemorated for all time in the war memorials of the 
Oxford colleges ; but those who survived the great ordeal 
of 1914-18 are helping to carry out the intention of Cecil 
Rhodes by promoting the interests of Anglo-German friend­
ship. Oxford has a lasting influence on all who pass through 
her quadrangles, and the atmosphere of this great university 
produces a breadth of view which is of constant value to 
those whose work lies in dealing with the affairs of nations. 
The German Foreign Office and diplomatic service each have 
several Rhodes scholars on their list, doing work of inter­
national importance which is greatly facilitated by the 
experience gained in their respective colleges. They have 
learned to understand the English character and mentality 
in a way which is denied to most foreigners. They have seen 
English youth at the time of life when character is formed. 
They have shared the successes and failures of their fellow-
undergraduates. They have gained a unique insight into 
our national merits and shortcomings. I have renewed my 
old friendships with several of these Rhodes scholars in 
Germany within the last year, and I found them quite 
unchanged. Although they had not seen Oxford or England 
for many years, and some had almost forgotten the English 
GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY 251 
language, they were still Oxford men in every sense of the 
word. The return of the Germans will prove of immense 
value to an improvement in relations between their own 
country and ours, and it is to be hoped that it will be found 
possible to increase their numbers, and that the work begun 
in the colleges of Oxford will be continued in the Auswdrtiges 
Ami in Berlin and at the German Embassy in London. A 
community of sympathy and interest born at Oxford may 
spread in many directions, and there are great opportunities 
for some common bond in those who play leading parts in 
the affairs of Great Britain and Germany. The Prince of 
Wales has welcomed the German Rhodes scholars back to 
Oxford, and the new-comers may be assured that they are 
welcomed not only by Oxford of to-day, but also by those who 
knew their predecessors and appreciated their good qualities. 
It must not, however, be imagined that a rapprochement 
with Germany can be brought about without overcoming 
serious obstacles involving political decisions of the greatest 
importance. Whether such an understanding is possible 
much depends on the British attitude towards the status quo 
in Europe. If the British people intend to consider the status 
quo as unalterable, then there is a grave obstacle to any under­
standing. But if, on the other hand, they are prepared to 
regard it as subject to modification in course of time, then 
there are sufficiently good prospects of an Anglo-German 
rapprochement, which might well be regarded as an object of 
political endeavour in forthcoming years. If Great Britain 
can see her way to accept the latter view, there is a great 
opportunity, not only of depriving the Baltic situation of its 
more serious aspect, but also of ensuring a safer and brighter 
future for Germany, and making a very substantial contribu­
tion to a firm and practical foundation of European peace. 
At the time of writing the British troops are busy' packing 
up' on the Rhine, and the French have undertaken to 
complete the evacuation of their troops by the end of June, 
1930. The question of control of the Rhineland after the 
evacuation has been settled to the satisfaction of Germany. 
The Saar is all that remains, and there are indications that 
agreement will soon be reached on this question. Great 
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Britain has taken the lead in the final settlement of this 
great obstacle to European stability. The way is clear and 
the policy is obvious. On the 19th March this year, Herr 
Scheidemann, the veteran Socialist deputy who in 1918 
proclaimed the German Republic from the steps of the 
Reichstag, wrote to me as follows : ' We are sure that the 
great problems of peace will be settled, not against, but in 
co-operation with England, and they must be settled. We 
are not separated by political differences of opinion. We 
all have the same aim of rebuilding Europe and the peace 
of the world, an aim which we can only attain if England, 
France, and Germany join in the effort. Mr. MacDonald 
has shown us a programme of peaceful co-operation, and 
has thus obtained the support of all parties.' Mr. Mac-
Donald can do what would have been difficult for Sir 
Austen Chamberlain. While the former Foreign Secretary 
consolidated our position with France, it rests with the 
present Government to complete the work of Locarno by 
applying itself to our relations with Germany, and the omens 
are at present distinctly favourable. Let ' London-Paris-
Berlin ' be the watchword of British continental policy. 
Although we British may not realize the important 
influence we have on the affairs and policies of other 
countries, the fact remains that there are a great many 
nations in the world to-day which look to Great Britain for 
a solution of their difficulties and a dissipation of their 
dangers. This is particularly the case in the countries of 
Northern Europe and the Baltic. Northern statesmen feel 
that Britain can do much to guide European policies and 
that British example means a great deal. I have a deep 
regard for the clear-minded judgment of the North, and a 
firm conviction in the truth of what a certain Northern 
statesman said to me not many months ago. We were 
discussing the question of Germany, Russia, and the Baltic, 
when the conversation led to British policy with regard to 
the possibility of a Russo-German combination. My friend's 
last words to me were : ' Great Britain has the whole matter 
in the palms of her hands.' He was right. 
APPENDIX 
FINAL PROTOCOL OF THE LOCARNO CONFERENCE, 
1925, WITH ANNEX A (RHINELAND PACT) 
No. i. 
Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference, 1925. 
LES representants des Gouvernements allemand, beige, britan-
nique, frangais, italien, polonais et tchecoslovaque, reunis k 
Locarno du 5 au 16 octobre 1925, en vue de rechercher d'un 
commun accord les moyens de preserver du fleau de la guerre 
leurs nations respectives, et de pourvoir au reglement pacifique 
des conflits de toute nature qui viendraient eventuellement k 
surgir entre certaines d'entre elles, 
Ont donne leur agrement aux projets de traites et conventions 
qui les concernent respectivement et qui, elabores au cours de 
la presente conference, se referent reciproquement les uns aux 
autres : 
Traite entre l'Allemagne, la Belgique, la France, la Grande-
Bretagne et l'ltalie (Annexe A). 
Convention d'arbitrage entre l'Allemagne et la Belgique (An­
nexe B). 
Convention d'arbitrage entre l'Allemagne et la France (An­
nexe C). 
Traite d'arbitrage entre l'Allemagne et la Pologne (Annexe D). 
Traite d'arbitrage entre l'Allemagne et la Tchecoslovaquie 
(Annexe E). 
Ces actes, des & present paraphes ne varietur porteront la date 
de ce jour, les representants des parties interessees convenant 
de se rencontrer k Londres le ier decembre prochain, pour 
proceder, au cours d'une meme reunion, k la formalit6 de la 
signature des actes qui les concernent. 
Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres de France fait connaitre 
qu'& la suite des projets de traites d'arbitrage ci-dessus mention-
nees, la France, la Pologne et la Tchecoslovaquie ont egalement 
arrete, k Locarno des projets d'accords en vue de s'assurer 
reciproquement le benefice desdit traites. Ces accords seront 
r6gulierement deposes k la Societe des Nations mais des k present 
M. Briand en tient des copies k la disposition des Puissances ici 
representees. 
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Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference, 1925. 
(Translation.) 
THE representatives of the German, Belgian, British, French, 
Italian, Polish and Czechoslovak Governments, who have met at 
Locarno from the 5th to 16th October, 1925, in order to seek by 
common agreement means for preserving their respective nations 
from the scourge of war and for providing for the peaceful settle­
ment of disputes of every nature which might eventually arise 
between them, 
Have given their approval to the draft treaties and conventions 
which respectively affect them and which, framed in the course 
of the present conference, are mutually interdependent: 
Treaty between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and 
Italy (Annex A). 
Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium (Annex 
B). 
Arbitration Convention between Germany and France (Annex 
C). 
Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland (Annex D). 
Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia 
(Annex E). 
These instruments, hereby initialled ne varietur, will bear 
to-day's date, the representatives of the interested parties agree­
ing to meet in London on the 1st December next, to proceed 
during the course of a single meeting to the formality of the 
signature of the instruments which affect them. 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs of France states that as a result 
of the draft arbitration treaties mentioned above, France, Poland 
and Czechoslovakia have also concluded at Locarno draft agree­
ments in order reciprocally to assure to themselves the benefit of 
the said treaties. These agreements will be duly deposited at the 
League of Nations, but M. Briand holds copies forthwith at the 
disposal of the Powers represented here. 
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Le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres de Grande-
Bretagne propose qu'en reponse k certaines demandes duplica­
tions concernant l'article 16 du Pacte de la Societe des Nations 
et presentees par le Chancelier et le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres 
d'AUemagne, la lettre, dont le projet egalement est ci-joint 
(Annexe F), leur soit adressee en meme temps qu'il sera procede 
k la formalite de la signature des actes ci-dessus mentionnes. 
Cette proposition est agree. 
Les representants des Gouvernements ici representes dedarent 
avoir la ferme conviction que l'entree en vigueur de ces traites et 
conventions contribuera grandement k amener une detente morale 
entre les nations, qu'elle. facilitera puissamment la solution de 
beaucoup de problemes politiques ou economiques conformement 
aux interets et aux sentiments des peuples et qu'en raffermissant 
la paix et la securite en Europe elle sera de nature a hater d'une 
maniere efficace le desarmement prevu par l'article 8 du Pacte 
de la Societe des Nations. 
lis s'engagent k donner leur concours sincere aux travaux 
dejk entrepris par la Societe des Nations relativement au desarme­
ment et en rechercher la realisation dans une entente generale. 
Fait k Locarno, le 16 octobre 1925. 
DR. LUTHER. 
STRESEMANN. 
EMILE VANDERVELDE. 
ARI. BRIAND. 
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN. 
BENITO MUSSOLINI. 
AL. SKRZYNSKI. 
DR. EDUARD BENES. 
ANNEX A. 
Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, 
Great Britain and Italy. (Initialled at Locarno, October 16, 
I925-) 
LE President de l'Empire allemand, Sa Majeste le Roi des 
Beiges, le President de la Republique frangaise, Sa Majeste le 
Roi du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'lrlande et des 
Territoires britanniques au del& des Mers, Empereur des Indes, 
Sa Majeste le Roi d'ltalie ; 
Soucieux de satisfaire au desir de securite et de protection qui 
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The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain 
proposes that, in reply to certain requests for explanations 
concerning article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
presented by the Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of Germany, a letter, of which the draft is similarly attached 
(Annex F) should be addressed to them at the same time as the 
formality of signature of the above-mentioned instruments takes 
place. This proposal is agreed to. 
The representatives of the Governments represented here 
declare their firm conviction that the entry into force of these 
treaties and conventions will contribute greatly to bring about 
a moral relaxation of the tension between nations, that it will 
help powerfully towards the solution of many political or economic 
problems in accordance with the interests and sentiments of 
peoples, and that, in strengthening peace and security in Europe, 
it will hasten on effectively the disarmament provided for in 
article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
They undertake to give their sincere co-operation to the work 
relating to disarmament already undertaken by the League of 
Nations and to seek the realization thereof in a general agreement. 
Done at Locarno, the 16th October, 1925. 
LUTHER. 
STRESEMANN. 
EMILE VANDERVELDE. 
ARI. BRIAND. 
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN. 
BENITO MUSSOLINI. 
AL. SKRZYNSKI. 
EDUARD BENES. 
ANNEX A. 
Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, 
Great Britain and Italy. (Initialled at Locarno, October 16, 
I925-) 
(Translation.) 
THE President of the German Reich, His Majesty the King 
of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, and His 
Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor 
of India, His Majesty the King of Italy ; 
Anxious to satisfy the desire for security and protection which 
17 
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anime les nations qui ont eu a subir le fleau de la guerre de 
1914-18 ; 
Constatant l'abrogation des traites de neutralisation de la 
Belgique, et conscients de la necessite d'assurer la paix dans la 
zone qui a ete si frequemment le theatre des conflits europeens ; 
Et egalement animes eu sincere desir de donner k toutes les 
Puissances signataires interessees des garanties complementaires 
dans le cadre du Pacte de la Societe des Nations et des traites 
en vigueur entre elles; 
Ont resolu de conclure un traite k ces fins ont design^ pour leurs 
plenipotentiaires, savoir: 
Lesquels, apres avoir echange leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en 
bonne et due forme, ont convenu les dispositions suivantes : 
ARTICLE IER. 
Les hautes parties contractantes garantissent individuellement 
et collectivement, ainsi qu'il est stipule dans les articles ci'apres, le 
maintien du status quo territorial resultant des frontieres entre 
l'Allemagne et la Belgique et entre l'Allemagne et la France, et 
l'inviolabilite desdites frontieres telles qu'elles sont fixees par ou 
en execution du Traite de Paix signe k Versailles le 28 juin 19^, 
ainsi que l'observation des dispositions des articles 42 et 43 dudit 
traite, concernant la zone demilitarisee. 
ARTICLE 2. 
L'Allemagne et la Belgique et de meme l'Allemagne et la France 
s'engagent reciproquement k ne se livrer de part et d'autre a 
aucune attaque ou invasion et k ne recourir de part et d'autre 
en aucun cas k la guerre. 
Toutefois cette stipulation ne s'applique pas s'il s'agit: 
1. De l'exercice du droit de legitime defense, c'est-^-dire de 
s'opposer k une violation de l'engagement de l'alinea pre­
cedent ou k une contravention flagrante aux articles 42 
ou 43 dudit Trait6 de Versailles, lorsqu'une telle contra­
vention constitue un acte non provoque d'agression et qu'en 
raison du rassemblement de forces armees dans la zone 
demilitarisee une action immediate est necessaire; 
2. D'une action en application de l'article 16 du Pacte de la 
Societe des Nations ; 
3. D'une action en raison d'une decision prise par l'Assemblee 
ou par le Conseil de la Societe des Nations, ou en application 
de l'article 15, alinea 7, du Pacte de la Societe des Nations, 
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animates the peoples upon whom fell the scourge of the war of 
1914-18 ; 
Taking note of the abrogation of the treaties for the neutraliza­
tion of Belgium, and conscious of the necessity of ensuring peace 
in the area which has so frequently been the scene of European 
conflicts ; 
Animated also with the sincere desire of giving to all the 
signatory Powers concerned supplementary guarantees within 
the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations and 
the treaties in force between them ; 
Have determined to conclude a treaty with these objects, and 
have appointed as their plenipotentiaries : 
Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good 
and due form, have agreed as follows : 
ARTICLE I. 
The high contracting parties collectively and severally guar­
antee, in the manner provided in the following articles, the 
maintenance of the territorial status quo resulting from the 
frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany 
and France and the inviolability of the said frontiers as fixed 
by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles 
on the 28th June, 1919, and also the observance of the stipulations 
of articles 42 and 43 of the said treaty concerning the demilita­
rized zone. 
ARTICLE 2. 
Germany and Belgium, and also Germany and France, 
mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade 
each other or resort to war against each other. 
This stipulation shall not, however, apply in the case of— 
1. The exercise of the right of legitimate defence, that is to 
say, resistance to a violation of the undertaking contained in the 
previous paragraph or to a flagrant breach of articles 42 or 43 of 
the said Treaty of Versailles, if such breach constitutes an 
unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of 
armed forces in the demilitarized zone immediate action is 
necessary. 
2. Action in pursuance of article 16 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations. 
3. Action as the result of a decision taken by the Assembly 
or by the Council of the League of Nations or in pursuance of 
article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of 
17* 
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pourvu que dans ce dernier cas cette action soit dirigee 
contre un £tat qui le premier s'est livre k une attaque. 
ARTICLE 3. 
Prenant en consideration les engagements respectivement pris 
par elles dans l'article 2 du present traits, l'Allemagne et la 
Belgique, et l'Allemagne et la France s'engagent k regler par voie 
pacifique et de la maniere suivante toutes questions de quelque 
nature qu'elles soient, qui viendraient k les diviser et qui n'aurai-
ent pu etre resolues par les procedes diplomatiques ordinaires : 
Toutes questions au sujet desquelles les parties se contesteraient 
reciproquement un droit seront soumises k des juges, k la decision 
desquels les parties s'engagent k se conformer. 
Toute autre question sera sera soumise a une commission de 
conciliation et, si' l'arrangement propose par cette commission 
n'est pas agree par les deux parties, la question sera portee devant 
le Conseil de la Societe des Nations, statuant conformement k 
l'article 15 du Pacte de la Societe. 
Les modalites de ces methodes de reglement pacifique sont 
l'objet de conventions particulieres signees en date de ce jour. 
ARTICLE 4. 
1. Si l'une des Hautes Parties contractantes estime qu'une 
violation de l'article 2 du present traite ou une contravention aux 
articles 42 ou 43 du Traits de Versailles a ete ou est commise, elle 
portera immediatement la question devant le Conseil de la 
Societe des Nations. 
2. Des que le Conseil de la Society des Nations aura constats 
qu'une telle violation ou contravention a ete commise, il en 
donnera sans d£lai avis aux Puissances signataires du present 
traite, et chacune d'elles s'engage k preter, en pareil cas, im­
mediatement son assistance k la Puissance contre laquelle l'acte 
incrimine aura ete dirige. 
3. En cas de violation flagrante de l'article 2 du present traite 
ou de contravention flagrante aux articles 42 ou 43 du Traits de 
Versailles par l'une des Hautes Parties contractantes, chacune 
des autres Puissances contractantes s'engage des k present k preter 
immediatement son assistance k la partie contre laquelle une telle 
violation ou contravention aura 6te dirigee des que ladite 
Puissance aura pu se rendre compte que cette violation constitue 
un acte non provoque d'agression et qu'en raison soit du franchis-
sement de la frontiere soit de l'ouverture des hostilites ou du 
rassemblement de forces armees dans la zone demilitarisee une 
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Nations, provided that in this last event the action is directed 
against a State which was the first to attack. 
ARTICLE 3. 
In view of the undertakings entered into in article 2 of the 
present treaty, Germany and Belgium and Germany and France 
undertake to settle by peaceful means and in the manner laid 
down herein all questions of every kind which may arise between 
them and which it may not be possible to settle by the normal 
methods of diplomacy : 
Any question with regard to which the parties are in conflict 
as to their respective rights shall be submitted to judicial decision, 
and the parties undertake to comply with such decision. 
All other questions shall be submitted to a conciliation com­
mission. If the proposals of this commission are not accepted 
by the two parties, the question shall be brought before the 
Council of the League of Nations, which will deal with it in 
accordance with article 15 of the Covenant of the League. 
The detailed arrangements for effecting such peaceful settle­
ment are the subject of special agreements signed this day. 
ARTICLE 4. 
r. If one of the high contracting parties alleges that a violation 
of article 2 of the present treaty or a breach of articles 42 or 
43 of the Treaty of Versailles has been or is being committed, 
it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League 
of Nations. 
2. As soon as the Council of the League of Nations is satisfied 
that such violation or breach has been committed, it will notify 
its finding without delay to the Powers signatory of the present 
treaty, who severally agree that in such a case they will each 
of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against 
whom the act complained of is directed. 
3. In case of a flagrant violation of article 2 of the present 
treaty or of a flagrant breach of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty 
of Versailles by one of the high contracting parties, each of the 
other contracting parties hereby undertakes immediately to come 
to the help of the party against whom such a violation or breach 
has been directed as soon as the said Power has been able to 
satisfy itself that this violation constitutes an unprovoked act of 
aggression and that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier 
or of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces 
in the demilitarized zone immediate action is necessary. Never-
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action immediate est n£cessaire. Neanmoins, le Conseil de la 
Society des Nations, saisi de la question conformement au premier 
paragraphe du present article, fera connaitre le resultat de ses 
constations. Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent en 
pareil cas k agir en conformite avec les recommandations du 
Conseil qui auraient recueilli l'unanimite des voix 5. l'exclusion 
des voix des representants des parties engagees dans les hostilites. 
ARTICLE 5. 
La stipulation de l'article 3 du present traite est placee sous la 
garantie des hautes parties contractantes ainsi qu'il est prevu 
ci-apres : 
Si l'une des Puissances mentionnees k l'article 3 refuse de se 
conformer aux methodes de reglement pacifique ou d'executer 
une decision arbitrate ou judiciaire et commet une violation de 
l'article 2 du present traite ou une contravention aux articles 
42 ou 43 du Traite de Versailles, les dispositions de l'article 4 du 
present traite s'appliqueront. 
Dans le cas ou, sans commettre une violation de l'article 2 du 
present traite ou une convention aux articles 42 ou 43 du Traite 
de Versailles, une des Puissances mentionnees k l'article 3 
refuserait de se conformer aux methodes de reglement pacifique 
ou d'executer une decision arbitrale ou judiciaire, l'autre partie 
saisira le Conseil de la Societe des Nations, qui proposera les 
measures & prendre ; les hautes parties contractantes se con-
formeront k ces propositions. 
ARTICLE 6. 
Les dispositions du present traite ne portent pas atteinte aux 
droits et obligations resultant pour les hautes parties con­
tractantes du Traite de Versailles, ainsi que des arrangements 
compiementaires, y compris ceux signes k Londres le 30 aout 
1924. 
ARTICLE 7. 
Le present traite, destine k assurer le maintien de la paix et 
conforme au Pacte de la Societe des Nations, ne pourra etre 
interprete comme restreignant la mission de celle-ci de prendre 
les mesures propres k sauvegarder efi&cacement la paix du monde. 
ARTICLE 8. 
Le present traite sera enregistre k la Societe des Nations con­
formement au Pacte de la Societe. II restera en vigueur jusqu'k 
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theless, the Council of the League of Nations, which will be 
seized of the question in accordance with the first paragraph of 
this article, will issue its findings, and the high contracting 
parties undertake to act in accordance with the recommendations 
of the Council provided that they are concurred in by all the 
members other than the representatives of the parties which have 
engaged in hostilities. 
ARTICLE 5. 
The provisions of article 3 of the present treaty are placed 
under the guarantee of the high contracting parties as provided 
by the following stipulations : 
If one of the Powers referred to in article 3 refuses to submit 
a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral 
or judicial decision and commits a violation of article 2 of the 
present treaty or a breach of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of 
Versailles, the provisions of article 4 shall apply. 
Where one of the Powers referred to in article 3 without com­
mitting a violation of article 2 of the present treaty or a breach 
of articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, refuses to submit 
a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral 
or judicial decision, the other party shall bring the matter 
before the Council of the League of Nations, and the Council 
shall propose what steps shall be taken ; the high contracting 
parties shall comply with these proposals. 
ARTICLE 6. 
The provisions of the present treaty do not affect the rights 
and obligations of the high contracting parties under the Treaty 
of Versailles or under arrangements supplementary thereto, 
including the agreements signed in London on the 30th August, 
1924. 
ARTICLE 7. 
The present treaty, which is designed to ensure the maintenance 
of peace, and is in conformity with the Covenant of the League 
of Nations, shall not be interpreted as restricting the duty of the 
League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual 
to safeguard the peace of the world. 
ARTICLE 8. 
The present treaty shall be registered at the League of Nations 
in accordance with the Covenant of the League. It shall remain 
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ce que, sur la demande de l'une ou de l'autre des hautes parties 
contractantes notifiee aux autres Puissances signataires trois mois 
d'avance, le Conseil, votant k la majoritedes deux tiers au moins, 
constate que la Societe des Nations assure aux hautes parties 
contractantes des garanties suffisantes, et le traits cessera alors 
ses effets k l'expiration d'un delai d'une annee. 
ARTICLE 9. 
Le present traite n'imposera aucune obligation k aucun des 
dominions britanniques ou k l'lnde, k moins que le Gouvernement 
de ce dominion ou de l'lnde ne signifie qu'il accepte ces 
obligations. 
ARTICLE 10. 
Le present trait6 sera ratifie et les ratifications seront deposees 
k Geneve dans les archives de la Societe des Nations aussitdt que 
faire se pourra. 
II entrera en vigueur des que toutes les ratifications auront ete 
deposees et que l'Allemagne sera devenue membre de la Societe 
des Nations. 
Le present traite, fait en un seul exemplaire, sera depose aux 
archives de la Societe des Nations, dont le Secretaire general 
sera prie de remettre k chacune des hautes parties contractantes 
des copies certifies conformes. 
En foi de quoi les plenipotentiaries susnommes ont signe le 
present traite. 
Fait k Locarno, le 16 octobre 1925. 
L. 
STR. 
E. V. 
A. B. 
A. C. 
B. M. 
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in force until the Council, acting on a request of one or other 
of the high contracting parties notified to the other signatory-
Powers three months in advance, and voting at least by a two-
thirds majority, decides that the League of Nations ensures 
sufficient protection to the high contracting parties ; the treaty 
shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of one year 
from such decision. 
ARTICLE 9. 
The present treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the 
British dominions, or upon India, unless the Government of such 
dominion, or of India, signifies its acceptance thereof. 
ARTICLE 10. 
The present treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall 
be deposited at Geneva in the archives of the League of Nations as 
soon as possible. 
It shall enter into force as soon as all the ratifications have 
been deposited and Germany has become a member of the League 
of Nations. 
The present treaty, done in a single copy, will be deposited 
in the archives of the League of Nations, and the Secretary-
General will be requested to transmit certified copies to each 
of the high contracting parties. 
In faith whereof the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present treaty. 
Done at Locarno, the 16th October, 1925. 
LUTHER. 
STRESEMANN. 
EMILE VANDERVELDE. 
A. BRIAND. 
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN. 
BENITO MUSSOLINI. 
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In a box. £3 3*. net. 
FYLEMAN (Rose) 
Fairies and Chimneys 
The Fairy Green 
The Fairy Flute 
The Rainbow Cat 
Eight Little Plays for Children 
Forty Good-night Tales 
Fairies and Friends 
The Adventure Club 
Forty Good-Morning Tales 
Seven Little Plays for Children 
Twenty Tea-Time Tales 
Each 3s. 6d. net. 
Gay Go Up 
Illustrated by Decie Merwin. 
S S .  net. 
The Rose Fyleman Fairy Book 
Illustrated by Hilda Miller. 
ioj. 6d. net. 
A Garland of Rose's : Collected 
Poems 
Illustrated by Ren& Bull. 
8s. 6d. net. 
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GIBBON (Edward) 
The Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire 
With Notes, Appendixes and Map9, 
by J. B. Bury. Illustrated. 7 vols. 
Demy 81w. 15*. net each volume. 
Also, unillustrated. Crown Svo. 
7s. 6d. net each volume. 
GLOVER (T. R.) 
Virgil 
The Conflict of Religions in the 
Early Roman Empire 
Poets and Puritans 
Each 1 of. 6d. net. 
From Pericles to Philip 
I Z S .  6d. net. 
GRAHAM (Harry) 
The World we Laugh in : More 
Deportmental Ditties 
Illustrated by ' Fish Seventh 
Edition. 5s. net. 
Strained Relations 
Illustrated by H. stuart menzies 
and Hendy 6S. net. 
The World's Workers 
Illustrated by ' Fougasse 
Ss. net. 
GRAHAME (Kenneth) 
The Wind in the Willows 
Nineteenth Edition. 7s. 6 d. net. 
Also illustrated by Wyndham 
Payne. 7s. 6d. net. 
Also unillustrated. 3s. 6d. net. 
See also Milne (A. A.) 
HADFIELD (J. A.) 
Psychology and Morals 
Seventh Edition. Crown 8vo. 
6s. net. 
HALL (H. R.) 
The Ancient History of the 
Near East £1 is. net. 
The Civilization of Greece in 
the Bronze Agb 
Illustrated. £1 10s. net. 
A Season's Work at Ur of thb 
Chaldees i 5*. net. 
HERBERT (A. P.) 
Honeybubble & Co. 6s. net. 
Misleading Cases in thb Common 
Law 
With an Introduction by Lord 
Hew art. 55. net. 
The Bomber Gipsy 31. 6d. net. 
Light Articles Only 
Illustrated. 65. net. 
The Wherefore and the Why 
Illustrated. 31. 6d. net. 
The Secret Battle 3s. 6d. net. 
HIND (A. M.) 
A Catalogue of Rembrandt's 
Etchings 
Two Vols. Profusely illustrated. 
£1 15s. net. 
HOLDSWORTH (W. S.) 
A History of English Law 
Nine Volumes. £i 5s. net each. 
HUDSON (W. H.) 
A Shepherd's Life 
Illustrated. 10s. td. net. 
Also, unillustrated. 3s. 6d. net. 
HUTTON (Edward) 
Cities of Sicily 
Illustrated. 10s. 6d. net. 
Milan and Lombardy 
The Cities of Romagna and the 
Marches 
Siena and Southern Tuscany 
Naples and Southern Italy 
Illustrated. Each 8s. 6d. net. 
A Wayfarer in Unknown Tus­
cany 
The Cities of Spain 
The Cities of Umbria 
Country Walks about Florencb 
Rome 
Florence and Northern Tuscany 
Venice and Venetia 
Each illustrated. 7s. 6d. net. 
INGE (W. R.), D.D., Dean of St. 
Paul's 
Christian Mysticism 
(The Bampton Lectures of 1899). 
Sixth Edition. 7s. 6d. net. 
KIPLING (Rudyard) 
Barrack-Room Ballads 
254*A Thousand. 
The Seven Seas 
180th Thousand. 
The Five Nations 
143rd Thousand. 
Departmental Ditties 
116th Thousand. 
The Years Between 
951 h Thousand. 
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KIPLING (Rudyard)—continued 
Four Editions of these famous 
volumes of poems are now pub­
lished, viz. :— 
Crotvn 8vo. Buckram, 7s. 6d. net. 
Fcap. 8uo. Cloth 6s. net. 
Leather. 7s. 6d. net. 
Service Edition. Two volumes 
each book. Square Fcap. 8vo. 
3s. net each volume. 
A Kipling Anthology : Verse. 
Cloth, 6s. net and 3s. 6d. net. 
Twenty Poems from Rudyard 
Kipling 
471 st Thousand. i s .  net. 
A Choice of Songs 
Second Edition. zs. net. 
LAMB (Charles and Mary) 
The Complete Works 
Edited by E. V. Lucas. Six 
Volumes. With Frontispieces. 
6s. net each. 
Selected Letters 
Edited by G. T. Clapton. 
3*. 6d. net. 
The Charles Lamb Day Book 
Compiled by E. V. Lucas. 
6s. net. 
LANKESTER (Sir Ray) 
Science from an Easy Chair 
Science from an Easy Chair : 
Second Series 
Diversions of a Naturalist 
Great and Small Things 
Illustrated. Each 7s. 6d. net. 
Secrets of Earth and Sea 
Illustrated. 8s. 6d. net. 
LODGE (Sir Oliver) 
Man and the Universe 
7s. 6d. net and 3s. 6d. net. 
The Survival of Man 
7*. 6d. net. 
Raymond 10s. 6d. net. 
Raymond Revised 6s. net. 
Modern Problems 
Reason and Belief 
Each 3s. 6d. net. 
The Substance OF Faith 
2s. net. 
Relativity I S .  net. 
LUCAS (E. V.) 
The Life of Charles Lamb 
2 Vols. £j is. net. 
The Colvins and Their Friends 
£1 is. net. 
Vermeer the Magical 51. net. 
A Wanderer in Rome 
A Wanderer in Holland 
A Wanderer in London 
London Revisited (Revised) 
A Wanderer in Paris 
A Wanderer in Florence 
A Wanderer in Venice 
Each 10s. 6d. net. 
A Wanderer among Pictures 
8s. 6d. net. 
E. V. Lucas's London £1 net. 
Introducing London 
Introducing Paris 
Each 2s. 6d. net. 
The Open Road 6S. net. 
Also, illustrated by Claude A. 
Shepperson, A.R.W.S. 
1 os. 6d. net. 
Also, India Paper. 
Leather, 7s. 6d. net. 
The Joy of Life 
6s. net. Leather Edition, 7s. 6d. net. 
Also India Paper. 
Leather, 7s. 6d. net. 
The Gentlest Art 6S. 6d. net. 
And The Second Post 6S. net. 
Also together in one volume. 
7s. 6d. net. 
Fireside and Sunshine 
Character and Comedy 
Good Company 
One Day and Another 
Old Lamps for New 
Loiterer's Harvest 
Luck of the Year 
Events and Embroideries 
A Fronded Isle 
A Rover I Would Be 
Each 3s. 6d. net. 
Her Infinite Variety 
Cloud and Silver 
A Boswell of Baghdad 
'Twixt Eagle and Dovb 
The Phantom Journal 
Giving and Receiving 
Encounters and Diversions 
Zigzags in France 
Turning Things Over 
Each 6s. net. 
Roving East and Roving West 
ss. net. 
Mr. Punch's County Songs 
Illustrated by E. H. Shepard. 
1 os. 6d. net. 
' The More I See of Men . . 
Out of a Clear Sky 
If Dogs Could Write 
Each 3s. 6d. net. 
See also Lamb (Charles). 
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LYND (Robert) 
It's A Fink World 
The Green Man 
The Pleasures of Ignorancb 
Each ss net. 
The Goldfish 
The Little Angel 
The Blue Lion 
The Peal of Bells 
The Money-Box 
The Orange Tree 
Each 3s. 6d. net. 
McDOUGALL (William) 
An Introduction to Social 
Psychology ioj. 6d. net. 
National Welfare and National 
Decay 6S. net. 
An Outline of Psychology 
i os. 6d. net. 
An Outline of Abnormal Psycho­
logy i 55. net. 
Body and Mind 12s. 6d. net. 
Character and the Conduct of 
Life ioj. 6d. net. 
Modern Materialism and Emerg­
ent Evolution 7s. 6d. net. 
Ethics and Some Modern World 
Problems 7s. 6d. net. 
MALLET (Sir C. E.) 
A History of the University of 
Oxford 
In 3 vols. Each £1 is. net. 
MAETERLINCK (Maurice) 
The Blue Bird 6*. net. 
Also, illustrated by F. Cayley 
Robinson. 10s. 6d. net. 
Our Eternity 6s. net. 
The Unknown Guest 6s. net. 
Poems 5s. net. 
The Wrack of the Storm 
6s. net. 
The Burgomaster of Stilemonde 
ss. net. 
The Betrothal 6s. net. 
Mountain Paths 6s. net. 
The Great Secret 7s. 6d. net. 
The Cloud that Lifted and The 
Power of the Dead 
7s. 6d. net. 
Mary Magdalene ZS. net. 
MASEFIELD (John) 
On the Spanish Main 
8s. 6d. net. 
A Sailor's Garland 3s. 6d. net. 
Sea Life in Nelson's Time 
7s. 6d. net. 
METHUEN (Sir A.) 
An Anthology of Modern Verse 
185th Thousand. 
Shakespeare to Hardy : An 
Anthology of English Lyrics 
z6th Thousand. 
Each, Cloth, 6s. net. 
Leather, 7s. 6d. net. 
MILNE (A. A.) 
Toad of Toad Hall 
A Play founded on Kenneth 
Grahame's ' The Wind in the 
Willows.' 5s. net. 
Those Were the Days 
7s. 6d. net. 
Not that it Matters 
If I May 
The Sunny Side 
The Red House Mystery 
Once a Week 
The Holiday Round 
The Day's Play 
Mr. Pim Passes By 
Each 3s. 6d. net 
When We were Very Young 
Nineteenth Edition. ig6th Thousand. 
wlnnle-the-pooh 
Eighth Edition. 106th Thousand. 
Now We are Six 
Fifth Edition. 119 th Thousand. 
The House at Pooh Corner 
Third Edition. 105th Thousand. 
Each illustrated by E. H. Shepard. 
7s. 6d. net. 
Leather, 10s. 6d net. 
The Christopher Robin Story 
Book 
Illustrated by E. H. Shepard. 
S S .  net. 
MILNE (A. A.) and FRASER-SIM-
SON (H.) 
Fourteen Songs from ' When We 
were Very Young' 
Twelfth Edition. 7s. 6d. net. 
Teddy Bear and Other Songs 
from ' When We were Very 
Young ' 7s. 6d. net. 
The King's Breakfast 
Third Edition. 3s. 6d. net. 
Songs from ' Now We are Six ' 
Second Edition. 7s. 6d. net. 
More ' Very Young ' Songs 
7s. 6d. net. 
The Hums of Pooh 7s. 6d. net. 
Words by A. A. Milne. 
Music by H. Fraser-Simson. 
Decorations by E. H. Shepard. 
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MORTON (H. V.) 
The Heart of London 
The Spell of London 
The Nights of London 
Each 3s. 6d. net. 
In Search of England 
The Call of England 
In Search of Scotland 
Each illustrated. 7s. 6d. net. 
OMAN (Sir Charles) 
A History of the Art of War in 
the Middle Ages, a.d. 378-1485 
2 vols. Illustrated. £1 16s. net. 
Studies in the Napoleonic Wars 
8s. 6d. net. 
PERRY (W. J.) 
The Origin of Magic and 
Religion 
The Growth of Civilization 
Each 6s. net. 
The Children of the Sun 
£1 is. net. 
PETRIE (Sir Flinders) 
A History of Egypt 
In 6 Volumes. 
Vol. I. From the ist to the 
XVIth Dynasty. 
Eleventh Edition, Revised. 
125. net .  
Vol. II. TheXVIIth and XVIIIth 
Dynasties. 
Seventh Edition, Revised. 9s. net. 
Vol. III. XIXth to XXXth 
Dynasties 
Third Edition. 12s. net. 
Vol. IV. Egypt under the 
Ptolemaic Dynasty 
By Edwyn Bevan. 15s. net. 
Vol. V. Egypt under Roman Rule 
By J. G. Milne. 
Third Edition, Revised. 12s. net. 
Vol. VI. Egypt in the Middle 
Ages 
By Stanley Lane Poole. 
Fourth Edition. ios. net. 
PONSONBY (Arthur), M.P. 
English Diaries £j is. net. 
More English Diaries 
i3s. 6d. net. 
Scottish and Irish Diaries 
ios. 61i. net. 
STEVENSON (R. L.) 
The Letters 
Edited by Sir Sidney Colvin. 4 
Vols. Each 6s. net. 
SURTEES (R. S.) 
Handley Cross 
Mr. Sponge's Sporting Tour 
Ask Mamma 
Mr. Facey Romford's Hounds 
Plain or Ringlets? 
Hillingdon Hall 
Each illustrated, 7s. 6d. net. 
Jorrocks's Jaunts and Jollities 
Hawbuck Grange 
Each illustrated, 6s. net. 
TAYLOR (A. E.) 
Plato : The Man and His Work 
£1 is. net. 
Plato : Tim/eus and Critias 
6s. net. 
Elements of Metaphysics 
12s. 6d. net. 
TILDEN (William T.) 
The Art of Lawn Tennis 
Singles and Doubles 
Each illustrated, 61. net. 
The Common Sense of Lawn 
Tennis 
Match Play and the Spin of the 
Ball 
Illustrated. 5s. net. 
TILESTON (Mary W.) 
Daily Strength for Daily Needs 
Thirty-third Edition. 3s. 6d. net. 
India Paper. Leather, 6s. net. 
TRAPP (Oswald Graf) 
The Armoury of the Castle of 
Churburg 
Translated by J. G. Mann. 
Richly illustrated. 
Limited to 400 copies. 
£4 14s. 6d. net. 
UNDERHILL (Evelyn) 
Mysticism 15s. net. 
The Life of the Spirit and the 
Life of To-day 7s. 6d. net. 
Man and the Supernatural 
7s. 6d. net. 
Concerning the Inner Life 
2s. net. 
The House of the Soul 2s. net. 
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VARDON (Harry) 
How to Play Golf 
Illustrated. Nineteenth Edition. 
5s. net. 
WAND (J. W. C.) 
The Development op Sacra-
mentalism 6s. net. 
A History of the Modern Church 
8j. 6d. net. 
WILDE (Oscar) 
The Works 
In 17 Vols. Each 6s. 6d. net. 
I. Lord Arthur Savile's Crime 
and the Portrait of Mr. W. H. 
II. The Duchess of Padua 
III. Poems 
IV. Lady Windermere's Fan 
V. A Woman of No Importance 
VI. An Ideal Husband 
VII. Thb Importance of Beino 
Earnest 
VIII. A House of Pomegranates 
IX. Intentions 
X. De Profundis and Prison 
Letters 
XI. Essays 
XII. Salome, A Florentine 
Tragedy, and La Sainte 
Courtisank 
XIII. A Critic in Pall Mall 
XIV. Selected Prose of Oscar 
Wilde 
XV. Art and Decoration 
XVI. For Love of the King 
5 f .  n e t .  
XVII. Vera, or the Nihilists 
WILLIAMSON (G. C.) 
The Book of Famille Rose 
Richly Illustrated. £8 8j. net. 
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